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Over the past two decades, there has been a growing body of work in the 
field of complex governance, which assumes that socio-political systems 
are nested, self-organised, emergent and non-linear. However, there has 
been a void in the complex governance field for looking at alternative forms 
of governance to nation-states, political parties, representative democracy 
and policy, such as Special Economic Zones, seasteads and their 
synthesised form, SeaZones. This thesis addresses this gap in the 
scholarship by taking a complex systems perspective to examine the 
creation, regulatory framework, governance, stakeholders and demise of a 
particular case study, namely the Floating Island Project in French 
Polynesia. Using participatory observation and document analysis, the 
thesis explores the attempt to take what was the world’s first SeaZone from 
design to implementation. The thesis identifies various legal, institutional, 
political, social, cultural, economic, historic and environmental issues 
relating to the Floating Island that are encountered when trying to set up an 
alternative form of governance and a floating island. It argues that the 
Floating Island Project exhibited three key features of complex governance: 
first, it was structured as a nested system; Second, it concerned 
stakeholders in multiple levels, including local and global; Third, it was 
pervaded by waves of cross-temporal and cross-spatial events. In doing so, 
this study contributes to and extends the scholarship on complex 
governance in general and floating Special Economic Zones, SeaZones, 
specifically, by examining, from a complex systems perspective, the 
possibilities, limitations, and challenges of setting up special jurisdictions 
with emerging and alternative and forms of governance with legal, spatial 
and digital extraterritoriality.  
 
 1 











   
 
2 
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. Introduction 
This thesis explores the governance, creation and demise of a maritime special 
jurisdiction entitled Floating Island Project in French Polynesia. The Project 
emerged with the signature of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between 
the French Polynesian government and the non-profit Seasteading Institute, in 
January 2017. However, the private company Blue Frontiers led the Project. In 
setting up the Floating Island Project, Blue Frontiers aimed to create  an alternative 
form of governance called a SeaZone. The SeaZone would be a floating Special 
Economic Zone. Spatially and politically, it was inspired by autonomous human 
communities on the ocean – seasteads. Seasteads are a form of governance that 
does not exist yet, but that has recurred in the media as a sometimes controversial 
alternative form of governance to nation-states. Special Economic Zones are small 
areas within nation-states that have different regulations from the rest of the 
country. They have led to drastic economic and social transformations in many 
places around the world in the last forty years. The Floating Island would combine 
these two forms of governance, seasteads and special zones, in a SeaZone on a 
floating island and area in the shallow waters of a Tahitian lagoon, a part of the 
ocean enclosed by a coral reef.  
 
The Floating Island Project stated that it had two purposes: decentralising 
governance and mitigating the effects of sea-level rise. It attempted this by placing 
an artificial floating island on the sea with a special regulatory framework approved 
by French Polynesia (the SeaZone), and by governing it through a cryptographic 
token named Varyon.  
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Because of the legal and physical enclosing of the Floating Island and the floating 
Special Economic Zone, SeaZone, within French Polynesia’s institutions and 
ocean, it is important to clarify that the Project would be ‘nested’ within French 
Polynesia, despite the governance autonomy it sought. To move forward from 
design to implementation, it needed French Polynesia’s official backing through an 
Act of the Assembly. The Seasteading Institute and Blue Frontiers submitted 
feasibility studies to the government for the Assembly’s approval, as it is common 
when private actors propose projects to governments. Blue Frontiers 
complemented this strategy with an international marketing campaign to attract 
residents and funding. However, the Project did not go through.  
 
While the government did not move forward with the project, I was able to conduct 
research on the Floating Island using participatory observation and documentary 
analysis since the MOU signature to its demise. To conceptually understand my 
findings and to approach this case study, I used a complex governance framework. 
At the beginning, I chose a complex governance framework because I was familiar 
with the complex systems literature and I saw a void to explore forms of governance 
that were alternative to the nation-state, such as heterarchies, polycentric systems 
and anarchism. This case study seemed one of such cases. However, as I 
deepened into the case study, I slowly realized how much of traditional nation-state 
governance (political parties, elections, political representatives) permeated the 
project. As the research advanced, more and more it became clear how certain 
features of complex systems that complex governance authors discussed were 
very useful for explaining key events of the Floating Island, namely, its governance, 
creation and demise.  
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This thesis’ main contribution to knowledge is to identify various legal, institutional, 
political, social, cultural economic, historic and environmental issues relating to the 
Floating Island that are encountered when trying to set up an alternative form of 
governance and a floating island. Secondly, and specifically to the field of complex 
governance, this thesis brings together the complex governance field and particular 
features of complex systems (nestedness, waves, multiple levels of stakeholders) 
specifically in relation to SeaZones. Thirdly, this thesis contributed to the emerging 
field of special jurisdictions and SeaZones by investigating, from a complex 
systems perspective, their governance, stakeholders, and even problems that arise 
in their planning. This had not been done before.  
 
Overall, the thesis contributes to the interdisciplinary area of research on complex 
governance within the discipline of political science. That is to say, it takes a 
complex systems perspective to examine the regulatory framework, governance, 
stakeholders and events of a particular case study, namely the Floating Island 
Project in French Polynesia. In doing so, the thesis extends the scholarship on 
governing complex socio-political systems, in general, and on special jurisdictions, 
such as SeaZones, in particular. It extends the complex governance field by putting 
key notions of the field in relation to a form of governance that the field’s literature 
has never explored before. It extends the special jurisdictions, and, in particular, 
SeaZones field by providing complexity-related issues that are present in the 
formation of these types of projects. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first 
time that complexity and a complex governance angle have been used to study 
SeaZones. This is also the first doctoral thesis entirely focused on the Floating 
Island Project.  
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Now, to conceptually explain these issues from a complex governance framework, 
I used three features of complex governance systems described by the literature. 
These are: the existence of nested institutions, multiple stakeholders and waves of 
cross-temporal events.  With the Floating Island Project in French Polynesia as the 
case study, this thesis addresses the following research questions: In what ways 
might a complex systems perspective contribute to understanding the governance, 
creation and demise of the Floating Island Project in French Polynesia? More 
specifically, how might we re-read the governance, creation and ultimate demise 
of the Floating Island Project through the lenses of nestedness, multiple levels, 
waves? And from a complex systems perspective, what are the possibilities, 
limitations, and challenges of setting up special jurisdictions, with emerging and 
alternative forms of governance, such as SeaZones, nested within nation-states? 
This thesis argues that the Floating Island Project exhibited three key features of 
complex governance: first, it was structured as a nested system; Second, it 
concerned stakeholders in multiple levels, including local and global; Third, it was 
pervaded by waves of cross-temporal and cross-spatial events.  
 
In this introductory chapter, there are four additional sections. Section 1.2. states 
the research goal, questions and objectives. Section 1.3. sets up the conceptual 
problem that drives this thesis. Section 1.4. provides the scope and limitations of 
the research and Section 1.5. outlines the rest of the thesis.  
 
1.2. Research Goal, Objectives and Questions 
The goal of this thesis is to understand the governance, creation and demise of the 
Floating Island Project in French Polynesia using complexity theory. For the 
concept of governance, I use Jessop’s (1997:1) definition: "the complex art of 
steering multiple agencies, institutions, and systems that are both operationally 
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autonomous from one another and structurally coupled through various forms of 
reciprocal interdependence". Jessop’s definition of governance suitably fits the type 
of system studied in this thesis because it focuses on the interactions of agencies, 
systems and institutions, and takes into consideration the local as well as on the 
global. This perspective is very useful for the Floating Island and its 
extraterritoriality. The Project would be inside, but outside French Polynesia’s 
regulations, and inside but outside its land territory. Thus, the different notions 
within Jessop’s definition (agencies, institutions and interdependent systems) are 
useful for analysing governance of the Floating lsland Project for they allow looking 
the intertwined nature of the project’s multiple stakeholders, institutions/regulations 
and interconnected events. These three key concepts of Jessop (agencies, 
institutions and systems) unfold in the three complex governance concepts of the 
empirical chapters. Namely: the notion of agencies is reflected into stakeholders in 
chapter 6. Systems and reciprocal interdependence plays out as the waves of 
chapter 7. And Institutions appears under institutions and regulations in chapter 5. 
To get a better sense of how the ‘parts’ of Jessop’s definition unfolded in the 
Project, I explore these issues in the context to the Project’s specific form of 
governance, a SeaZone, and how it relates to its creation and end. Having said 
that, these were the thesis’ main research questions:   
 
• In what ways might a complex systems perspective contribute to 
understanding the governance, creation and demise of the Floating Island 
Project in French Polynesia? 
• More specifically, how might we re-read the governance, creation and 
ultimate demise of the Floating Island Project through the lenses of 
nestedness, multiple levels and waves?  
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• From a complex systems perspective, what are the possibilities, limitations, 
and challenges of setting up special jurisdictions, with emerging and 
alternative forms of governance, such as SeaZones, nested within nation-
states? 
Additional questions include: 
• In what ways might complex systems theory be used as lenses to 
understanding special jurisdictions, with legal, digital and spatial 
extraterritorialities nested in nation-states? 
• How do notions relating to complex governance unfold in the regulatory 
framework, governance, stakeholders and events of a particular case study, 
namely the Floating Island Project in French Polynesia? 
 
Answering these questions contributes to comprehending key issues that appear 
in the creation and demise of a form of governance, and Project, that has received 
significant media attention, despite not going through. Additionally, these questions 
improve existing knowledge about a type of governance that has not been explored 
yet in the literature of complex governance. Moreover, the complexity perspective 
on the Floating Island Project provides a new angle about the case study and 
SeaZones. In this way, this research helps expand the complex governance field 
by showing how features of complex governance are useful for understanding the 
governance, creation and demise of this attempt to set up an alternative form of 
governance.  
 
The overall objectives of the thesis are to:  
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• Show how features of complex governance, such as nestedness, multiple 
levels and waves, shaped the governance, creation and demise of the 
Floating Island Project.  
• Understand, through the use of complex governance, aspects of the 
Floating Island Project in French Polynesia, such as its regulatory 
framework, stakeholders and the Project’s demise.  
• Examine, from a complex systems perspective, the possibilities, limitations 
and challenges of creating special jurisdictions with emerging/alternative 
forms of governance, nested within nation-states.  
• Identify how complexity can help understand new, emerging, alternative 
forms of governance.   
• Explore features of complex governance in the creation of alternative and 
emerging forms of governance with particular extraterritorialities. 
 
 
1.3. Problem: Understanding the Floating Island Project Using 
Complex Systems Theory 
Because the goal of the thesis is to use complexity theory to understand the 
Floating Island’s attempt to go from design to implementation, that is, its 
governance creation and demise, the problem I address is how do features of 
complex governance, such as nestedness, multiple levels and waves can be used 
to study the governance, creation and demise of the Floating Island Project. This 
means that the thesis explores how a complex systems perspective might 
contribute to understanding special jurisdictions, such as SeaZones, with legal, 
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spatial and digital extraterritorialities nested within nation-states.1 Complex 
systems are, therefore, key to this thesis.  
 
For decades, scientists have recognised that there are certain features that make 
up some systems which nowadays are referred to as ‘complex’. The following are 
some of their characteristics. One common way to refer to complex systems is 
systems composed of many elements interacting in multiple ways. Complex 
systems are systems whose behaviours are self-organised (Camazine et al., 2003; 
Haken, 2006). Self-organisation refers to the capacity to generate order and 
patterns from within, based on local interactions, without external imposition. 
Holland (1995) and Nicolis and Nicolis (2012) explain that the structures of these 
systems emerge from these self-organised interactions. Given that the behaviours 
of complex systems are self-organised, and their structures are emergent, their 
dynamics are said to be adaptive (Holland, 1995). Interactions within complex 
systems can be both, bottom-up and top-down. Complex systems’ topologies vary 
and tend to be networked (Solé, 2009). Their future is also difficult to predict and, 
at times, unpredictable (Gershenson and Heylighen, 2005; Taleb, 2010). Yet, their 
actions are history-dependent (Walby, 2003). That is to say, their nature and 
evolution are time-coupled (Prigogine, 1977), and so is the relation of these 
systems with their environments.   
 
Because complex systems are open systems, they constantly exchange 
information, matter and energy with their environment. Prigogine (1980) explains 
that complex systems’ relations with their environments are open to a point where 
boundaries are often only functional. Indeed, as Urry (2004) conveys, because 
 
1 Extraterritoriality is a term used to describe places holding a special regulatory status - before 
or after diplomatic negotiations (Integrity Legal, 2009). 
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complex systems’ boundaries and their environments are blurred, understanding 
this type of systems needs to be done in reference to their environments (this is a 
reason why in this thesis I discuss the Polynesian historical and sociopolitical 
context when studying governance in the Floating Island). The Project existed 
within a particular setting of the environment where it sat. Additionally, as Simon 
(1962) states, the organisation and structures of these systems are nested. 
Nestedness means that complex systems are formed by systems within systems 
within systems. While there are multiple ways to explain what makes a nested 
system, one of the most common ways to distinguish them, and the one used in 
this thesis, is if “upper” levels constrain “lower” ones in a structure. All these 
features make complex systems nonlinear, a term that refers to a lack of a 
proportional relation between inputs and outputs.  
 
Scientists working with complex systems recognise complexity as an ontological 
feature of complex systems. “Complexity is complex”, Cilliers (1998:9) writes. From 
microscopic systems to macroscopic ones, the complexity literature has grown 
significantly since theories about complex systems began to be formalised around 
particular topics, problems and schools. Subjects in the literature of complex 
systems are diverse, and often include ant colonies (Gordon, 2010), fungi networks 
(Babikova et al., 2013), large infrastructure projects (Gerrits and Verweij, 2018), 
cities (Sassen, 2013; Batty, 2018), human societies (Bar-Yam, 1997), the internet 
(Barabasi, 2014; Solé, 2009), biological organisms (Solé and Goodwin, 2000), and 
other living systems and life-like systems (Bedau, 2007; Iordache, 2012b), in 
particular. Besides being understood as a feature of certain systems, an ontology, 
complexity is also seen as an established set of theories (Maldonado and Gómez-
Cruz, 2011). The formalisation of complexity led several authors to describe it as a 
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set of sciences which display every element of a present-day scientific revolution, 
from a Kuhnian perspective (Maldonado, 2009a).  
 
The formalisation of today’s outlawyers from normal science, these ‘anomalies’ 
began in the seventies when complex systems, features and fields became the 
focus of a small subset of scientists (Mitchel, 2011). Their studies included theories 
involving chaos, turbulence, non-equilibrium thermodynamics, fractals, 
catastrophe, networks and non-classical logics (Maldonado and Gomez-Cruz, 
2011). The study of these theories brought out the recognition of the limitations of 
classical science models to understand, govern and control systems which 
exhibited features of complex systems (Bar-Yam, 2009). One way to understand 
classical science is as science inspired by Newtonian physics.  
 
Several authors have argued that Newtonian physics inspired mainstream science 
before knowledge about complex systems theory developed as a field (see: 
Prigogine and Stengers, 1997, 1984; Heylighen et al., 2006; Mainzier, 2007). As 
such, science before complexity focused on properties such as predictability, 
linearity and causation. As Gershenson and Heylighen (2005:48) argue, classical 
science was interested in reductionism, determinism, dualism, correspondence 
and rationality. In the social sciences, especially in its early days, the inspiration of 
Newtonian-physics was often translated into a quest for stability, organisation, 
hierarchies, top-down control and centralised systems, among others. However, 
after complexity, scientists have realised the potential of theories about complex 
systems to explain systems, behaviours and phenomena that seem to behave in 
non-predictable ways, and which exhibit features of complexity (Geyer and Rihani, 
2010).   
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Many disciplines and domains have created new fields and subfields which involve 
the epistemological discoveries of complexity and properties of complex systems. 
For instance, biology and ecology have developed several theories around 
evolution, adaptation and self-organisation (Schneider and Kay, 1994; Emmeche, 
1997; Solé and Goodwin, 2000). Chemistry and physics have branched to an 
entirely new understanding of irreversible processes, time, chemical reactions and 
dynamic systems with works on non-equilibrium thermodynamics (Prigogine and 
Nicolis, 1977; Prigogine, 1978; Prigogine and Stengers, 1997). Engineering has 
begun extrapolating properties of biological systems to what is now called complex 
engineered systems (Braha et al., 2006). This has generated developments on self-
organised mechanical systems, such as swarm robotics (Hamann, 2018). 
Likewise, computer science has given birth to the field of artificial life (Langton, 
1995; Bedau, 2007; Gómez-Cruz, 2013). Even management science has started 
to approach organisations as living systems (Mitleton-Kelly 2003). However, the 
discipline of political science, where this thesis situates itself, is only beginning to 
grasp the knowledge of complex systems.  
 
Political science’s mainstream tends to approach the study of governance systems, 
which are clearly not simple nor predictable, in ways that resemble or rest upon 
principles of Newtonian physics and classical science, although this has slowly but 
surely been changing over the past couple of decades. Mainzer (2007:367) 
unpacks this idea in the following quote: “Political thinkers, lawyers and politicians 
have believed in a mechanistic world of linear causality…Thomas Hobbes tried to 
transfer the Galilean and Cartesian laws of movement from mechanics to 
anthropology to the state theory”. Similarly, Morçol (2001) explains that it is rather 
the quest for universal and fixed laws of governance what reflects such inspiration. 
This is why a large focus of the discipline are centralised organisations, hierarchical 
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structures, sequential processes, and top-down control, even though these are 
often accompanied by bottom-up, decentralised and horizontal structures and 
processes of some sort. Thinking about the limitations of the discipline’s focus on 
top-down approaches is important, insofar a large set of social, economic, 
technological and spatial systems that are governed by the systems studied in 
political science are complex and, therefore, difficult to predict, far-from-equilibrium 
and with a tendency to self-organise. Therefore, attempts to exercise top-down or 
external control in these complex, nonlinear systems do not produce their expected 
results (Holling and Meffe, 1996).  
 
It is not the goal of this thesis to argue that human social systems are complex. The 
authors I mention in the next section about complexity and social systems have 
done this before, much better than I could. But the reader, thus, must accept that 
human societies are indeed complex. Moreover, they must recognise that one of 
the most important lessons about complex systems, so far, is that when 
environments are often complex, forms of governance that exercise top-down 
control are not sound producers of order (Bar-Yam, 1997, 2000; Gerrits, 2012; 
Mainzer, 2007; Room, 2016; Schuster, 2004; Wachhaus, 2012, 2014). Something 
similar can be said about forms of governance which use centralised control, as 
argued by Bar-Yam (2009), Gershenson (2007) Rzevski (2011), and Schuster 
(2004). Centralised control also struggles to produce desired outcomes in the 
presence of complex systems. Yet, this thesis is not about a normative version of 
governance, but about how we approach governance that presents features of 
complex systems. Therefore, my aim in this thesis is to explain how complex 
governance was present in the case study, to demonstrate the explanatory power 
of complex systems theory in the context of social systems and some forms of 
governance in the making, namely SeaZones and other special jurisdictions.  
 




Changing how we understand governance systems that are complex is not a trivial 
problem, given that, to a large extent, the systems in which political science focuses 
on are tasked with regulating, organising and guiding the evolution of societies. 
Thus, they need to be understood in ways that do not attempt to set their complexity 
aside, but that conceptually engage with it. Approaching complex governance 
systems through their characteristics as complex systems is especially important 
for some forms of governance that are possible today, such as floating Special 
Economic Zones. This is because they explicitly define themselves as an 
alternative to traditional models. My aim here is to show how some forms of 
governance, in particular complex governance - i.e., governance presenting 
features of complex systems -,  can be understood through complex systems 
lenses. Doing this comes with an added ‘advantage’. Several of the most important 
challenges and transformations of this century, such as climate change and 
cyberinfrastructure, also present features of complex systems. A complexity theory 
framework, then, provides a way to approach socio-political systems in ways that 
science before complexity could not. Several complexity theory authors have 
approached this issue with a well-known tautology, although applied specifically to 
governing, not to understanding, complex systems: governing complexity requires 
complexity (Ashby, 1956; Ostrom, 1998).  
 
This tautology, the law of requisite variety, in my opinion, is one of the best 
principles applicable to complex systems. It states that only a system with at least 
as much complexity of another system can control it (Ashby, 1956). Bar-Yam 
(1997) explains this law specifically in the context of social systems, claiming that 
when collective complexity exceeds individual complexity, hierarchical control is no 
longer effective. On the contrary, having a ‘requisite variety’ offers a larger set of 
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solutions (Jessop, 2003). Authors such as Cilliers (2001) have used this principle 
of complex systems to explain that understanding complexity requires complexity 
too.  
 
Based on the law of requisite variety, we can assess that more complex forms of 
governance, such as networks involving top-down and bottom-up processes, 
centralised, decentralised and distributed systems, among others, would more 
accurately describe and even govern the complexity of human societies, and some 
contemporary forms of governance than simple models involving top-down control. 
While I will not engage directly with the law of requisite variety in this direction, I 
want to use it as a starting point to stress how requisite variety can be used 
conceptually, even though I only mention it one more time in the thesis. Complex 
systems, such as human societies and some systems which govern them, can be 
understood via features and approaches that better capture their complex nature. 
Consequentially, creating a form of governance of such form requires more 
complex approaches too.  
 
The emerging field of complex governance, that is, complexity theory extrapolated 
and adapted into governance, does two things in relation to the issue above. First, 
it attempts to understand certain governance systems through particular features 
of complex systems which some forms of governance seem to embody. Second, 
the field additionally searches for forms of governance that work in less centralised 
and top-down ways to traditional forms of governance. In this thesis, I mainly focus 
on the first of these two ideas, even though I find the second one more striking: 
using features of complex systems to understand governance in a project which 
sought to establish a form of governance that combined an alternative and an 
emerging form of governance.  
 




Indeed, the Floating Island attempted to bring together an emerging and an 
alternative form of governance, Special Economic Zones and seasteads, 
respectively. The general idea was to create a floating Special Economic Zone. 
Special Economic Zones comprise areas within nations that have different policies 
from the rest of the country. And seasteads is the name given to politically 
autonomous human settlements in international waters where governance is 
privately provided. No seastead exist yet, but there are approximately 5.400 
Special Zones around the world (UNCTAD, 2019:137). This is why I refer to 
seasteads as “alternative” forms of governance and Zones as “emerging”. 
However, because SeaZones do not currently exist, I categorise the Floating Island 
Project as an attempt to set up an ‘alternative’ form of governance, instead of an 
‘emerging’. By alternative I mean a different, new option to nation-states. In this 
thesis, to make a distinction between states and emerging systems such as special 
jurisdictions, including SeaZones, I refer to states, democratic elections and 
political parties under the broad, and for some, problematic, term ‘traditional forms 
of governance’. I would rather use the term “legacy systems”, but that is another 
story.2  
 
In a nutshell, in this thesis, I show how features of complex governance were 
present in the Floating Island, including the SeaZone and its institutional and 
regulatory structure, its international marketing campaign and the events which 
contributed to the Project fading throughout 2018. I use the term 'fading' and not 
 
2 It is important to note that classifying SeaZones as alternative forms of governance has, 
however, limitations. As Chapter Five shows, SeaZones, being Special Economic Zones, are, 
in some ways, an extension to nation-states. However, because they are rooted in the idea of 
replacing states with private governance, I have allowed myself to use this term, even though 
there are limitations and blurred boundaries to how much a SeaZone is an alternative or an 
extension of states. While my goal here is not to solve this question, I do engage with the 
implication’s of SeaZone’s nested nature in the next chapters, particularly in Chapter Five and 
in the discussion and reflections of Chapter Eight.   
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‘sunk’ or 'failing' or something which indicates a specific end because it is not clear 
when did the Project ceased existing. Instead, there were several events and 
moments where the Project became less real and possible, but there was not a 
specific end to it. However, my aim is not to explain why the Floating Island 
declined. This does not mean that I do not provide causal explanations. I do provide 
them, but in the sense of Byrne and Uprichard: “how a particular complex system 
came to be the type of thing it is” (Byrne and Uprichard, 2012:112), instead of 
something different. Specifically, I take Byrne and Uprichard’s approach to 
trajectories as effects and retroductive analysis, whereby a system is explained by 
tracing steps back into its past. This means that for some of the empirical 
observations of this thesis, instead of drawing casual links, I look back at what 
happened before the Project ‘faded away’.  
 
That said, my thesis argument is that the Floating Island exhibited three key 
features of complex governance: first, it was structured as a nested system; 
Second, it concerned stakeholders in multiple levels, including local and global; 
And third, it was pervaded by waves of cross-temporal and cross-spatial events. 
By using  these three complex governance features (nestedness, multiple levels of 
stakeholders and waves) I show how features of complex governance lead to a 
better understanding of the governance, creation and demise of the Floating Island 
Project. It additionally helps to examine, from a complex systems perspective, the 
possibilities, limitations and challenges of creating special jurisdictions with 
emerging/alternative forms of governance, nested within nation-states. Further, the 
thesis discusses the implications of dealing with complex systems features when 
trying to create special jurisdictions with alternative and emerging forms of 
governance with extraterritorialities, such as being placed on the ocean. Here, I 
demonstrate how using complex systems theory as lenses, and the complex 
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governance field, can be good resources to explain the Floating Island Project, a 
case which exhibited features of complexity 
 
The methodology used to dive into the research took elements from ethnographic 
research with participatory observation and documentary analysis. The empirical 
chapters will show how answering these questions with these methods contribute 
to expanding the field of complex governance by using the field’s theories in novel 
approaches, in relation to a project involving a special jurisdiction that has not been 
sufficiently explored. However, the research also contributes to the emerging field 
of special jurisdictions with research findings which could become best practices 
for the maritime and floating nascent zones industry. As I present in the discussion 
chapter (Eight), my long-term goal is that these findings can help future early stage 
maritime and floating zone projects better strategise by designing projects that 
directly benefit all the stakeholders involved. Likewise, I hope they too help local 
communities detect early whether a project aligns with their interests.   
 
For understanding this motivation, I should explain that the research additionally 
contributes to and rests upon the knowledge of two areas which are becoming 
increasingly important at the beginning of the century: special jurisdictions and 
floating architecture, especially as a technology to adapt to rising seas. Special 
jurisdictions have become a core economic engine for the 21st century. Authors 
such as Eastearling (2014), while being critical of Zones, uses examples of cases 
such as Shenzhen, Singapore, Hong Kong and Dubai to claim that Special Zones 
will probably dominate the economic future. The World Bank (FIAS, 2008) and 
Frazier and McKinney (2019) explain that Zones have managed to become what 
they are today because they have specific policy conditions that enable value-
creating activities, such as entrepreneurship. Their small size also enables them to 
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innovate and even experiment with policy at small scales. However, their economic 
success is also explained by how they manage to be outside a state’s regulation 
while being in its territory. This property of exception is called extraterritoriality (see: 
Laungaramsri, 2006; Eastearling, 2016). Extraterritoriality has led many special 
jurisdictions to surpass the GDP of large nation-states. Seven out of the ten top 
GDP per capita jurisdictions are either Special Economic Zones or microstates 
nested within larger nation states (World Bank, 2018; IMF, 2019; CIA 2017). 
Khanna (2016) recalls that Zones export trillions of dollars of goods, annually.3 
Floating, amphibious or water-based architecture is another growing area that is 
equally important for the research. 
 
Floating architecture is starting to become an architecture and engineering ‘trend’. 
Today, floating buildings and technologies are popularizing a solution to adapt to 
sea-level rise (De Graaf, 2009, 2012). This topic is even being discussed and 
promoted even at the United Nations (2019). Today, there are floating: farms 
(Moustafa, 2018), agriculture (Mok et al., 2014), aquaculture (Cauvin, 2014), solar 
panels (see: Ciel et Terre, 2011) wind turbines (Energy.gov, 2015), wave energy 
generation (Floating Power Plant, 2019), airplane runways (Lamas-Pardo et al., 
2015), container terminals Reham (2015), underwater data centres (Swanson, 
2011), and, as Wang  and Tay (2011) recall, floating: hotels, bridges, performance 
stages, oil rigs, fuel storage facilities, cruise terminals, ecological villas and towns. 
All the technologies needed to build an offshore floating neighbourhood, like the 
Floating Island, already exist. Increased maritime economic activities have helped 
 
3 The top ten places with higher GDP per capita according to the IMF are Qatar, Macau, 
Luxembourg, Singapore, Brunei, Ireland, Norway, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Switzerland, 
Hong Kong, United States. According to the World Bank, the countries are Qatar, Macau, 
Luxembourg, Singapore, Brunei, Ireland, United Arab Emirates,  Kuwait, Switzerland, San 
Marino, Hong Kong, Norway. And according to the CIA, the top ten are Qatar, Monaco, Macau, 
Luxembourg, Falkland Islands, Singapore, Bermuda, Isle of Man, Brunei,  Ireland, Norway, 
Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates. 
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popularise floating architecture (Wang and Wang, 2014). Many of these are 
sustainable technologies art of what is known as the ‘blue economy’ (Pauli, 2019; 
Quirk, 2017) or the ‘green economy in the blue world’ (UNEP et al., 2012). The blue 
economy is a twenty-four trillion-dollar market that comprises activities and 
businesses related to the ocean (Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2015:5).  
 
Besides structures on the ocean, in total, the Floating Island combined three 
extraterritorial innovations: it had floating architecture - thus it had a spatial 
extraterritoriality component of building on the ocean; It sought to have legal 
innovations with a special regulatory framework - thus it had legal extraterritoriality; 
Also, it would have had a digital extraterritorial system by governing the SeaZone 
with a cryptographic token. In discussing these extraterritorial innovations, I will 
show how a project with a special regulatory framework, where land is created from 
scratch and is placed over an ocean, and sought to be digitally governed, can 
benefit from the explanatory power of complex system theory, in general, and 
complex governance, in particular. However, doing this in the context of complex 
systems is not easy.  
 
Stepney and Walsh (2018:319) list properties of complex systems which make 
them difficult to understand. These include: feedback, emergence, relations and 
interactions, openness, instability, multiple timescales and tipping points. While I 
am aware of these and other limitations to understanding complex systems, to fairly 
describe them in the thesis’ written accounts, the complex governance features I 
have chosen to study here (nestedness, multiple levels of stakeholders and waves 
of cross-temporal events), carry within them other features of complex systems. As 
the empirical chapters show, these three concepts entail multiple systems, levels, 
spaces and times. To mention one example, the empirical observations about 
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waves bring together several places (Floating Island, Atimaono lagoon, 
municipality Teva I Uta, French Polynesia) and several times (Polynesia’s 
colonisation two centuries ago, Polynesia’s colonial present situation as an 
“overseas collectivity”  and online and offline protests in 2018). In this way, the case 
study aims at transcending, to the extent to which it is possible, the limitations of 
only exploring either individual or holistic features of a system, or a single point in 
time. As such, this thesis seeks to they represent a compelling example of the type 
of conceptual contributions that complex systems theory can bring to the study of 
alternative forms of governance, such as SeaZones, and cases like the Floating 
Island.  
 
1.4. Scope and Limitations 
There are several limitations to this research and its findings. Some of them are 
due to a non-disclosure agreement. Signing this document restricted the evidence 
I could present as data. It forced me to rely on publicly accessible information. For 
several parts of the research, notably for Chapters Five and Six discussing the legal 
feasibility study and local and global stakeholders, this agreement meant that I 
could not use evidence which would have strengthened my claims and argument. 
More on this in the Methodology Chapter. This agreement also led me to share 
only part of a more comprehensive story. A complementing approach could have 
examined internal factors within the Company that might have contributed to the 
Project’s fading. Some of this thesis’s findings might also be constrained by my 
subjective impression of the Project based on the participant-observation. Another 
limitation of this investigation is that the Floating Island Project was never built. This 
makes it impossible to contrast what the Project’s documents suggest with what 
the Project implemented once it was developed. This is a limitation proper to 
document analysis which I have recognised in the methodology Chapter.  
 




Another limitation is that it is not possible to directly extrapolate some issues that 
appear relevant here to projects in other locations. Past events and visions of the 
future are different everywhere. Some places might be more open to accepting a 
project with an international demographic or an enclave. Others might not use 
Facebook in the way it was used here, where it was even the government’s 
primary communication tool. Likewise, the role of local stakeholders might be less 
decisive in other places. And some governments, depending, for instance, on their 
degree of authoritarianism, can operate with less community support regarding 
special regulations, floating, maritime and Zone projects. Nevertheless, in the 
conclusions I do bring out the research findings and how can ithey be read for alike 
special jurisdictions.  
 
Note that, although this thesis’s case study has an origin in free-market political 
economies which seek to replace, reduce and sometimes eliminate the role of the 
state in the provision of governance, this thesis is not a critique nor he opposite of 
these ideas. Instead, my aim is to examine how complex governance unfolds in the 
Floating Island Project.  
 
1.5. Outline of the Thesis 
I divide the thesis into three parts. Part I situates the thesis. Part II comprises the 
empirical chapters. Part III contains the discussion, reflections and conclusions. 
This thesis proceeds as follows. The next chapter, Chapter Two, describes 
complexity theory and key features of complex systems that are relevant for this 
thesis. More specifically, it engages with a subfield within complex systems theory 
that deals with social systems. After addressing complexity, the chapter 
synthesises the complex governance field. The chapter highlights a gap in the 
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scholarly field of complex governance for studying and special jurisdictions, such 
as the one presented in this thesis. The chapter additionally introduces the 
literature review on SeaZones because the case study of this thesis requires its 
own historical context and conceptual framework. Chapter Three begins by 
introducing the case study entitled the Floating Island Project in French Polynesia. 
It describes its origin, outlines the main actors, discusses its vision, and goes over 
the events which led to its ‘fading’. The fourth chapter explains the approach to the 
research process. It discusses the methodological approach that drove the 
research and the methods employed for data collection. The methods were 
participatory observation - online and offline - and documentary analysis. 
Furthermore, the chapter outlines the research design, reflects on the advantages 
and disadvantages of the methods and discusses ethical aspects of conducting the 
study and my role. Transversal to this chapter is a reflection of my own role as a 
participant-observant. These are followed by the empirical chapters.  
 
Chapter Five discusses the institutional and regulatory framework of the Floating 
Island Project and its SeaZone. It begins by explaining a feature of complex 
systems, nestedness. The chapter shows how the concept of nestedness 
describes how the Project’s framework was and would be structured. It explicates 
two origins of the Project’s nestedness, French Polynesia’s colonial history and a 
decision by The Seasteading Institute to create maritime Special Economic Zones 
in the territorial waters of a host nation instead of seasteads in international waters. 
The chapter also gives examples of domestic and supranational institutions related 
to French Polynesia’s own history, as a nested system, which would have framed 
the Project. The chapter uses a concept present in the complexity governance 
literature, ‘tangled’, to explain the ambiguous and overlapping jurisdictions of the 
multiple institutions of the Floating Island Project’s nested framework. The chapter 
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stresses that creating the Floating Island Project’s SeaZone, with the regulatory 
exemptions its sought, would have been a process of ‘untangling’ institutional 
regulations. Next, the chapter presents additional international government 
stakeholders which the Project brought in into its nested structure with the use of a 
cryptographic token to govern itself. It chapter closes with a critique of approaches 
that set up special jurisdictions that focus too much on formal stakeholders.  
 
Chapter Six discusses non-government stakeholders in the Project, local and 
global. Local stakeholders were Polynesians who lived or worked near the potential 
location of the Floating Island. Global stakeholders were the participants of the 
Project who bought its tokens or belonged to demographics which the marketing 
materials targeted. The chapter argues that the Project concerned multiple levels 
of stakeholders, including local and global. However, it maintains that the Project 
targeted global, to the detriment of locals. To explain why the Project concerned 
local stakeholders, I use Elinor Ostrom’s work on complex governance of 
socioecological systems, in particular how her work highlightes the relevance of 
current appropriators of the commons for their governance. To explain why it 
concerned, and targeted, global stakeholders, I use data from the Project’s 
cryptographic token, Varyon and its marketing. The chapter additionally describes 
missed opportunities for involving locals in the Project’s governance 
documentation.  
 
Chapter Seven argues that networked cross-temporal and cross-spatial events 
pervaded the Floating Island Project. To explain these events, I use Sylvia Walby’s 
use of the term ‘waves’ in relation to complex waves in the context of global social 
movements, such as feminism and globalisation, over time. This chapter looks at 
three waves and their interactions as they relate to the Floating Island: the first 
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wave concerns the wave of French colonisation of Polynesia; The second wave 
involves a streak of Facebook posts, which went viral in Tahiti in the first quarter of 
2018; The third wave consists of a series of protests at the Project’s most likely 
lagoon, at the Assembly and the streets, organised by local fishermen and women 
and the opposition party. The goal of this chapter is to show how the momentum 
from the interaction of these three waves contributed to the ‘fading’–some may say, 
the demise– of the Floating Island. The chapter presents ‘accompanying ripples’ 
which also contributed to the fading. Some of these ripples are distrust towards the 
government, the Project’s local representative and foreign companies doing 
businesses in French Polynesia. Throughout the chapter, I point out important 
properties of waves, such as their networked and cross-temporal nature. I do this, 
for instance, when analysing the waves’ intertwining in the Project, even though the 
time-span between the start of the wave of Polynesia’s colonisation and the two 
subsequent waves were approximately two hundred years apart. This is followed 
by the concluding chapters.  
 
Chapter Eight discusses the thesis as a whole. It discusses the implications of 
complex governance in projects ideologically-driven and the possibilities, 
limitations and challenges of setting up alternative forms of governance. It then 
presents five best practices derived from the research useful when creating these 
types of projects. And it concludes with some thoughts on the project’s 
extraterritoriality and how it relates to autonomy. Last, Chapter Nine synthesises 
the thesis. It presents the contributions and concludes. 
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This thesis contributes to this interdisciplinary area of research that within the 
disciplines of political science and sociology deals with complex systems. More 
specifically, the chapter speaks to the field of complex governance, seeking to 
contribute to and to extend the scholarship on governance of complex socio-
political systems in general and the Floating Island Project in particular, including 
its form of governance, a SeaZone. This chapter has two main components. The 
first part is about complexity and the second one is about SeaZones. The first four 
sections about complex systems introduce the conceptual and analytical 
framework used throughout the thesis. Their goal is to provide the theoretical 
background of the research on complex systems theory and to present a brief 
account of the use of complexity in the social sciences. This helps to understand 
the complex governance field, which studies governance through the lenses of 
complexity science.  
 
The next section begins with a description of complexity. It explains the features of 
complex systems relevant to this thesis, such as nestedness, self-organisation, 
multiple levels, and waves. It then outlines the benefits of using complexity as a 
theoretical framework for studying governance and for the case study. The chapter 
then briefly explains the concept of complex governance and the complex 
governance field. However, because the form of governance that the Floating 
Island Project tried to implement is new, following this, the chapter also introduces 
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the conceptual origin of SeaZones. The purpose of doing this is so the reader 
becomes familiar with the political imaginaries where the Floating Island Project 
originated. This situates the Project and enables us to understand the empirical 
chapters better.  
 
2.2. Complexity 
There is no set definition of complexity (Cillers 1998), and my aim here is not to 
present a comprehensive account of it. Sophisticated attempts at this have already 
been made by authors such a Gerrits (2012), Mitchel (2011), Rescher (1998) and 
Wolfram (2002), and I will selectively draw on these or other as needed. To 
introduce the way I have used complexity in this thesis, in what follows, I aim to 
briefly explain complexity and highlight some of its key concepts that are especially 
relevant to the case study. I do this before going on to say more about the complex 
governance scholarship that frames the thesis overall.  
 
The origins of complexity and the theory-building around features of complex 
systems, including social systems, are in physics (Prigogine & Stengers, 1983, 
Turing, 1990), but also in biology and chemistry (Prigogine, 1961; Gell-Man, 1995; 
Nicolis, G & Prigogine, 1977, Nicolis & Nicolis, 2012). There have been many 
attempts to synthesise the key features of complex systems, one of them is by 
Cilliers. Cilliers (1998:3) provides a useful list on which I base the following 
description of complex systems. A complex system generally has numerous 
elements interacting nonlinearly. The interactions among these elements occur 
locally, among immediate neighbours. But this proximity can be physical and or 
informational. This means that two systems can be far from each other, but have 
a direct link (in place and time). Therefore, in complex systems, the notion of local 
does not necessarily mean physical proximity. Additionally, the interactions of 
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elements in a complex system are diverse, rich in diversity and are also 
interdependent. Simply put, these interactions are nonlinear. This means that there 
is not a proportional correspondence between inputs and outputs. These systems 
can also present chaotic behaviours. Small events can have large, unpredictable, 
unexpected results in the future. This occurs because complex systems have 
positive and negative feedback loops, which can stimulate or inhibit interactions, 
close or far into the future.  
 
Moreover, complex systems are open, far-from-equilibrium systems, which 
exchange information, energy and matter with their environment. This makes the 
border between complex systems and their environment hard to define. Complex 
systems are also history-dependent. That is, they evolve through time, and their 
past is co-responsible for the present. However, it does not determine it.  
 
No element or part of a complex system can grasp nor represent its whole 
informational picture. They have too many “moving parts” and, as Holland (1995) 
explains, these systems also adapt (Holland, 1995). Another way to describe 
complex systems is as systems that self-organise and generate emergent 
behaviours (see Holland, 2000). For instance, ecosystems emerge from local level 
interactions (Levin, 1998). Thus, they are characterised by properties such as 
uncertainty, unpredictability, non-determinism, non-linearity, bifurcations, self-
organisation, adaptation and evolution. Each of these features can be a property, 
process, phenomena, characteristic or behaviour. The three particular features of 
complex systems that are relevant for this research are nestedness, multiple levels 
and waves. Here I only briefly explain them, because I engage more in-depth with 
how each unfolded in the case study in the empirical chapters. I begin with 
nestedness.  
 




Nestedness (Simon, 1962), as explained in the introduction chapter, is a structural 
property of complex systems, consisting of systems within systems. We find 
examples of nestedness in the organisation of biological organisms (Oltvai and 
Barabási, 2002), human societies (Simon, 1962; Cilliers, 1998), the internet and 
the worldwide web (Barabasi and Bonabeau, 2003). Cells, tissues, organs, 
organisms and the biosphere are organised hierarchically, one ‘inside the other’. 
However, one key thing to note about nested complex systems is that, despite this 
hierarchical organisation, systems at different levels can exchange information with 
any other. For instance, in biological organisms, global environmental factors affect 
cells, but cells could potentially affect entire organism populations. This 
characteristic of complex systems, nestedness, is vital in Chapter Five, where I use 
it to discuss the structure of the Floating Island Project’s institutional and regulatory 
framework. Nestedness relates to, but differs from, having multiple levels. Having 
multiple levels is the second key feature of complex systems which was reflected 
in the Project’s complex governance.  
 
Organising in multiple scales or levels is also a fundamental feature of some 
complex systems. Wilensky and Resnick (1999) explain that the organisation of 
complex systems in levels is fundamental for how global behaviours and patterns 
emerge in complex systems from local interactions. Wilensky and Resnick mention 
several examples to explain the multi-level structure of complex systems. One is 
the difference between cars and traffic jams. Another example they provide is the 
difference between people and crowds in stadiums. Similarly, Li and Kwauk 
(2003:522) illustrate multiple levels with the elements of the periodic table and how 
they generate larger levels of physical and chemical ordered structures. Likewise, 
Urry (2004:236) introduces the example of individual human health, entire health 
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populations, and the health care systems they are part of. It is important to 
understand that in levels of a complex system, information is processed 
interactively among multiple agents at multiple scales (Eberbach et al., 2004; 
Goldin et al., 2006; Dodig-Crnkovic, 2011; Schneider, 2012; Burgin & Dodig-
Crnkovic, 2013).  
 
The multilevel feature in this thesis relates to the idea that there are local and global 
systems and interactions. Yet, as I wrote above, this is different from nestedness. 
A key distinction between a system being nested and one having multiple levels is 
that, in multiple levels systems, ‘higher’ levels do not necessarily constrain ‘lower’ 
ones. In other words, nested systems are made of multiple levels containing each 
other, whereas multiple levels no. For example, Chapter Six discusses local and 
global stakeholders. The category global stakeholders of the Floating Island refers 
to the international supporters of the Project. In contrast, local stakeholders refers 
to the geographical neighbours of the Project in the island of Tahiti. From a 
nestedness perspective, local stakeholders, being part of the “lower level”, would 
be nested within the larger system of global stakeholders, the “upper level”. 
Nevertheless, in this case, local and global are separated because local 
stakeholders, Polynesians, were not part of the Project’s global stakeholders. 
However, while these global stakeholders do not emerge from nor contain the local 
ones, what is behind this stakeholders distinction is nestedness and the idea that 
in each geographical location, there are local stakeholders, and that the 
combination of local stakeholders from many locations creates the category of 
global stakeholders. The relation of these two concepts enables seeing how the 
empirical Chapters Five and Six, five focused on nestedness and six on multiple 
levels, relate. A complimentary way to further understand this feature is through 
 
   
 
31 
Vincent Ostrom (1972, 1999) and Elinor Ostrom’s (2010) work on polycentric 
systems.  
 
For E. Ostrom  (2009b:552), polycentrism, in the context of governance 
specifically, means that there are “Multiple governing authorities at different scales 
rather than a monocentric unit”. These levels are interdependent. In other words, 
polycentric governance refers to governance “in which political authority is 
dispersed amongst a range of bodies that operate in overlapping jurisdictions 
which are not in a hierarchical relationship to one another” (Skelcher, 2005:89). 
Ostrom mentions different scales in polycentric systems, such families, firms, local 
governments, networks of local governments, states or provinces, regions, national 
governments and international regimes. Ostrom’s idea is similar to Urry’s (2004) 
thesis regarding the multiple institutions that form part of the global world. Because 
of the multiplicity of levels and stakeholders involved, works on this type of 
polycentrism often appear in relation to the governance of natural resources 
(Kuzdas et al., 2015; Carlisle and Gruby, 2017; Berardo and Lubell, 2019) and 
complex sustainability issues (Monkelbaan, 2019). However, in this thesis I chose 
to focus on Ostrom's work on the commons, and not on her theories on 
polycentrism, because her work on the commons more extensively discusses the 
importance of local stakeholders in the governance of complex socioecological 
systems, a key idea I want to emphasise when discussing the Project’s multiple 
stakeholders.  
 
Other key features of complex systems relevant for this thesis are critical turning 
points, chaos and fitness landscapes. I “deal” with them through the concept of 
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waves because of the social nature of the systems I study.4 The concept of waves, 
as Walby (2009:100) uses it, consists of social processes that that can build up in 
multiple points of time. In Walby’s words:   
 
A wave is a distinct set of social processes with a particular kind of 
temporal and spatial characteristic that can suddenly transfer social 
practices from one location to another; it can build suddenly, interact 
with a social system, and either produce change or decay or hybridize. 
It is especially important to understanding the implications of emergent 
civil societal projects on established social formations.  
(Walby, 2009:100) 
 
Walby (2009:83) writes that tipping points relate to waves because some waves 
may occur because the system has reached a tipping point:  
 
This sociological literature of revolutions and political turning points 
encompasses a theorisation not only of ‘normal’ development, but also 
of the build-up of various pressures into the critical political juncture, 
and of the explanation as to which pathway from a series of possibilities 
is taken. This typically involves explanations at different levels of 
abstraction, including not only individuals but also institutions, 
structures, process, and the level of the system as a whole.  
 
 
4 Walby (2009; 3) recalls that there are two main ways to understand transformations in 
complexity. One is through the concept of co-evolution of complex adaptive systems, linked 
to the Santa Fe school. The second one is through critical turning points, associated with 
Prigogine. Critical turning points take place suddenly, bifurcating the path of the system in 
question. For Walby, both notions are complementary. Walby (2003; 12) additionally notes 
that in complex systems small changes can have larger sudden effects in the future. This 
notion is called chaos. This chaotic nature of complex systems is something that the empirical 
chapters show in the study of waves. 
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Walby (2009:83) also discusses how the notion of waves carry behind it critical 
points and paths:  
 
A further conceptual addition is proposed to the concept of a critical 
turning point: ‘catalysts and dampeners’. Two social systems each on 
trajectories of transformation may change at different rates. There may 
be factors that speed or ‘catalyse’ the rate of change while others slow 
or ‘dampen’ the rate. They may not independently change the nature 
of the system, other than its rate of change. Certain forms of polity 
speed or catalyse economic development, while others slow or 
dampen economic development. The concepts of catalysts and 
dampeners draw on the conception of positive feedback within a 
system as part of this. 
 
I use the concept of waves for it explains how past and present sociopolitical events 
came together in the Floating Island Project’s decline. This is my way to show the 
property and the way it was present as feature of complex governance.. Indeed, 
when waves are taken to a governance context, and in particular in this case study, 
they shape in the form of events in the past and present that affected the Project. 
Similarly, when nestedness and multilevel appear in the context of governance, 
they reflect forms of governance that involve nested institutions and multiple levels 
of stakeholders. 
 
Another relevant complex system feature for the case study, although one which I 
do not explore in-depth, is self-organisation. Self-organisation is one of the most 
common means in which order emerges in complex systems (see: Turing, 1990; 
Kauffman, 1996, 2000; Camazine et al., 2002). It consists of order which emerges 
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in a bottom-up way with no external intervention or centralised control (Kauffman, 
1993). A system is self-organising if “it acquires a spatial, temporal or functional 
structure, without specific interference from the outside” (Haken, 2006). According 
to Byrne & Callaghan (2013), self-organisation is an occurrence at a higher level, 
in a non-summative way, of interactions in complex systems. This is why self-
organisation usually appears with the concept of emergence (Crutchfield, 
1994:516). The concept of self-organisation is used frequently to examine social 
phenomena (Fuchs, 2006; Imada, 2008). In this thesis, it explains the process 
behind the waves which pervaded the case study. However, I chose not to make 
this feature central to the thesis because self-organization has been explored in 
many types of complex systems. Moreover, Walby’s (Walby, 2003, 2009) concept 
of waves accurately embodies the shaping of the event surrounding the Project’s 
fading.    
 
As several of the descriptions of the aforementioned features have suggested, 
sometimes it is hard to isolate features of complex systems. For instance, 
emergence, another feature of complex systems, is the process of newly created 
structures and properties from self-organised interactions. Emergence relates to 
self-organisation, but also goes hand in hand with complex systems capacity to 
adapt (Holland, 1995). Emergence, as well as self-organisation, entail 
decentralised processes and networks of multiple levels (Mucha et al., 2010; 
Gómez et al., 2013; Battison et al., 2017). Because of the conceptual richness of 
these and other characteristics of complex systems to explain social phenomena, 
the social sciences have embraced the study of complex systems. In the next 
section, I briefly outline key authors and their ideas.  
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2.3. Complexity in Social Science 
There is a growing body of work within the social sciences and, in particular, 
political science, which begins from the recognition that human social systems are 
complex (Mitleton-Kelly, 2003a, 2003b; Sawyer, 2005; Sanderson, 2009; Byrne & 
Uprichard, 2012; Teisman & Gerrits, 2014; Byrne, 1998; Byrne and Callaghan, 
2013; Castellani and Hafferty, 2009; Urry, 2013; Room, 2016; Gerrits, 2012; Batty, 
2013; Walby, 2003, 2004, 2009; Haynes, 2008, 2015; Geyer and Rihani, 2012; 
Geyer and Carney, 2015; Allen, 1998; Lansing, 2015; Lansing and Cox, 2019; 
Mittleton-Kelly, 2003a, 2003b; Ostrom, 1995, 1990, Krugman, 1996; Ormerod, 
2005, 2012).  Each useful in their own way, together these authors have extended 
the application of complexity into social science fields, including political science. 
In different ways, they provide overviews of social complexity, mention 
applications, implications, methodologies and examples.  
 
To mention only a few of these contributions, Castellani and Hafferty (2009) 
present an overview of the intersection of sociology and complexity by looking at 
the parallel history and development of these fields, both of which took key notions 
from systems thinking and cybernetics. From their combination, the authors 
develop an area of research called Sociology and Complex Systems – SACS. Urry 
(2004) also presents, in a very clear way, key characteristics of complex systems, 
such as non-linearity, emergence, having phase spaces and attractors, which 
makes complex systems different from systems that are not complex. Omerod 
(2012) uses the concept of networks to explain how thinking about individual 
motivations and the connections among  individuals and the institutions they are 
part of can lead to better policy-making. And Mitleton-Kelly (2003b) uses principles 
of complex systems to complex systems to develop new ways to understand 
organisations. This thesis builds on and extends these authors’ contributions, 
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specifically in the area of complex governance as it relates to the Floating Island 
Project.  
 
Despite the trajectory and contributions of complexity in the social sciences, 
conceptual approaches to complex systems are sometimes overlooked outside of 
the social sciences when they lack a mathematic or computational apparatus. 
However, Byrne & Callaghan (2013) point out that the scientific nature of social 
complexity should be taken for granted, regardless of whether social complexity 
uses mathematical or computational models or if it only uses a qualitative 
approach. Nevertheless, often the social sciences approach complex systems with 
tools such as modelling and simulation (North & Macal, 2007), social network 
analysis (Ter Wal & Boschma, 2009) and metaheuristics (Talbi, 2009). While it 
remains the case that a great part of complexity theory, indeed, focuses on 
computational and mathematical tools (see Bonabeau and Theralauz, 1995, North 
& Macal, 2007), the extensive body of literature dealing with social complexity 
recognises some the limitations of entirely computational approaches to 
comprehend the social world, although their contributions are, indeed, accepted.  
 
While recognising the possibilities of modelling and simulation, this thesis uses a 
conceptual approach to complexity for examining the Floating Island Project. By 
approaching complexity conceptually, I am following the work of other complexity 
scholars (e.g. Ostrom, 1990; Uprichard and Byrne 2006; Byrne 1998; Walby, 2009; 
Gerrits, 2012; Byrne and Callaghan 2015; Room, 2016), whose study of social 
systems tends not to use computational tools. A conceptual approach to social 
complexity allows me to unpack the findings of the case study, such as the reasons 
why the Floating Island faded, better than if I had used computational models. I 
explain the reasons behind my research approach in the methodology chapter.  
 




Before proceeding, I should add that, in social complexity, there is a recognition by 
authors such as Byrne and Callaghan (2013) of political agency in the work of 
complexity scientists dealing with the human social world and how their work 
relates to possible interventions that could drive changes. In this sense, this thesis 
attempts to make a political statement about the use of complex systems theory to 
understanding complex social, political, legal, historical, environmental and 
technological phenomena. Indeed, one of my aims with the study of features of 
complex systems in the Floating Island is to show how complexity can help 
understand relevant issues in creating special jurisdictions, some of which are 
driving several of the century’s most significant governance 
transformations. However, I am more interested in how this can then help move 
floating zones from design to implementation in better ways.  
 
Following the work of de Puig de la Bellacasa (2017), one of my interests with this 
thesis, as I bring out in the conclusions when emphasising on the role local 
stakeholders should have in these projects, is to ‘mobilise care’ towards the 
neglected right of local stakeholders to decide about the future of their territories 
and the ways they join contemporary governance and urbanisation trends. The 
issues and features I bring out in the empirical chapters are a reflection of this 
desire. That said, those cases where I speak for Polynesians, I do it acknowledging 
my own involvement in the reproduction dominant values which Puig de la 
Bellacasa tries to get away from. Nonetheless, my hope that this thesis paves the 
path to more bottom-up zone projects; projects where moving from design to 
implementation is done from a perspective of care and the inherent sense of 
responsibility it carries. This means having non-anthropocentric ways of managing 
maritime zone projects. This project was respectful in this way. However, it also 
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means responsibility for human stakeholders on the disadvantaged side of the 
power dynamics. This is an important topic, not only because I foresee that many 
projects that will come after this SeaZone might focus on aquaculture and might 
prioritize non-human exploitation, but also because that do not, could still derive in 
interactions that are unequal, unfair for local human stakeholders. To avoid this, 
the bumpy path from design and planning to implementing needs to be thought 
carefully; care as thoughtfully and care as in with respect. Central to a fair 
implementation plan is governance. Planning and implementing are ultimately 
related to it. And governance, indeed, plays a key role in this thesis. The next 
section introduces governance from a complex systems perspective: complex 
governance, the concept and the field.  
 
2.4. Complex Governance 
For the purposes of this research, the notion of governance used in this thesis is 
Jessop’s (1997:1): "the complex art of steering multiple agencies, institutions, and 
systems that are both operationally autonomous from one another and structurally 
coupled through various forms of reciprocal interdependence".5 This thesis 
extends Jessop’s definition by using complexity as a way of driving the kind of 
systems that governance structures and processes need to embrace. That is to 
say, the approach to governance as it is used in this research implies that complex 
governance exhibits several features of complex systems. Indeed, from a complex 
systems perspective, my research uses several features of complex systems, 
nestedness, multiple levels and waves. From a complex governance perspective, 
these concepts translate into nested institutions, multiple levels of stakeholders 
and waves of cross-temporal events. The core use of these features to this thesis 
 
5 This complex governance definition helps sustain my claim that the Project’s lack of 
engagement with all levels of the SeaZone played against it. This will be more clear in the 
empirical chapters.   
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situates it within the complex governance field. However, there is also complex 
governance as a concept.  
 
As a field, Morçöl (2014) described the complex governance field as a combination 
of the literature on governance, networks and complexity. As a concept, Teisman 
et al. (2009:5) describe complex governance as governance that presents non-
linear dynamics, self-organisation and co-evolution among subprocesses and 
subsystems. For Vella and Baresi (2017), complex governance means governance 
involving multi-dimensions, multi-stakeholders and multi-scales. Other approaches 
to complex governance, such as Muñoz-Erickson’s (2014), recognise that complex 
governance involves multiple visions and politics of knowledge in policy action 
systems. For Lubell et al. (2016), complex governance means solid networks of 
multiple formal institutions. Similarly, Rodriguez-Pose (2008) describes complex 
governance as a horizontal and vertical structures in which institutional public and 
private actors coordinate in bottom-up ways in participatory and experimental 
policy-making involving cities and regions. Hurell (2007) understands it as a 
process in which transitional networks involving state, market and civil actors 
participate in creating of transnational, global rules. And Abbot sees in complex 
governance the possibility for a non-hierarchical orchestration of complex 
governance as a way to increase the benefits and reduce the costs of increased 
institutional complexity. 
 
Texts covering complex governance have started to peak in the last 11 years. 
Specifically within this area of work, in 2017, out of 198 titles appearing in a Web 
of Science search, most publications dealt with the disciplines of political science 
(Cairney, 2012; Dryzek, 1994; Haynes, 2015), public administration (Haynes, 
2008; Wachhaus, 2012, 2014), international relations (Keohane & Nye, 1977); 
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Keohane, 2001; Thompson et al. 1998), economics (Hidalgo & Hausmann, 2009: 
Holling, 2001) and environmental sciences (Deere-Birkbeck, 2010; Underdal, 
2013; Wesley & Pforr, 2010). Additionally, some works belonged to the disciplines 
of economics and finance (Bushman et al., 2004), law (Post & Eisen, 2000) and 
geography (O'Sullivan, 2004), although these were relatively less. Furthermore, 
there were important publications referring to the fields of management and 
business organisational theory (Anderson, 1999), firms (McKelvey, 1999) and 
leadership (Ulh-Bien and McKelvey, 2007). However, in 2019 the results of the 
Web of Science revealed that environmental studies and public administration 
surpassed texts on political science.   
 
One of the most common topics discussing complex governance is climate 
change. It is common in the climate change literature to focus on transnational 
climate governance as an example of complex governance (Hale and Andonova, 
2016). Works about climate change and complex governance usually refer to 
complex governance from a structural point of view (similar to Ostrom), one where 
multiple institutions are present (Gómez Lee and Maxfield, 2017; Haarstad, 2016; 
Zia and Koliba, 2011, Hamilton and Lubell, 2017). The presence of various types 
of institutions is, indeed, a characteristic of complex governance. Hence why 
authors such as Abbot (2012) see complex governance as the global, 
decentralised, fragmented structure with no central coordination in which relations 
among institutions, with state and non-state actors, shape to address transnational 
issues, including climate change. Similarly, Bulkeley (2005:876) argues that issues 
in environmental governance are "created, constructed, regulated and contested 
between, across and among scales, and through hybrid governing arrangements 
which operate in network terms". Numerous works in the field also discuss water 
(Kuzdas et al. 2015; Söderberg, 2015, 2016; Siegmund-Schultze et al. 2015) and 
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water's transboundary nature (Dietz et al., 2012). This inherent quality of oceans, 
being transboundary, is relevant in Chapter Six where I argue that the Floating 
Island Project concerned Polynesians. D'Zouza and Nagendra et al. (2011) explain 
why it is useful. They describe cases where urbanisation processes sidelined 
traditional users of a water common.   
 
While complex governance helps better explain certain types of governance 
systems that present features of complex systems, and despite that this polycentric 
approach has been central to discussions about climate change in recent years, 
authors mention several challenges of dealing with complex governance forms. 
For example, Wyborn (2015) discusses the challenges of implementing policies in 
complex governance settings. This might due to lack of face to face interactions or 
coordination problems in the network. For Yates et al. (2013) some problems arise 
because of the difficulty for small places to implement decisions involving national, 
regional and international strategies to cope with unsustainable marine 
environmental practices. Berardo et al. (2015) note the challenges of complex 
governance structures for the management of regional natural resources. Zia and 
Koliba (2011) report problems of accountability when there are too many players 
involved. Smucker et al. (2015) criticise the dissonances between national views 
and local realities when adapting to climate change through this type of 
systems. Because of the often transnational nature of complex governance, 
several publications discuss the lack of a central role of states in complex 
governance situations. As Kahler (2016) explains, complex governance involves 
transnational spaces. Therefore, national governments are no longer the central 
and mediating actors between subnational and global actors, yet they still play the 
role of providing the functional boundaries. Teisman and Edelenbos (2011), 
likewise, see complex governance where, without any central control, multiple 
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agencies synchronise. In sum, complex governance can be seen as hybrid, nested 
forms of governance with local and global actors. This is why Farrell and Newman 
(2018) see complex governance as an opportunity for non-state actors to influence 
global agendas.  
 
As a way to begin linking this part of the theoretical exposition on complex 
governance with the next part discussing SeaZones, outside of a complex systems 
perspective, I should note that literature on complex governance discussing special 
jurisdictions has not been extensively developed. Indeed, a Web of Knowledge 
search combining the terms “complex system” and “special economic zone” shows 
no records. Similarly, a google scholar search with the terms “complex system”, 
“complexity” and “special economic zone”, shows 198 results. However, only 9 of 
these results specifically discuss Zones and only 5 of them truly focus on Zones 
and complex systems. The other works are explained by the colloquial use of the 
word complexity outside of a complex systems framework.  
 
One of these texts discussing complex systems and special jurisdictions is by 
Devadas and Gupta. Devadas and Gupta (2011) use a system dynamics 
methodology to analyse the relationship between special zones in India and the 
broader urban area where they locate. They explored infrastructural, 
environmental, economic, physical, social and ecological parameters which lead 
zones to push manufacturing clusters, attract capital and technology and provide 
easy business environment. The authors conclude that a way to increase zone’s 
spill-over effects is to locate them near rural areas, as opposed to big cities. The 
other study is by Cooke and Fangzhu (2012), who look at how non-western 
Chinese firms use western market research and environmental benchmarks to 
penetrate western markets. Cooke’s and Fangzhu’s chapter uses a socio-technical 
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systems perspective based on multiple level systems analysis comprised by 
markets, industry, science, technology, policy and culture subsystems to look at 
China’s transition from a fuel-based economy to renewable productions. They do 
so to study this strategy from a resilience perspective. The publication uses notions 
related to complex systems to conduct the analysis, such as  a lack of centralised 
central control, adaptation and far-from-equilibrium in the Chinese innovation 
strategy that combines green technologies with manufacturing. Another publication 
is a book by Lagendijk et al. (2009). The book’s overarching narrative explores the 
overlapping of multiple forms of governance, scales and territorialities today, 
between the state and other forms of governance, including zones. Among its 
chapters, Brenner (2009), specifically, looks at the history, from a complex 
governance perspective, of peripheral industrial and manufacturing and enterprise 
Zones in Europe. And Cerny (2009) refers to how neoliberalism (a concept often 
associated with Zones) pushes to rethink territories. This thesis is the first attempt 
in the field to study a floating Special Economic Zone.  
 
As for seasteads, while the complex systems concepts of ‘emergent’ and ‘the 
adjacent possible’, popularised by Stuart Kauffman (2000), appear in two 
foundational seasteading texts from where SeaZones originate (see Mutabdzija 
and Borders, 2011a, 2011b), these terms are only briefly mentioned to explain the 
idea that the map of future of legal systems, which include seasteads, reveals itself 
as these systems advance. Mutabdzija and Borders use the adjacent possible as 
a starting point to think about a seasteading strategy. However, these two concepts 
are not discussed in depth nor further. And last, there are no publications to date 
that discuss SeaZones from a complex systems perspective. In the next section, I 
provide a conceptual and historical account where SeaZones originate. The 
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section help understand some of the Project’s initial conditions that made 




In a nutshell, SeaZones result from combining two forms of governance, seasteads 
and Special Economic Zones. SeaZones adopt the legal frameworks of Special 
Economic Zones and are inspired by seasteads maritime spatiality as a form of 
governance. The topic of SeaZones is so recent that there are only a handful of 
academic publications that focus entirely on them (see Lallemant-Moe, 2017a; 
Mezza-Garcia, 2019, Ranghanatan, 2019; Bell, 2017a; Bell, 2017b; Bell, 2018). 
Bell (2018), who coined the term, describes SeaZones, such as the Floating Island 
Project’s, as floating communities with special jurisdictions - “a new kind of special 
economic zone in a country encompassing both land and water areas”. Bell (2018) 
clarifies that a SeaZone can mean one of two things. First, it is the delimited 
physical space where a special regulatory framework applies. Second, a SeaZone 
comprises the special regulatory framework of that physical space. Thus, the 
difference between the SeaZone and the Floating Island Project is that the term 
SeaZone refers to the regulations of the Project, as well as to the area covered by 
those regulations. In contrast, ‘Floating Island Project’ refers to the Project overall. 
While no SeaZone exists yet, here I present the literature and ideas from where 
they originate from to better understand the execution and developments of the 
Floating Island Project. I do this by unpacking key notions developed by The 
Seasteading Institute and others relating to Special Economic Zones.   
 
Broadly, Special Economic Zones – hereafter referred to as ‘Zones’ - is the name 
employed for areas in countries that follow different regulations or tax exemptions 
to rest of the country. The World Bank describes Zones as: “geographically 
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delimited areas administered by a single body, offering certain incentives 
(generally duty-free importing and streamlined customs procedures) to businesses 
which physically locate within the zone” (FIAS, 2008:2). Zones’ purpose is often to 
augment economic activities in specific places or industries and to attract 
businesses (FIAS, 2008). Because of this concentration of reforms, Zones are 
among the strongest engines of economic growth around the world, especially in 
late-development countries (Defever et al., 2018). They tend to increase national 
exports (FIAS, 2008) and improve the local and national economy (Moberg, 2015a, 
2015b). For instance, in 2016, Zones’ regulations led to over 200 billion USD in 
global exports (Khanna, 2016). This is partly explained by how their tax and 
regulatory incentives appeal to companies and investment (He, 2002), leading 
businesses to move to them. However, their rapid growth has been accompanied 
by increased economic inequality, and sometimes exploitative conditions for 
workers, including women workers, and also environmental damage, especially in 
state-managed zones (FIAS, 2008). Several economically successful Zones, such 
as Hong Kong’s Administrative Region, have been historical accidents. But today’s 
growing trend comes from deliberate efforts.  
 
To date, no Special Economic Zone floats, although various kinds of maritime 
Zones, located in coasts and focused on marine businesses, exist. They exist in 
the Philipines (Reyes, 2013), Korea (Song, 2015), Korea and China (Sun, 2004), 
Korea and Japan (Valencia, 1989), Nagasaki and Zoushan (Ahn and Lee, 2017). 
The closest example of a floating Special Economic Zone was Dejima, an artificial 
island on reclaimed land in Japan. From 1641 to 1852, Dejima was the only place 
where Japan traded with outsiders, the Dutch, during a period where Japan 
isolated itself from the rest of the world (Serlet, 2017). This island was able to do 
this because it had spatial and legal extraterritoriality. That is, it was physically and 
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legally outside Japan while being part of it. Dejima, however, is no longer used for 
trade. This case study describes the first modern attempt to make an artificial 
floating island with legal extraterritoriality within a nation. The Floating Island 
Project’s SeaZone would resemble traditional Special Economic Zones in that it 
would offer a regulatory framework for taxes, customs and labour. Nevertheless, 
because their primary conceptual origin is in ‘seasteads’, the idea is that SeaZones 
focus less on economics and more on governance.  
 
The other source of SeaZone’s inspiration, ‘seasteads’, focuses on establishing 
self-governed communities while floating on the sea. The term seastead first 
appeared on a report by the Stratton Group (1969:72), a commission created 
through an Act of the U.S. Congress (Christie, 2007). Christie (2007) narrates how 
the term appeared: "To encourage private entrepreneurial efforts in the coastal 
seas, the (Stratton) Commission even recommended that states develop leasing 
procedures to permit nonextractive seabed activities and proposed a system of 
“seasteads,” analogising offshore development to frontier development under the 
Homestead Act of 1862".  However, the concept of seasteads, as applied it in this 
thesis, arose in the work of foundational publications associated with The 
Seasteading Institute. Authors associated with the Institute, Friedman and Taylor 
(2010:223), describe the practice of seasteading as: “the establishment of 
permanent, autonomous communities in the ocean”. The Oxford Dictionary 
(2017a, 2017b), which introduced ‘seasteading’ as a term in its repository in 2017, 
defined seasteading as: “The practice of establishing permanent settlements on 
structures located in areas of the sea outside the jurisdiction of any country”. Blue 
Frontiers, the company leading the Floating Island, explains seasteads in the 
following terms:  
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a floating human habitation, designed to remain in the sea indefinitely. 
Seasteads’ design is mobile so they can be easily moved and 
reconfigured in relation to other seasteads. This allows for the 
formation, reformation, and dissolution of networks, neighbourhoods, 
cities, and eventually nation-states in international waters.  
(Blue Frontiers, 2018e9) 
 
Some authors, before the creation of The Seasteading Institute in 2008, connected 
seasteads to technical aspects of living self-sufficiently at sea. These include 
floatation, energy and food (Gramlich, 1998) or sailing and inhabiting a boat 
(Neumeyer, 1981; FitzGerald, 2006). In contrast, seasteading, as the form of 
governance that inspired SeaZones and, as The Seasteading Institute envisions 
it, involves creating offshore, floating human settlements with alternative forms of 
governance. Seasteading, as a practice, is interested in experimenting with them 
in the deep seas. 6 
 
Seasteading and seasteads, as promoted by The Seasteading Institute, are based 
on the notion of voluntary ascription and critiques to nation-states. Mutabdzija and 
Borders (2011b:3) describe the seasteading movement’s mission as follows: “the 
idea of creating permanent societies living at sea — societies outside the auspices 
of established governments”. Foundational seasteading authors see seasteading 
 
6 The seasteading literature is polarised and can be split into two groups: those who favour 
seasteading and those against it. Those in favour tend to be related, in the past or present, to 
The Seasteading Institute. I refer to them as “foundational seasteading authors” because 
many of them wrote the initial documents about seasteading. These authors include: 
Friedman, P., Gramlich, W., Taylor, B., Borders, M., Mutabdzija, D., Balloun, O., Hickman, S. 
and Marty, M. Contemporary, but still foundational authors, include Bell, T.W. and Quirk, J. 
Foundational authors tend to introduce or explain seasteading and related concepts. On the 
contrary, the rest of the literature, a much larger portion, responds to it, usually with critiques 
about seasteading’s utopian character, negative aspects of its legal and spatial 
extraterritoriality, lifestyle of the ‘super rich’ and how seasteading embodies neocolonising 
practices. Few, such as Lalemandt-Moe (2018), stand in the middle by not being overly 
favourable nor critical.    
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as a route to break the monopoly of governance states possess (Friedman & 
Gramlich, 2009:21). Friedman and Gramlich argue that governance has stagnated 
and is reluctant to experiment (Friedman and Gramlich, 2009:20; Friedman and 
Taylor, 2011). They criticise and bring out the limitations of traditional politics and 
elections for achieving desired outcomes (Friedman, 2009). Furthermore, they 
denounce that political activism targets policy and legislation and, thus, does not 
allow for structural changes in governments (Friedman, 2009f Friedman & Taylor, 
2011b). These authors also highlight that the large size of most nation-states does 
not allow satisfying the needs of individuals who desire more autonomy within 
these large systems (Friedman & Gramlich, 2009; Gramlich et al. 2002).7 Likewise, 
they express that representative democracy does not meet the diversity of 
individual preferences (Taylor, 2010; Lee, 2010).8 As a response, authors related 
to The Seasteading Institute seek more dynamic and varied forms of governance 
by placing new governments at sea, a place that some foundational authors 
consider unclaimed. 
 
However, the main reason foundational seasteading authors argue that 
governance requires an aquatic medium relates to the idea of having “dynamic 
geography”. This means that houses, neighbourhoods or entire cities can move 
 
7 As understood through the logics of anarcho-capitalism, the concepts of freedom and 
autonomy are fundamental to seasteading’s ultimate goal, although the short-term one is 
achieving formal autonomy, even if it is minimal. For Friedman & Gramlich (2009:204), 
freedom comes from creating alternatives to the nation-state governance model, while 
autonomy is “the power to set their own rules” (Friedman & Taylor, 2011:14) and that each 
person chooses their own social contract and government (Friedman & Gramlich, 2009: 204). 
Similarly, Mutabdzija and Borders, (2011b) clarify that autonomy is different from sovereignty. 
Autonomy equals self-governance and rule-making, whereas sovereignty involves, for 
instance, having a seat in the United Nations or issuing internationally recognised passports. 
A more radical version of seasteading suggests that individuals start their own countries 
(Taylor, 2014:136).  
8 It is interesting to note that these critiques to democracy in the foundational seasteading 
literature today is understood almost as a self-evident truth. Authors within the social 
complexity literature, such as Geyer and Rihani (2010), explain that complexity debunked the 
direct relation that people used to have about how democracy leads to desired outcomes and 
expected results.  
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around and change location, depending on residents’ and citizens’ satisfaction with 
the governments they choose (Friedman, 2002). If residents are happy, they stay. 
If they are unhappy, they float to governments with governance better suited to 
their tastes. This idea, while attractive, is not free from problems. For example, it 
is not straight-forward how would seasteads deal with cases of murder, child and 
animal abuse. Yet, foundational authors expect that dynamic geography would 
create better governance because the possibility for individuals, houses, 
neighbours and cities to detach from a government by moving even entire cities 
would lead these private governments to compete with each other. The authors 
state that dynamic geography will give governments incentives to perform better, 
like when companies compete. Foundational seasteading authors convey that this 
pressure over governments does not exist in land. They explain that neither cities 
nor countries relocate, making land governments less dynamic and prone to 
change. On top of this, the authors criticise that most land is under government 
control. In contrast, the ocean, as space yet to be claimed, according to Friedman 
& Taylor (2011), would entail lower entry barriers to the governance industry.  
 
Previous seastead-like attempts to the Floating Island Project include residential 
ships such as Freedom Ship. This one was a project for a floating city for 100.000 
people, which explored settling permanently in international waters. A Las Vegas 
real estate millionaire sought to carry out a more political attempt. He attempted to 
create a country on a human-made island in the Minerva reefs near Tonga. The 
Minerva Republic declared its own independence in 1972 and issued its own 
currency. However, Tongan officials invaded and uninstalled the flag (Strauss, 
1984; Queenoftheisle, N.D.). The most popular, and arguably successful, 
seasteading antecedent was the Principality of Sealand (Ryan et al., 2006), a 
micronation on an abandoned oil rig in the coast of Suffolk, in the United Kingdom. 
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With its declared “sovereignty”, Sealand allowed itself to host Pirate Bay servers 
(Strauss, 1984). As a response, the United Kingdom extended its territorial waters 
to include Sealand. Similarly, the Atlantis Project consisted of creating an entire 
independent floating city called Oceania in the Caribbean. But a fire, a hurricane 
and a Haitian gunboat took down the built structures. New Utopia was also an 
undertaking for a floating city in the Caribbean that raised 500 million USD in 
funding. But the United States’ Securities and Exchange Commission labelled it a 
fraud. A more realistic approach was BlueSeed. It aimed to create a floating city in 
international waters near Silicon Valley in California for entrepreneurs and 
researchers who, otherwise, would need a visa to work in the United States. 
However, Blueseed announced it was not moving forward in August 2017 when 
the Floating Island was announced. In the face the lack of success of previous 
seasteading attempts, the idea of a SeaZone is The Seasteading Institute’s 
attempt to more successfully create communities on the ocean, without ending in 
a state-led invasion. The idea of a SeaZone, therefore, originates in The 
Seasteading Institute (Bell, 2016). Instead of locating in international waters as 
seasteads, SeaZones take the Special Economic Zone model of being “within, but 
outside” a state. As such, they are located in the territorial waters of states and 
have a state’s backing.  
 
It is important to note that there is no consensus within foundational authors about 
what is the individual unit of a seastead, whether it is an individual house, a 
platform or a cluster of buildings. For instance, in some publications, the notion of 
a seastead has been used to describe a group of seasteads. The following quote 
by The Seasteading Institute’s quote shows it (TSI, 2017b): “We generally refer to 
a seastead as a community living at sea and largely responsible for setting its own 
rules and culture”. In other documents, seasteading is used to describe a floating 
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city-state, such as in Mutabdzija & Borders (2011b). Similarly, Taylor (2010g) 
writes: “A group of seasteads governed by a common set of rules –regardless of 
whether there is a single body administering those rules or whether the group is 
spatially contiguous forms a seasteading polity”. Adding more confusion to the 
term, seasteading approaches focused on self-sufficiency, such as Gramlich’s 
(1998), attribute this name to individual houses or buildings independently of their 
political autonomy - calling their communities clusters.  
 
Furthermore, in the literature, there is no agreement on how location differentiates 
between a seastead and a SeaZone, even though this is a fundamental distinction 
of both.9 For example, the word seasteading is widely adopted by the community 
of seasteading supporters, regardless of whether the constructions are in 
international or territorial waters. This was the case with a floating house placed in 
February 2018, by a former volunteer of Blue Frontiers, in the Contiguous Zone of 
Thailand, fourteen miles away from shore (Ocean-Builders, 2019). This area is 
Thailand’s jurisdiction and counts as territorial waters, not international. Yet, the 
manufacturer and inhabitants of the floating home, Ocean Builders and Chad 
Elwatorski, as well as the seasteading Facebook community, referred to it as a 
seastead (TSI, 2019). The Thai navy strongly responded to this.  
 
Because of the lack of differentiation of among the terms, it is common to find 
SeaZone and seastead being used almost interchangeably. Even Blue Frontiers, 
 
9 The delimitation of the ocean in national and international waters depends on their proximity 
to shore. Territorial waters, according to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS, 1982: Art. 2-32), include waters from the nation's baseline to 12 nautical miles. In 
territorial waters, states have full sovereignty over the ground, subsoil, the maritime area and 
aerospace. Following the territorial waters, there is the contiguous zone. It extends 24 nautical 
miles. In the contiguous zone, nation-states still have jurisdiction over customs, immigration 
and fiscal regulations. After the contiguous zone up to 200 nautical miles is the Exclusive 
Economic Zone (UNCLOS, 1982: article 57). After 200 nautical miles, international waters 
begin. In countries where the coral reef encloses the ocean and create what is called a lagoon, 
inland waters go from the low water mark to the reef (Lallemant-Moe, 2017b).  
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the company building the Floating Island Project, referred to floating platforms of 
SeaZones as seasteads. They explained them in the following words: “SeaZones 
can be home to numerous seasteads, offering groups voluntary opportunities to 
implement novel or untried ideas” (Blue Frontiers, 2018e:11). Other authors, such 
as Bell (2017b) do classify seasteads depending on their location in inland waters, 
territorial waters or international waters, although he argues that SeaZones are like 
host-nation seasteads. While this thesis is not a foundational seasteading text, I 
claim that seasteads are not single buildings in international waters, but a cluster 
of them is. This is because the goal of seasteading is to create communities in the 
high seas and a community is not formed by one single family. Moreover, one 
single home does not allow for dynamic geography. Using the term seastead 
independently of its location in territorial or international waters and whether it 
refers to a single floating home or an entire community, both with different 
implications, causes confusion. This confusion is sometimes repeatedby news. 
 
For clarity purposes, I employ the term SeaZones to refer exclusively to floating 
Special Economic Zones in territorial waters of nations. Likewise, I use the term 
SeaZone to talk about the regulatory framework of the Project – once it was 
regulated by the SeaZone Acts. I employ Island or Floating Island when I mean the 
floating building(s) in the area covered by the SeaZone. And I adopt the term 
Floating Island Project or simply Project to speak of the endeavour overall. When 
I write about the plot of water and land where the SeaZone framework would apply, 
I make sure I name the lagoon of Atimaono or its municipality. This language 
differentiation distinguishes between floating communities in territorial and 
international waters. It additionally suggests that the legal frameworks and 
governance implications surrounding SeaZones and seasteads are different, even 
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though seasteads and SeaZones are prone to similar rules and problems, as this 
thesis later shows. 
 
One of the key problems shared by seasteads and SeaZones that surfaced in this 
case study is their image issues. This is because the terms are regularly (almost 
always) mixed up by media and because both tend to be associated with a kind of 
anarchism which sees in capitalism a replacement for most governance functions 
which are today provided by states: anarcho-capitalism (Steinberg et al., 2012). 
Anarcho-capitalism is a free market economy that advocates for private provision 
of governance services (Friedman, 1989). This political economy is similar to other 
libertarian theories, such as minarchism. Minarchist authors, such as Nozik (1974), 
advocate for reducing the role of the state to a minimal expression. The idea is to 
only leave the fundamental parts (courts, military, and police) so it can protect free-
market policies. Nonetheless, anarcho-capitalism, as it interests this thesis and 
case study, goes one step further. Its goal is replacing the state with an ecosystem 
of private governments competing in a governance market. These services would 
include infrastructure, dispute resolution, security, courts and legal systems 
(Friedman, 1989). Through market solutions to governance, anarcho-capitalism 
seeks to decentralise state power.10  
 
Indeed, for foundational seasteading authors, seasteads seem to be a way to 
achieve anarcho-capitalism, similar to that portrayed in David Friedman’s (1989) 
Machinery of Freedom (Friedman, 2009). D. Friedman is one of the main authors 
of the type of anarcho-capitalism which seeks to replace public services with 
 
10 The terms “anarcho-capitalism”, “libertarianism”, “minarchism” and “libertarian anarchy” 
have differences among them, although they are sometimes used interchangeably. In this 
thesis, I use the term “anarcho-capitalism”, even though the most widely used term in the 
seasteading community is libertarianism. I use this term because anarcho-capitalism talks 
about a market for governance, while libertarianism not always. Yet, this anarchism of some 
forms of libertarianism is implicit in the anarchy of anarcho-capitalism.  
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private service providers. The author claims that voluntary institutions “should 
replace governments in its most essential functions” (Friedman, 1989:76). This 
means that societies would organise by individuals voluntarily deciding to opt-in in 
a government, instead of being born under a predetermined one. Anarcho-
Capitalism relates quite directly to SeaZones.   
 
Patri Friedman, a co-founder of The Seasteading Institute, who is the son of David 
Friedman, is also the grandson of Rose and Milton Friedman. M. Friedman won 
the 1976 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics and was famous for his ideas on free 
markets and capitalism. Thus, The Seasteading Institute, the Californian non-profit 
that since 2008 has led the seasteading movement, is the result of a three-
generation lineage of libertarian thinkers.11 Besides this three generations lineage, 
a well-known libertarian billionaire and investor, Peter Thiel, co-founded The 
Seasteading Institute with P. Friedman. He also donated 1.7 million USD over 
several years to The Seasteading Institute (Hencken, 2014), although his funding 
ceased three years before the Memorandum of Understanding with French 
Polynesia. 
 
Another problem in SeaZones’ and seasteads’ ‘baggage’ relates to how these 
aquatic forms of governance see the oceans as unclaimed places to colonise. This 
has led most academic texts and news articles discussing seasteads and 
SeaZones to focus on the narrative of Silicon Valley millionaires seeking to avoid 
 
11 That said, foundational seasteading authors, such as Friedman and Gramlich (2009:7) and 
Friedman (2010) clarify that although this is the political origin of seasteads, long-term 
seasteading is politically agnostic. Similarly, The Seasteading Institute defines its vision as 
meta-political and Non-ideological (TSI, 2017b). The Institute sees in seasteading a platform 
for trying different governance options, from universal basic income to free market. Likewise, 
Blue Frontiers in its website defines itself as ideologically neutral, explaining that it is up to 
costumers to try what they think works best for them. In this regards, Bell (2017:58) writes that 
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taxes in a luxurious floating island. For instance, Miéville (2017:18), who describes 
seasteading as a neoliberal evil pirate utopia, writes: “the libertarian seasteaders 
are a joke. The pitiful, incoherent and cowardly utopia they pine for is a spoilt ch ild’s 
autarky, an imperialism of outsourcing, a very petty fascism played as maritime 
farce -Pinochet of Penzance”. Other critics see it as a utopian form of urbanism 
(Lynch, 2017), neoliberal suburbanism and cyberlibertarian utopianism (Peck, 
2011:912). Similarly, Simpson (2016b) writes: “seasteading is part of a digital 
countercultural movement driven by techno-libertarianism -a libertarian political 
approach to technology-, and anarcho-capitalism”. Similarly, Coburn (2014), 
associates seasteads to charter cities, a form of governance that, as originally 
depicted by Romer (2009, 2010), could not be closer to neocolonialism. This is 
because a foreign government or entity would be in charge of managing a city in a 
‘third world country’. Coburn calls both, charter cities and seasteads, laissez-faire 
utopias trying to take advantage of the political imaginary of the developing 
world. The critiques and the negative image of seasteading are important for this 
thesis because they provide problems underpinning SeaZones that surfaced in the 
empirical observations. 
 
However, the deepest problem with SeaZones in relation to this issue is that they 
are rooted in the notion of colonising the ocean. Colonisation is, indeed, a notion 
that runs throughout the thesis. It is present in three main ways: the colonisation of 
a lagoon; French Polynesia’s colonisation; and critiques of Polynesians to creating 
a foreign enclave on their ocean. This last one arises from the origin of SeaZones 
in The Seasteading Institute. Mentioning colonisation is relevant for this case study 
because complex systems are history-dependent. I unpack this idea in the 
empirical chapters.  
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Colonising and seasteading are conceptually related because another way 
foundational authors refer to seasteading is as “homesteading the high seas” 
(Friedman and Taylor, 2011b:13). The word seasteading is, indeed, a combination 
of sea and homesteading (Oxford, 2017b). The notion of homesteading originates 
in Locke’s (2013)’s 1689’s treaties, for whom land ownership arises from 
appropriation by working the land. While Locke’s ideas did not necessarily entail 
colonisation nor homesteading as we know it today, the term homesteading is 
historically loaded. Tully (2017) explains that Locke’s homesteading property rights 
surfaced in the process of European colonisation of North America. He recalls that 
the displacement of indigenous from North America happened with a series of 
federal acts called the Homesteading Acts. In 1862, these Acts allowed European 
settlers to appropriate and become owners of 80 million acres of Native American 
lands (LOC, nd). Andrews (1999:80) explains that this historical event became 
responsible for displacing millions of Native Americans from their territories, and 
for reducing their populations from 15 million to less than 250.000. The 
Homesteading Acts built on the premise that property ownership should be linked 
to the people labouring upon it (Schlatter, 1951). As McMaken (2017) explains, 
Native Americans owned land in common, by sharing it. Thus, these lands were 
wrongly identified as lacking property rights. Consequently, Native Americans were 
forced to move to reservations, away from the ancestral territories where they lived. 
The etymological origin of seasteading has led Peck (2011:912) to say that 
seasteading repeats the lore of the “wildly unregulated west”. But the relation 
between homesteading and seasteads is not only etymological.  
 
Foundational seasteading publications (Friedman & Gramlich, 2009; Balloun, 
2012; Friedman & Taylor, 2010; 2011) often romanticise European settling in North 
America. The explication of seasteading by The Seasteading Institute (2017b) 
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reflects this fact: “The term comes from homesteading, which means making a 
home for oneself in new, uninhabited places. It generally has associations with 
self-sufficiency and a frontier lifestyle. Seasteading is reminiscent of that idea, but 
at sea.” Another example of this romanticisation is Friedman & Taylor (2011b:6), 
when they write that: “Colonial America was a very competitive and innovative 
political culture”. Besides the processes of settling/colonisation, in the seasteading 
literature colonisers are, too, romanticised.  
 
The foundational seasteading literature sees the first colonisers of the 
homesteading period as visionaries who saw the Americas as an opportunity to 
create new political regimes where, in their view, there was none. Such exaltation 
appears in the foundational seasteading texts over and over. It explains why, when 
talking about homesteading, views centre on the entrepreneurial and freedom-
seeking spirit of European settlers, who wanted to dissociate from the old 
aristocracy. However, there is no recognition of the oppression and displacement 
that homesteading entailed for Native Americans - nor on the fact that not all 
homesteaders chose that lifestyle. Moreover, as Veracini (2011) explains, there is 
a difference between colonisers and settlers. Colonisers come with imbalanced 
power and displacement, whereas setting does not necessarily entail unequal 
power relations of domination.  
 
Yet, for Veracini (2015:80), what Quiggin (2010) calls the avoidance of mentioning 
Native Americans in the nineteenth century history of the United States, is a “settler 
colonial reflex”. The author used this same terms to refer to the vision of the 
seasteading movement (Veracini, 2016). A previous director of development of 
The Seasteading Institute (2009) attempted to address a related critique by stating: 
“A bunch of rich white guys? So were the founding fathers – and their success 
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brought freedom to everyone”. Other examples surface in other text extracts, such 
as: “While the American experiment turned out for the best” (Friedan and Taylor, 
2011:13). Another example is Mutabdzija and Borders (2011:23): “Under a 
homesteading doctrine, we have a mechanism through which formerly unowned 
resources can come to be privately owned. The settling of the American West is 
instructive”. This theoretical relation to North America’s colonisation led Wachs 
(2017) to write that seasteading is a “Libertarian-influenced crusade that borrows 
from the language of the American frontier to frame its freewheeling settlement at 
sea.” Wachs (2017) argues that the comparison between seasteaders and 
American frontiersmen invokes the European notion of a tabula rasa used to justify 
the Native American genocide.  
 
What is worse, the language used in several foundational texts from where 
SeaZones originate perpetuate today’s differences between the Global North and 
the Global South. For instance: Friedman & Taylor write:  
 
“If we can make seasteading work, we can transform 70% of the 
Earth’s surface into a laboratory for experimenting with alternative 
social systems. If we buy an island or part of a third-world, all we would 
have would be one piece of dirt. While we believe that having more 
sovereign pieces of dirt is a good thing, our vision is much bigger than 
that of just creating a single new country”.  
(Friedman and Gramlich, 2009:295) 
 
Another example taken from the initial key seasteading book reads: “We think 
seasteading will be in reach of many Americans at the beginning, but not the third 
world. This does not mean that our movement will not help poorer people” 
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(Friedman and Gramlich, 2009:135). In another part, Friedman and Gramlich 
(2009:290) write: “Sure, oceanfront property in the third world is cheaper and 
prettier, but there is a reason that most people who can afford to live in the first 
world instead”. Similarly, Friedman & Gramlich (2009:294) quote in their online 
book an email by a supporter: “For the investment required to build 100 acres of 
floating condo, you could take over three Third World hellholes, complete with 
workforce and low-quality army”. Similar examples are plentiful. One is by The 
Seasteading Institute (2014): “The ideal country would be stable, non-corrupt, 
small, and relatively poor by first world standards. It would also have to be open to 
foreign investment, the values of freedom, and the leveraging of its sovereignty”. 
The sense of entitlement and appropriation does not end there. Friedman and 
Gramlich write:  
  
Land doesn’t easily scale, and so doesn’t fit our incremental approach. 
It’s pretty clear how to build the first percent of a 100 acre floating 
condo - you build a 1 acre floating condo. But how do you take over 
1/20th of a third world country?  
(Friedman and Gramlich, 2009:295) 
 
In sum, SeaZones take their legal aspect from Special Economic Zones and the 
spatial, political and entitlement one from seasteads. Specifically, SeaZones adopt 
from Special Economic Zones the notion of having a special regulatory framework, 
which enables new regulations, or exceptions, distinct from the country where they 
physically, and legally, nest. In this thesis, I call this process of creating new or 
exceptional regulations “untangling”. This is because there are multiple regulations 
by institutions which need to be untied. From seasteads, SeaZones take the idea 
of building privately governed, politically autonomous communities floating on the 
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ocean. The last important concept to briefly describe in this second part of the 
theoretical framework is extraterritoriality.   
 
Extraterritoriality is the name given to spaces outside the jurisdictions of countries. 
The concept applies for places such as Antarctica (SAT, 1959), CERN (2004), the 
Moon (UNOOSA, 1979; Virgilu, 2009), outer space (UNOOSA, 1979) and the 
United Nations building (UN, 1947). Important for this case study, international 
waters are an extraterritory too. While extraterritoriality is not among the features 
of complex governance central to this thesis’s concerns (nested institutions, 
multilevel stakeholders and waves), it does help understand that the Project sought 
to nest within French Polynesia, and the relation between the Project’s special 
regulatory framework and the aquatic physical space where it would locate.  
 
2.6. Conclusion 
This theoretical and conceptual framework presented the key features of complex 
governance that run throughout the thesis. It discussed the complex governance 
concept and field. It additionally traced the origin of SeaZones in Special Economic 
Zones and in seasteads and discussed key ideas about them that help set up and 
better understand the case study. The next chapter introduces the case study.  
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CHAPTER 3. CASE STUDY: THE FLOATING ISLAND 
PROJECT IN FRENCH POLYNESIA 
 
In this chapter, I introduce the case study entitled Floating Island Project in French 
Polynesia. In the first part of this chapter, I explain key points about the Project, its 
origin and the motivations of stakeholders involved in its creation. I examine 
reasons for creating floating architecture and provide a chronology of the Floating 
Island. The chapter covers the Project’s progression since its 2017 launch up unto 
to the events which led to its fading in 2018.  Likewise, I describe the cryptographic 
token, which would later be proposed as part of the governance of the Floating 
Island.  
 
The Floating Island Project was an attempt to set up a privately governed SeaZone 
in the territorial waters of French Polynesia. The SeaZone’s special regulatory 
framework, condensed in the Polynesian Assembly’s ‘SeaZone Acts’, would allow 
the Project to have different labour, customs, and residence regulations than the 
rest of Polynesia. Overall, the Island would accommodate around 300 people in an 
area of 75.000 m2 (7.5 Hectares, 785.000m). It would have around 12 platforms 
between 14 to 50 square meters each (EMSI, 2017). The platforms would occupy 
approximately 0.1% to 10% of the total project area. In the short-term, the Floating 
Island would be a mixed-use real estate development, powered by renewable 
energy (Blue Frontiers, 2017e). However, the long-term mission underpinning the 
Floating Island was to be a step towards seasteads. 
 
For years, The Seasteading Institute had tried to find a nation willing to host a 
politically autonomous floating community. They had hoped to locate a project 
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within 12 nautical miles of a host nation. In exchange, the country was to obtain 
supposed technology transfer and 'know-how'; I explain what type below. After 
several years of searching for a host nation, on January 13th 2017, The 
Seasteading Institute and the French Polynesian government signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding (2017) in San Francisco, California. Minister Jean-
Francois Bouissou signed on behalf of the French Polynesian government. As we 
will see, Bouissou was an important person in this case study, from the Floating 
Island Project’s start to finish. Shortly after, members of the Institute and the French 
Polynesian governmental liaison, Marc Collins Chen, formally registered Blue 
Frontiers in Singapore.12 The company Blue Frontiers, which I sometimes refer to 
as ‘the Company’, undertook the Project since.  
 
The main motivation of the Polynesian government to sign the Memorandum of 
Understanding was to bring new technologies to Polynesia to prepare for sea-level 
rise (MOU, 2017; TSI, nd-a). Sea-levels are of great concern today, with some 
estimates predicting a rise from 65cm (Weeman & Lynch, 2018) to 1 meter of water 
elevation (NRC, 2012) by the end of the century in various places. Because of sea-
level rise, Storlazzi et al. (2018) claim that the majority of flat islands around the 
world, including the Pacific, will be uninhabitable before the end of the century. 
According to Strauss and Kulp (2017), sea-level rise projections mean that flooding 
will reach at least one quarter of the coastal areas in the region. But Pacific islands 
and Small Island States are the places that are expected to suffer the most from 
sea-level rise (Lister & Muk-Pavic, 2015:2), despite their relatively insignificant 
contribution to climate change (Polynesians-Leaders-Group, 2015). 
 
12 Six male founders registered the company Blue Frontiers in Singapore: the former  
Executive Director of The Seasteading Institute, Randy Hencken; the liaison between the 
French Polynesian government and The Seasteading Institute, Marc Collins; Seavangelist 
and President of The Seasteading Institute, Joe Quirk; Bielorusian businessman, Egor 
Rijykov; seasteading ambassador, Nicolas Germineau; and a Singaporean local officer, Peng 
Hock James Soon  (SEC, 2017).   
 




The reason the situation is expected to be worse for many Pacific islands is 
because many Pacific islands, called atolls, have no mountains and are almost flat. 
Caron and Henry (2004) stress that with sea-level rise, many fear that these flat 
Pacific islands will be completely submerged. This makes French Polynesia part 
of a highly vulnerable group of Pacific countries (SPREP, 2016), which in the future 
is expected to experience a significant risk of refugees due to climate displacement 
(Wong et al., 2014:364). To prepare for this imminent threat, governments in the 
Pacific, such as Kiribati’s, are looking to sustainable floating islands for replacing 
lost land (Kiribati, 2012). As Bryant-Tokalau (2018:28) recalls, places such as the 
Solomon Islands and Micronesia, also in the Pacific, islanders have long 
considered using artificial islands to recover sovereignty lost to a submerged 
territory. 
 
Because of the threat of sea-level rising, before the Memorandum of 
Understanding, the French Polynesian government had signed the Taputapuatea 
P.A.C.T. (Polynesian Leaders Group, 2015). This is a document where Pacific 
leaders condensed their concerns towards the vulnerability of their territories when 
confronting sea-level rise. The leaders called for action for becoming global 
showcases in sustainable development. This is why the French Polynesian 
government saw the Floating Island Project as an opportunity for French 
Polynesia. The Project would be a way to bring innovative sustainable technologies 
with low environmental impact to this Pacific nation (MOU, 2017:7). Despite the 
potential uses of floating architecture to adapt to sea-level rise, some scholars 
viewed this narrative in the Project with scepticism. 
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For example, Lallemant-Moe (2017a, 2017b) maintained that artificial islands are 
not a legal solution for disappearing and submerging nations, given that artificial 
islands do not hold the same legal status as natural islands. As the United Nations 
Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS, 1982: Art. 60) states, artificial islands 
do not affect the delimitation of the territorial sea nor the size of the Exclusive 
Economic Zone of states. This is because replacing natural islands with artificial 
ones would not prevent the diminution of jurisdictions of maritime areas attached 
to lost land (Lallemant-Moe, 2017a). Given such a mismatch, authors such as 
Ranghanatan (2019) argue that the use of sea-level rise in the Floating Island 
Project was essentially rhetorical. Ranghanatan stated the Project embodied a 
tone-down version of its original political strain. She stated the Project downplayed 
the libertarian underpinnings of seasteading, including its explicit desire to increase 
freedom through the creation of dynamic geography, where seasteaders could 
‘move’ between different seasteads at will. Similarly, Feichtner (2019) stated that 
resorting to the ocean's extraterritoriality is a way for small island states, including 
French Polynesia, to seek a place internationally. Feichtner criticised that these 
strategies do not translate into direct, tangible benefits for the population, even if 
this is the idea that governments communicate to citizens.  
 
Moreover, as Bryant-Tokalau (2018) explains, this specific, modern approach for 
building artificial islands often ignores ancient and local knowledge. This is an issue 
that plays out in important ways in the case study. In the Floating Island, the 
idealisation of seasteading, comprising creating new floating territories to move to, 
disregarded what Stratford et al. (2013:72) describe as the emotional bond that 
Polynesian people have to their territories and the Fenua. Fenua is a concept of 
Polynesia which "encompasses both the archipelago and the cultural practices in 
it" (Stratford et al. 2013:72). Stratford et al. (2013:72) explain further that the 
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interpretation of Fenua means that Polynesians see themselves as part of the 
islands. This is a cosmological relation with the ocean, in Polynesian ‘Moana’, 
which Stratford et al. note that other cultures cannot easily comprehend. Dening 
(2007:288) explains this cosmological bond by noting that Polynesians, 
traditionally a seafaring culture, are sea people. The emotional bond to their islands 
was an issue which surfaced in the Project’s fading, specifically in critiques by 
Polynesians which mentioned the Fenua.   
 
It is important to know that, as its name suggests, the Floating Island would float 
and would not have foundations that make contact with the seabed. This is one of 
the advantages of floating architecture (De Graaf, 2012). Another one is that 
buildings can be built sustainably from scratch, with less waste and pollution 
(Sailsbury, 2003). Construction can take place somewhere else, while assemblage 
can be on site. This arguably makes projects very quick to construct. Most 
importantly, floating buildings can also be easily removed (Kirimtat et al., 2019). 
This makes floating architecture more sustainable than the more common practice 
of reclaiming land (Wang and Tai, 2011). Reclamation usually entails dumping the 
sand on the ocean and destroying the marine life underneath. In contrast, floating 
buildings keep the marine environment underneath more intact. They can even 
create artificial reefs, providing food and shelter to marine animals (Blue21, 
2017:59; Stopnitzky, 2011; Delta-Sync, 2013). Since these buildings do not 
necessarily need to connect to land grids, they can innovate with renewable 
technologies and closed-loop cycles for energy and water (Blue Frontiers, 2017e).  
 
The Floating Island, for example, proposed desalinising its own water, running on 
solar power, using rainwater and having closed-loop utility cycles and composting 
toilets (Blue Frontiers, 2018c). This last idea means that water would be recycled 
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and used several times. These type of sustainable maritime technologies relating 
to the blue economy were a second motivation of the government, besides sea-
level rise adaptation. The blue economy is becoming stronger every year, and it is 
growth is a known topic in French Polynesia. Polynesia even has a Blue Economy 
Minister. During the Project’s planning, it was Teva Rotfritch, also vice-president of 
French Polynesia (La Présidence, nd). This minister/vice-president, opened the 
conference which launched the Floating Island Project in Tahiti. Below I mention 
specific parts of presentations of this conference to introduce relevant ideas 
surrounding the “partnership” between The Seasteading Institute and Blue 
Frontiers with French Polynesia.  
 
First, the conference was organised in Tahiti in May 2017 (TSI, n.d.-b). Blue 
Frontiers co-founder, Randy Hencken (2017), characterised it as a space for the 
two families, Polynesians and seasteaders, to meet. Hencken (2017) also talked 
about how the ten principles of the festival Burning Man could inspire the culture 
of the Floating Island Project.13 This point is important, insofar it explains reflects 
an idea of the demographics targeted for inhabiting the Project. The idea of a 
foreign culture and foreigners locating in Polynesian waters would be key in the 
empirical chapters’. Another co-founder, Joe Quirk, President of The Seasteading 
Institute, to convey that something floating with different regulations was not 
unknown for Polynesians, described French Polynesia's most famous cruise ship:  
 
The Paul Gaugin sails between Indonesia, Fiji and French Polynesia. 
It flies the flag of the Bahamas. Its owners are registered in the Cayman 
 
13 The Burning Man Festival is a one week festival in the Nevada Desert in the United States, 
which says to be based on the principles of radical inclusion, radical self-reliance, radical self-
expression, civic responsibility, gifting, decomodification, leaving no trace, immediacy, 
participation and communal effort. During the festival, a temporary city with over 70.000 
people is erected with thousands of artistic expressions.    
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Islands and Delaware. The crew is hired from all over the world. The 
passengers pay in U.S. currency. And legal disagreements between 
the passengers and the ship owners are settled in French Polynesia’s 
jurisdiction. (Quirk, 2017b).       
 
In the conference presentations, the main public critique came from Vallat (2017), 
Chairman of the European Network of Maritime Clusters. This is the second idea I 
want to note about the conference. Vallat said that the Project could be unviable 
because the most crucial part was getting the acceptance of the community. He 
also voiced that the culture from Polynesia was not the same as California. After 
the conference, the Project focused on complying with the Memorandum of 
Understanding.  
 
Ultimately, the Floating Island Project followed a list of points that were ‘signed and 
sealed’ in the Memorandum of Understanding. Although this document was non-
binding, it stated that, to move forward with the Project, The Seasteading Institute 
needed to submit legal, environmental, economic and location studies to the 
Polynesian Government. The Memorandum stated these studies should align with 
Polynesia's sustainability vision and concerns. Furthermore, the Project should 
avoid negative effects on the Polynesian ecosystem. Additionally, the Project could 
not extract mineral nor water resources from the lagoon. Accordingly, the Project’s 
Environmental Impact Analysis (Blue21, 2017) explored potential environmental 
impacts of the Floating Island. The Dutch-based firm Blue21, who had been 
working with The Seasteading Institute for six years as DeltaSync, conducted the 
Environmental Impact Analysis. To comply with Polynesia’s environmental goals, 
they designed a sustainability framework with an environmental position they 
called 'environmentally restorative' (Blue21, 2017). The idea was to go beyond 
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sustainability to restoration (Roeffen, 2017). This is because Blue21 presented 
how floating architecture could have a positive impact on the marine 
environment. This sustainability vision of the Project is important for the empirical 
chapters, insofar as it presents an opposite view to what critiques to the Project 
voiced. While it is not the focus here to discuss this, Blue21’s restoration 
perspective also aligns with Puig de la Bellacasa’s framework of notion of care for 
non-humans, as I explain somewhere else in the thesis.  
 
The Project’s location study analysed five potential lagoons in Tahiti, besides the 
one in which I focus in this thesis (Blue Frontiers and Blue21, 2017), called 
Atimaono. Atimaono is in the Southern coast of Tahiti, the most populated island 
in French Polynesia. It is home to the capital and has the largest electoral districts. 
This was important for the Project, as I show in Chapter Seven. It is important to 
note that Atimaono was never confirmed as the final location. However, key 
materials of the Project, such as a nice video published on Christmas Eve (Blue 
Frontiers, 2017b), placed the Floating Island in this lagoon.  
 
The Memorandum of Understanding also stated that the Project’s legal study 
(GB2A, 2017; hereafter referred to as ‘the legal study’) had to include The 
Seasteading Institute's expectations for modifying or creating new regulations for 
the SeaZone. This would include regulations on a number of issues, namely: 
governance, labour, custom duties, international relations, flag and registration, 
entry and residence permits, among others (MOU, 2017). The proposed 
regulations mentioned in the legal study would likely be the foundations for the 
Project’s regulations and the SeaZone Acts. This legal study is the starting point 
for the discussions of institutions and nestedness in Chapter Five. Eventually, The 
Seasteading Institute or Blue Frontiers, with or without the French Polynesian 
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Assembly, would draft a bill for the regulatory framework of this special jurisdiction. 
With a granted regulatory framework, the Project expected to attract “blue 
economy” businesses to the Island as well as internet and blockchain start-ups. 
 
Digital technologies were important for the Project since its beginning. The Project 
had its own blockchain cryptocurrency or token called Varyon. Varyon would be 
used to govern the Floating Island and SeaZone, as I explain later in Chapter Six. 
Besides being a means to govern, Varyon would also be exchangeable for time 
and residences on the Island (Blue Frontiers, 2018e). To visit, individuals had to 
hold Varyon on a smart wallet.14 Additionally, Varyon was how the Project tried to 
fund itself through what is known as an Initial Coin Offering (ICO). But several 
factors affected this attempt to fund the Project. Nevertheless, one additional 
document which was important for the Project and the empirical chapters of this 
thesis is the Varyon white paper – hereafter referred to as ‘purchasing document’.15 
 
Importantly, in the end, in spite of all the optimism in the early days of The Floating 
Island Project, the Project did not come to fruition. There were several events 
throughout the ‘life course’ of the Project that were pivotal in its fading. Like a dying 
candle, the possibility of the Floating Island materialising slowly faded away. As is 
argued in the later chapters of this thesis, there were a number of setbacks that 
arguably came from the project’s ‘initial conditions’ – those conditions which have 
an inextricable influence in the shame of the Project’s trajectory.  
 
 
14 A smart wallet is a phone application that works as a digital wallet to store cryptocurrencies.   
15 The investment document of the Project is called a white paper because this is the name 
that in the cryptocurrencies space is given to a token’s initial documentation. However, I will 
use the traditional term ‘purchasing document’, which applies to the specific type of token 
Varyon would be, to avoid confusion.  
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The lack of fundraising success was one of these events. It also lost the three 
female Polynesians who worked for it. Another key aspect was that the Project 
slowly stopped having government support. Moreover, it suffered significant 
opposition by the local community and a founder created a competing company. 
Indeed, three months prior to the elections, the Project was the focus of online and 
physical protests and a petition in Tahiti. The Floating Island became politicised 
and found itself in the middle of a dispute between the president's party and the 
opposition. For many Polynesians, the Project not going through was a success. 
For the project's team, it was not. The following figure sums up the most important 
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CHAPTER 4. METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1. Introduction 
In this chapter, I describe the methodological approach used to address the 
research questions. The chapter aims to provide an overview of how this research 
was conducted, to increase the internal and external validity of the findings as they 
are presented in the empirical chapters that follow.  To do this, I will explain the 
qualitative methods used to gather the empirical data and how the data was 
analysed and interpreted. The thesis used two main research methods, 
participatory observation and online and offline document analysis. In what follows, 
I explain key parts of the research process, including the development of my role 
in the Floating Island Project, from an external observant to a participant/observer. 
I discuss how these roles played a part in the research, and I reflect on the 
advantages and challenges of my methodological approach and dual roles. 




To conduct this research, I drew from ethnographic methods. That is to say, whilst 
I would not claim to have conducted a fully in-depth ethnography in its purest of 
forms, I have drawn from its key tenets as a way of driving the research design and 
how the research proceeded, particularly in my use of participant-observation. 
Ethnography, as Herbert (2000) puts it, is a broad methodology which usually 
entails participatory observation; a method in which the researcher immerses or 
spends a large amount of time with a social group in order to understand ties and 
cultural relations. This was certainly the case in this research where I ended up 
being part of The Floating Island Project itself, in meetings, conferences, 
workshops, etc. – more on this below. My use of participant observation allowed 
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me to do what Herbert describes when he argues that this style of research enables 
to untangle the intentions and actions of people and events surrounding them. As 
Herbert explains, ethnographies often focus on what people say as well as what 
they do, thereby allowing researchers to see discrepancies between thought and 
action. Indeed, to conduct this research, I paid attention to what was said, not said 
as well as what people and the Project did throughout the fieldwork. 
 
Hammersley and Atkinson provide an overarching description of ethnography, 
which they define them as a set of methods that involve the following activities: 
 
The ethnographer participating, overtly or covertly, in people’s daily 
lives for an extended period of time, watching what happens, listening 
to what is said, asking questions - in fact, collecting whatever data are 
available to throw light on the issues that are the focus of the research.  
(Hammersley and Atkinson 1995:1) 
  
Hammersley and Atkinson add that ethnographies consist of seeing and describing 
the world as it is. Unlike in controlled experiments or positivist science, the idea of 
ethnographies is to understand how people construct their social world 
(Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995:11). Importantly, ethnographic approaches also 
acknowledge that researchers are socio-historically situated (Hammersley and 
Atkinson, 1995) and that this permeates the interpretation of what they observe 
(Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995:17). This is partly explained by the list of 
activities provided by Gray (2014) which are part of ethnographic research, which 
include selecting the field, gaining access, gaining informed consent, becoming 
invisible, building rapport, and getting out. This research involved all of these 
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activities, to a greater or lesser extent, depending on which stage of the research 
process. I am not the exception to this.  
 
My selection of the case study was due to my personal support and research 
interest in alternative forms of governance. The reason I was able to enter the 
Project and gain informed consent was because I was able to pay the 2,500 USD 
trip to Tahiti that would introduce the Project leaders and because I happened to 
be a well-educated woman from the Global South, doing her PhD when the Project 
kicked off. Perhaps I became invisible after a while because all those reasons 
combined: being a woman from the Global South and PhD student who, despite 
being a researcher, is interested and supportive of alternative forms of governance. 
Throughout that process, I, also, built rapport, first with the Project members and, 
as the Project advanced and I was able to see several its flaws, I built rapport with 
Polynesians. These activities and my role have shaped the findings accordingly. 
 
Doing Ethnography in a Complex Adaptive System 
The research design and data collection methods embodied Agar’s description of 
ethnographic methods in complex social systems. For Agar (2004:24), 
ethnography offers the possibility to study complex adaptive systems because it is 
a methodology that itself is a complex adaptive system. Agar argues that 
ethnography is the ideal methodology to study social systems with many parts 
which do not fit within Kuhn’s classical science. The author writes:   
  
Ethnographic research is, in and of itself, a complex adaptive system. 
The process involves an ethnographer, at least one, and different 
people that he/she spends time with, and in this day and age lots of 
information from other sources as well. The process begins in 
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comparative disorder, shifts and changes through time, and typically 
winds up with conclusions that were not expected at the beginning.  
(Agar, 2004:18) 
  
Agar adds that ethnographies allow one to see connections in nonlinear complex 
systems by finding patterns in the data, as opposed to isolate and then measure 
previously known things. Other authors, such as Freeman and Cameron (2008:2) 
and Salminen (2015) agree with this idea that the study of complex dynamic 
systems requires methodologies that acknowledge their complex nature. For 
ethnographers, this means acknowledging and accepting the ethnographic 
process as an open, dynamic complex system too. 
  
To illustrate his argument, Agar explains that the ‘algorithmic complexity’ of 
ethnographies is as complex as the thing studied. It is also larger than the 
algorithmic complexity of traditional social research. Moreover, in ethnographies, 
the algorithm is not a path, but an area. Agar calls this a ‘fuzzy algorithm’. By that, 
he means that ethnographic methods emerge as the study is carried out. Methods, 
therefore, are creative responses to the ways in which the researcher adapts the 
research problem. Research then becomes a fractal exercise in the fitness 
landscape, Agar explains, where one rich point leads to another and to another. 
Because of their complex adaptive system nature, Agar highlights difficulties of 
systematically designing ethnographic research for complex systems. Especially 
at the beginning of the ethnography when everything is open-ended and the 
problem itself has not entirely revealed. I experienced this with this thesis. Both the 
thesis and the case study were exercises in nonlinearity, in at least three ways. 
First, the questions, the problem and the methods emerged iteratively after the 
research had begun. Second, the data was selected by identifying patterns, and 
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this final piece is very different from the one I had planned to write. And third, the 
argument emerged after the Project had faded away. It is because of this 
characteristic of ethnographic methods that the ideas I share here are also very 
different from the ones I had at the beginning of the research, which, without 
knowing better, out the Project in a better light.  
 
This thesis also has elements of netnographies. Kozinets (2016) describes 
netnographies as research methodologies consisting of doing ethnography on the 
web. It usually takes place in online forums and communities. As we will see in 
further detail, as part of the research, I explored Facebook posts, Facebook groups 
and pages related to the case study. Salminen (2015) adds that netnographies are 
equally flexible and adaptive as ethnographies, in that they rely on participant-
observer methods. However, it is worth noting that although this thesis uses data 
from Facebook, this is not a thesis in digital methods. Facebook was not included 
as an original data source in this thesis. It was only at the end that the platform 
became a hot space for French Polynesians to protest against the Floating Island 
and, therefore, it was included afterwards.  
 
Intending to use using a complex systems framework to understand various 
aspects of the Floating island, in this thesis, I recollect my findings of complex 
governance in the creation, governance and demise of the Floating Island Project. 
This entails looking at the Project’s regulatory framework, but also key people and 
events that played a role in it. The following section describes my data collection 
as a participant/observer, which extended for a year and a half, from May 2017 to 
November 2018. During that period, I was immersed, online and physically, in the 
Floating Island Project.   
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4.3 .Data Collection Methods   
The data collection started in February 2017 and concluded in November 2018. 
However, I began participating in the Project in June, 2017. First, I describe the 
participant observation. 
 
4.3.1. Participant Observation 
After May 2017 and through most of the data collection process in the Floating 
Island Project, I had a dual role: I was a participant and an observer. Participant 
observation is a method that consists of the systematic observation of what is 
happening around the researcher while participating in a community (Guber 2001). 
Data collection in participant-observation is closely linked to the specific role of the 
researcher. Guber explains that, as an observant, the analysis of the data is based 
on the notes taken by the researcher. As a participant, the researcher, in a way, 
becomes part of the community. Authors such as Hammerley and Atkinson (1995) 
agree with Guber (2001:61) when she refers to an epistemological tension 
between these two roles. I certainly experienced such tension throughout the 
research between my role as a researcher (for my PhD) and participant (for the 
Floating Island Project). This is one of the challenges that I discuss in the 
Challenges section below. 
Participant observation was a transversal data collection and crucial method for 
this research. The dual role enabled me to access the Project, gather and make 
sense of the document analysis and the data, holistically. More importantly, it 
helped me understand the Project in ways that I could have not had I only relied 
on document analysis as an outside observer. I was able to note how useful this 
method was after I became a participant of the Floating Island. Then, I realised that 
much of what was written about it in the media was questionable and often 
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incomplete. I expand on this issue in Chapter Seven, where I discuss ripples which 
contributed to the Project’s fading.  
I was able to participate in the Project and observe it from within by virtue of getting 
involved with the company leading the project, Blue Frontiers. This happened one 
year and a half into my PhD when I began volunteering for the Project. My role in 
the company then evolved from volunteer to staff, when I became the Project’s 
podcast host and communicator. Therefore, for a significant portion of the data 
collection process, I had this dual role. I am not entirely sure when did this dual 
role ended because of the fading nature of the Project. My last activity for the 
Project was in June 2018. The following description of the evolution of my roles 
explains why I chose to pursue ethnographic methods of research. As the following 
paragraphs show, I found myself in a privileged position, as a researcher, after 
speaking at the Seasteading Conference in Tahiti in May 2017. 
 
External vs Internal Observant 
When, in January 2017, The Seasteading Institute announced the signature of the 
Memorandum of Understanding with the Polynesian government (TSI, 2017j13), 
my year and a half quest to find a case study involving an alternative or emerging 
form of governance ended. The Project would be launched with a conference in 
Tahiti four months later. Seeing the opportunity to participate in what I saw could 
be a historic moment for the Startup Societies movement’, I applied to speak.16 The 
topic of my talk was bio-inspired, self-organised political systems which ‘forked’ -
i.e., bifurcated - from nation-states. I was accepted. Months later, I flew to Tahiti. 
 
16 The Startup Societies movement (see: Startup Societies, nd; Frazier and McKinney, 2019b) 
comprises the proliferation in the last decades of small scale, experimental forms of 
governance, such as special Economic Zones, charter cities, ecovillages, seasteads, private 
residential communities, intentional communities and microstates.    
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While touring Tahiti in a bus with the other international speaker attendees, from 
17 countries, Blue Frontiers’ co-founder, Randy Hencken, invited speakers and 
attendees to volunteer for the Project.  
 
After returning from Tahiti, I joined as a volunteer in the online project management 
platform used by the Project, Basecamp (see: Ventury, 2019).17,18 Additionally, I 
started attending weekly video meetings of the Project's working groups⁠. My entire 
participation in the Project as a volunteer, including activities in these platforms, is 
protected under a non-disclosure agreement (NDA) (see Appendix 1). This 
Agreement states that I cannot share information that is not already public or that 
I have not been given permission to share if it was confidential. This affected the 
type of data I could collect and what I could argue, as I describe in the challenges 
section below. Despite the limitations, the non-disclosure agreement gave me 
access to internal data, working documents, maps, conversations, insights, 
budgets, people, confidential information and various internal visions about the 
Project.  
  
In August 2017, I was invited by the Startup Societies Foundation to be part of a 
seasteading panel at their summit in San Francisco. I shared the panel with three 
Blue Frontiers staff. My structured answers in the summit made clear the potential 
relevance of my profile as a doctoral candidate for the Project. Before that, while I 
sometimes commented on posts on the online project management platform, my 
participation in video meetings was mostly silent. Part of the reason for this was 
 
17 Basecamp is an app that allows group posts, to-do list, live chats, file storage and 
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that I was aware of my dual, and therefore uncomfortable, role. Therefore, at first I 
was mostly a quiet observant, cheering on a good idea every once in a while. 
However, afterwards, I started to contribute more on the online discussions with 
ideas and critiques. I also took on more tasks such as translating the website to 
Spanish. While being a volunteer, Blue Frontiers began planning the launch of its 
cryptocurrency, Varyon. To help promote the launch, I organized and attended 
events around the world about blockchain.  
 
It is worth noting that these events were predominantly male-dominated. As it often 
happens, it was common in these events for men to address only other men in 
conversation groups. Being raised by a feminist scholar, and being one myself, I 
decided not to allow the male-dominated ‘tech world’ to make me invisible. This 
affected the development of my role in the Floating Island. I soon became more 
active in Basecamp and even coined the initial name for the Project’s 
cryptocurrency, SeaCoin; the name was later changed because there was already 
another cryptocurrency in Greece with the same name, as it was discussed on the 
Project’s open group on the app Telegram.  
  
Weeks later, my more active involvement paid off. Blue Frontiers invited me in 
October 2017 to French Polynesia to run a one-day workshop for 25 Polynesians 
about biomimicry and self-organisation (Tahiti-Infos, 2017, Actu.fr, 2017). While 
the workshop was only one day, I decided to stay in Tahiti longer. Therefore, from 
October to December 2017, I lived at a rented house with the Blue Frontiers 
founders and staff in the mountains of Tahiti. Other volunteers, staff and advisors 
visited for periods at a time. 
 




Around the time, I still had not grasped the Project in its entirety, nor the different 
motivations of players in the Company. Back then, I, like most others involved in 
The Floating Island Project, believed the Project was going to – and should - work. 
However, things were not going well and I could see this. To have more influence 
in the Project’s direction, and given that I was one of the few members of the 
Project who spoke French (the main language of French Polynesia), I proposed 
myself for various managing positions within the Company. While none of these 
roles materialised, Joe Quirk, a key player in The Seasteading Institute, titled me 
as a 'seavangelesse' during a trip to Marlon Brando’s neighbouring island, 
Tetiaroa. I was pleased with this and posted about this new title on Facebook. This 
was Quirk’s deliberate play on words within the context of The Floating Island. After 
all, the title ‘evangelist’ is widely used in Silicon Valley and tech companies to 
denote, as it appears in Forbes Magazine, "a person who believes in your product 
or service so fervently that he or she aggressively promotes it to others” (Pattel, 
2015). Months later, in February 2018, I was officially hired in the role of Blue 
Frontiers´ `Seavangelesse´. I was basically the Company's international 
spokesperson through podcasts and in events, such as meetups.19 This 
spokesperson role, however, did not include French Polynesia. One of Blue 
Frontiers founders was in charge of that. I explore more in-depth the ethical 
implications of my dual role in the sections of advantages and challenges of this 
chapter and in the ethics section.  
  
 
19 It is important to note that because Blue Frontiers was a startup, during my participation in 
the project, I received a very minor percentage of equity in the company. However, because 
the Project faded, it was unclear what the status of the shares were. At the end of this PhD, I 
asked Blue Frontiers what the status of the Company and the shares, but I was awaiting for 
confirmation of their status and so far I have not received a reply. 
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In my new paid role of ‘seavangelesse’, my tasks were recording podcasts and 
writing blogs. The podcasts, blogs, meetups and living in Tahiti with Blue Frontiers' 
staff gave me countless opportunities to gain a better understanding of the Project, 
the people involved in it and the different positions and visions within it. This 
participation also contributed to my understanding of the Project. This is because, 
to be a well-informed podcast host, I had to study every aspect of the project. I 
learnt about governance, graphene reinforced concrete for floating platforms and 
even the market of floating real estate. However, in most cases, I tried to keep my 
position as a researcher and as Seavangelesse as separate as possible, although 
there were a few instances where these two roles met, as I explain in the empirical 
chapters.  
 
On average, I participated in 8 weekly meetings on Zoom and I daily read the 
Basecamp posts. The online group meetings worked as think tanks. Additionally, I 
attended one meeting with all the volunteers and staff. While, again, I do not cite 
nor reference content from the meetings nor platforms, the use of Basecamp was 
especially interesting and is worth saying a little more. Basecamp was used 
consistently for more than a year in the Project. It was the place where volunteers 
shared ideas and information (Ventures, 2019).  
 
Offline Participant observation 
The online participatory/observation was enriched by offline participatory 
observation in French Polynesia and in the Netherlands. I made two trips to French 
Polynesia in 2017. One visit was in May, as an external observant, and the second 
one went from October to December, as a participant/observant. As I wrote above, 
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during the second trip, I cohabited with the Blue Frontiers team residing in French 
Polynesia. This gave me countless opportunities for informal and formal 
communications about the Project’s progress and all its main actors. I could grasp 
spoken and unspoken nuances and subtleties of the participants that I could not 
have grasped otherwise. I could also see the various personal motivations among 
the five Blue Frontiers’ co-founders. These ranged from creating new communities 
and technologies, innovating with governance, to simply gaining personal status. 
In this second trip I was also given access to confidential information about the 
Project, including the unpublished legal feasibility study, which Thevenot (2017) 
explains was done by the French firm GB2A. The legal study was the legal report 
submitted to the government for studying the viability of the Project. As such, it 
gave me a clear understanding of the Project’s requests for the SeaZone.  
 
Likewise, in February 2018, I visited and worked for two weeks at the office of 
Blue21, the Dutch floating architecture firm working with the Floating Island, in 
Delft, Netherlands. While the reasons for my trip were not to collect data, this visit 
enabled me to better comprehend Blue21’s environmental vision for the Project, 
beyond the documents and meetings, and their commitment to sustainable 
architecture.  
  
My in-person empirical observations in these trips relied on recollections of 
conversations in which I was part of and on notes I took about them afterwards. 
Despite the richness of this information, I left out everything which is not in the 
public domain or related to the thesis. I discuss the limitations of doing so this in 
section 4.5. of this chapter. For space reasons, I also only dedicated a paragraph 
to some of the topics which were most interesting for me and that aligned very well 
with Puig de la Bellacasa’s care and non-humans approach. This is the systems 
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ecology perspective to the Island’s design and how non-human animals played a 
central role in the Environmental Impact Analysis of Blue21.  
  
4.3.2. Document Analysis 
Document analysis was the second data collection method used for this research. 
This method, as Bowen (2009) describes it, consists of the systematic revision or 
evaluation of documents, printed or electronic. According to Bowen, the data 
from documents should be selected, made sense of and later synthesised. This 
method allowed me to corroborate or back the qualitative evidence found as a 
participant-observer. It also pointed me in new directions to what to look for in my 
participation. Overall, documents were particularly useful for the research, given 
that the Project was in a planning phase - I say more about this below.  
 
Documentation is an efficient method of research because documents, being 
stable sources, work as halting points (Merriam, 1988). In ongoing projects, having 
halting points in the form of published data helps to select among the vast 
information of things being constructed. However, authors such as Bowen (2009) 
warn that documents should not be treated as 100% accurate evidence. To a 
certain extent, this applies to this case study too. While documents were the most 
static and shareable data source, the Floating Island Project study did not 
materialise. Consequently, it is difficult to contrast how the Island would have been 
had it not ended. Nevertheless, the halting nature of the documents allowed me to 
construct and share an image of the Project and the planning stage it reached, as 
faithful as possible to what I observed.  
 
Documents Analysed 
For data about the Floating Island, I mostly focus on sources containing first-hand 
information. For the empirical chapters (Five, Six and Seven), the main documents 
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analysed were publicly available documents by Blue Frontiers and Blue21 – all  
available on Blue Frontiers' website. More specifically, I looked at the 
environmental (Blue21, 2017), economic (EMSI, 2017) and location (Blue Frontiers 
and Blue21, 2017ls) studies. I also analysed the reports of the working groups 
about energy and water (Blue Frontiers, 2017e) and food (Blue Frontiers, 2017f). 
The Food Systems and Energy and Water reports discussed possible technologies 
for the Island collected in the two last quarters of 2017. These reports were written 
by volunteers and staff groups and, to a certain extent, they are a reflection of some 
ideas discussed on Basecamp and on Zoom. I also use the Varyon purchasing 
document (Blue Frontiers, 2018e) as a key data source. I additionally use data 
from Blue Frontiers’ Medium blogs account and various publications associated 
with The Seasteading Institute.  
  
There is, however, one confidential document which I mention in this thesis, the 
legal study (GB2A, 2017). The legal study was part of the studies submitted to the 
government. I cannot mention the specific concessions the Project sought. This 
limited the thesis, for it made it difficult to share those topics that were considered 
for the SeaZone from a legal perspective. Thankfully, there were enough public 
sources by Blue Frontiers and others, including the Memorandum of 
understanding, which mention the type of regulations sought by the project. 
Discussing these was a strategy I took to overcome the limitation of not being able 
to share the content of the legal study. Nevertheless, I expand more on the 
implications of this limitation on the Challenges section below.  
 
I took two additional safeguards to make sure I did not violate the non-disclosure 
agreement, besides using only public information. Since the legal study was a 
starting point to understand the regulations framing the SeaZone, close to the 
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thesis submission date I shared with Blue Frontiers’ co-founders phrases in the 
thesis that mentioned the legal study. Even though it was not necessary, I also 
shared phrases that discussed existing regulations mentioned in the legal study. 
Subsequently, I was given permission to cite the document in relation to the 
existing regulatory framework of French Polynesia. 
 
One additional strategy I used to overcome the limitations imposed by the NDA 
was to refer to French lawyers to support legal claims regarding existing 
regulations that apply in French Polynesia. And while the legal study is not in the 
references, I found important to mention it and give it the correct credits whenever 
necessary. This is because the study helped me get a general understanding of 
key, existing regulations of French Polynesia, some of which could have potentially 
applied for the Project. The study was particularly useful, especially because I am 
not a lawyer, nor my background is in law. In the section of the advantages and 
challenges of the methodological approach, I expand too on other challenges 
posed by the legal study, its French language and the non-disclosure agreement.   
  
  
Facebook, State of the Art Reports and Varyon purchasing document 
In addition to my participation in Blue Frontiers, for this thesis I also extracted data 
from Blue Frontiers' English and French Facebooks, as well as videos in personal 
profiles and Facebook pages. The Facebook data used for the thesis mainly 
consists of videos and video comments. All videos and comments were public and 
all the names of the Facebook users have been removed to protect their 
anonymity, unless they were or became public figures in Tahiti. 
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I selected the videos based on the number of views and comments they had during 
the peak of controversies about the project. There were four videos which stood 
out. I selected comments which reflected the most frequent views and grouped 
them by topic. During the selection process, I tried to select comments coming from 
Facebook users with names, profile pictures and background images that 
suggested they were from French Polynesia. This was to improve the chance that 
the views were expressed by someone from Tahiti or neighbouring islands.  
  
Excluded documents 
From the document analysis, I excluded most international new articles written 
about the Project. I only cite news sources that were French Polynesian or which 
help support my claims about the quality of the news discussing the project. I 
decided to exclude newspapers because, through participatory observation, I 
noted that most news articles written about the Floating Island were regurgitations 
about previous articles and contained information which was not well researched.  
 
I also exclude data from Blue Frontiers documents paragraphs, texts blogs or 
documents I took part in writing. As Bowen (2009) suggests, documents analysed 
should be written without the researcher’s intervention. The only exception is the 
Varyon purchasing document draft, which I contributed to. However, I was given 
access to this document when it was almost finished. My contributions in this 
document consisted of  imprinting my own hope about governance in the project, 
such as the idea of having heterarchical decision-making systems. However, this 
is all excluded from this thesis. I also contributed to conversations about the 
Island's possible e-Residence program. I worked on this idea separately under 
Blue Frontiers' Global Seasteading Movement, before it became a Blue Frontiers 
Global (see: blue-frontiers.global). However, I entirely exclude this international 
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competition and the e-residence idea I was working in from this thesis, even though 
this was not the same type of iteration of e-residency which is pushed forward in 
the purchasing document. Overall, written contributions I made to Blue frontiers 
documents is excluded from this analysis. 
 
4.4. Research Design 
This research, as is often the case with ethnographic approaches, collected 
rich data. A reason for this abundance was the evolving nature of the Floating 
Island. Indeed, throughout this research, the Project was in the planning phase. 
Therefore, during the data collection process, there was an abundance of ideas 
that could be easily confused with plans. Since almost any idea could potentially 
materialise, the data collection process was immense. So much so, that in January 
2018, the document for my notes and reflections was almost three times longer 
than what was required. To reduce the number of words, I developed a colour-
coding method for tracking the thesis progress and grading the daily words 
reduction progress. However, before that, I eliminated all information which was 
confidential, and I could not use. This limited what I could say, but avoided ethical 
issues arising from the use of confidential information. 
  
Data-Driven Research 
This thesis followed the data. At the end, a significant portion of it pointed to 
reasons why the Project had come to an end. However, at the beginning of the 
PhD, my interest in special jurisdictions with emerging or alternative forms of 
governance influenced my research choices. Thus, the early thesis material 
concentrated on how governance on the Floating Island might be. Throughout the 
data collection, I gathered data from the weekly meetings and organised it in the 
qualitative data classification software Nvivo. I grouped key concepts of 
 
   
 
89 
governance according to potential properties in the Floating Island’s governance, 
which I thought it could exhibit due to SeaZone's interest in creating new forms of 
governance and Special Economic Zones. This suggests that, before the Project 
begun fading, I approached it as something that was going to be. However, the 
fading of the Project and the peak of its crisis showed a more interesting and 
important side of it. It evidenced the Project's complexity in ways that its slow build- 
up did not. This influenced the research design, shifting the focus. With it, my role 
as an “ethnographer” shifted to that of a witness (Guillion, 2016); a ‘realist teller’ 
(Van Maneen, 2011). As Guber (2001) writes: “subjectivity forms part of the 
consciousness of every researcher and it plays an active role in knowledge”. 
Despite my initial enthusiasm about the Project, here I have tried to present the 
most accurate and objective representation of the Project, despite my initial 
support. This is why I speak here in first person, in some aspects critically and in 
others almost as an advocate. 
  
Nvivo 
During meetings, I collected data and inputted it into Nvivo as a way of managing 
the data overall. At the beginning of the data collection process, I gathered data on 
8 features of complex systems. These were: bottom-up processes, 
decentralisation, emergence, nestedness, networks, nonlinearity, self-organisation 
and complexity. Likewise, I collected data on 9 governance concepts: bottom-up, 
voluntary, non-hierarchical, hierarchical, heterarchical, polycentric, decentralised, 
voluntary and self-organised. However, none of these terms appeared recurrently 
- if at all - during meetings, even though it was possible to associate almost all data 
to them. For example, data about the Project cryptocurrency usually fall within the 
decentralisation category, since the token's goal was to decentralise governance. 
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But it could also be classified under voluntary, polycentric, etc. because these were 
broad, and rich categories. This was a limitation.  
Nvivo, additionally, presented limitations for categorisation including many 
overlapping complexity and governance concepts. For example, self-organisation 
and decentralised can both be understood as features of both. Given the 
complexity of my case study, I did not find this problematic. Yet, it did make data 
categorisation in Nvivo seem arbitrary - despite the software's purpose of avoiding 
this. An additional limitation of this process was that the majority of topics 
discussed never materialised because of the stage of the project. Because the 
Nvivo interface was not plastic enough for my case study, I abandoned Nvivo and 
begun categorising meetings and Basecamp data in the same way in which I 
categorised documents data and extracts: by colour-coding by topics related to 
complex governance, instead of by properties or features of complex systems and 
governance separately. 
  
Categorising and Colour-Coding by Topic 
Categorisation is crucial during data selection processes (Labuschagne, 2003). 
The data categorisation here entailed splitting into four categories: legal, 
environmental, economic and social. These categories originate in the 
Memorandum of Understanding (2017). The document read that the Institute 
needed to present legal, economic and environmental studies to the government. 
I added the social category also to capture the social and community aspect of the 
Project, which would arise from the people moving to the Floating Island and the 
interactions with those living near it.  
 
Each of the four categories had a colour. Legal data was blue. Environmental data 
was green. Economic data was yellow. And social data was pink. These four 
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colours are the most common in sticky notes and highlighters, which I used in 
notes, books and printed papers. Each color/category had a folder. Each folder 
had subfolders and documents for more specific topics. For example: selection 
process of residents was a sub-folder within the social folder. Collective 
management of utilities was a subfolder within the Environmental folder. Non-
human animals was a subfolder within the environmental one. Technological 
aspects were included under environmental. These categories were broad enough 
to include most aspects of the Project that would be governed. I also colour-coded 
the type of written data in each paragraph of each subfolder. This helped me to 
visually understand the type of data I had. 
  
The demise of the Project, however, expanded the focus of the research to include 
also why it did not go through.⁠  This is the main way in which the data collection 
process transformed after it had begun. Going back to Agar's view of 
ethnographies as complex adaptive systems, in studies where the object of study 
is being planned and is also constantly evolving, the methods become evolving 
processes themselves. As the Project began to fade, the focus moved from 
exploring the governance of the Project once it was built to discuss things I could 
‘observe’ in the present, such as its regulatory framework, stakeholders and 
decline.  
  
As the Project faded away, the research questions and the argument iteratively co-
constructed each other. My role as a researcher was to make sense of this data, 
by pointing out links between the data (Katz, 2002). Thus, I constructed (using the 
software Scapple) an evolving network of interrelation among the thesis' concepts. 
This concepts network enabled me to see the relations among concepts of the 
empirical chapters, and to present the thesis as academic storytelling process 
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(Guillion, 2016). I tried to build the empirical chapters in ways that followed Hart’s 
(2011:25) story arc: exposition, rising action, crisis, climax and falling action. This 
structure can still be seen in the empirical chapters and is the reason why I start 
with the history and the discussion on how the Project would be structured, I then 
move to presenting concerns, potentialities and disparities concerning the Project’s 
stakeholders that build-up tensions, and I close the empirical chapters with the 
Project’s controversy in Tahiti, by discussing the Project’s final stage.   
 
4.5. Advantages and Challenges of the Methodology 
There were three main advantages of conducting this research using ethnographic 
methods. These were access to first-hand sources, access to confidential 
information and seeing the Project unfolding from within. 
  
Advantage 1. First-hand sources 
By virtue of being a participant/observer, immersed online and offline into the object 
of study, I was able to rely on first-hand experience and data collected in first 
person. In retrospective, I understood that participating in the Project gave me a 
much more comprehensive knowledge than what the news outlets provided me 
when I was an external observant. Ironically, these news articles, in some ways, 
misinformed my research before I got involved.  
  
One example of the misinformation was the news’ repetition of Peter Thiel's 
involvement in the Project. This was one of the media’s  favourite topics. After 
visiting French Polynesia in May 2017 I realised that, contrary to what almost every 
news article said, Thiel was not involved in the Floating Island in any capacity. 
While news stories were abundant, having access to first-hand sources helped me 
to filter fake or tangential news. I, therefore, filtered and made sense of the data 
 
   
 
93 
based on what I saw first-hand. Having access to first-hand sources slowly 
debunked my initial assumptions and expectations about the Project, and it shaped 
my final argument. 
  
Advantage 2. Access to confidential information 
Since becoming a participant in the Project, but especially during and after visiting 
Tahiti the second time in October 2017, living and working 24 hours a day, 7 days 
a week, for 2 months, with Blue Frontiers’ staff gave me access to crucial and 
confidential information. It helped me understand further the case study, the 
different actors in it, and each of their various motivations. It also gave me access 
to confidential documentation, such as the legal study submitted to the 
government. These documents, and the study in particular, enabled me to see how 
the Project was being envisioned in regulatory, community, environmental and 
governance terms. 
  
Advantage 3. Seeing the Project from within 
Using participant-observation meant that I could see the Floating Island unfolding 
'from the inside'. This meant having access to informal conversations with 
members of Blue Frontiers, The Seasteading Institute and Blue21. These would 
inform my research, my position and my argument, even though most things are 
not explicitly included nor cited. This 'seeing from within' also allowed me to 
experience and understand some of the tensions behind the project, such as the 
perception in Tahiti towards the Project’s local representative. Some issues made 
it into my final draft because they were also externally reflected. The majority, 
however, did not. Issues connected to gender, diversity of the demographics, 
potential residents, multiple stakeholders are some of the ways in which 'seeing 
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from within' became tacit topics underpinning this research, thus contributing to its 
objectivity.   
 
Challenges 
I experienced five main challenges in terms of how the research was conducted. 
These were: studying a project in the planning stages, writing with a non-disclosure 
agreement, having two simultaneous hats, reading legal documents in French and 
writing about a failed project involving former colleagues. I go through each of 
these challenges briefly in what follows.  
  
Challenge 1. Project in Planning Phase 
The first challenge intrinsic to this research using participant-observation was 
studying an open-ended, evolving case study. This meant that, throughout the 
investigation, the Project was always changing. This made it difficult to choose 
halting points to look at. It also meant collecting enormous amounts of information, 
since each aspect of the Project or idea, until the Project faded away somewhere 
in the third quarter 2018, was something that could potentially materialise. These 
moving parts made it challenging to limit the data collection. Moreover, no aspect 
of the Project was entirely developed and the position of the government was most 
of the time unknown, postponed and uncertain. This increased the difficulty for 
presenting a definitive view of where the Project was going in its planning phase. 
The ultimate demise of the Project resolved this. It focused the problem, research 
questions led me to select a specific subset of events and events in time, and 
reduced the data I could use. 
  
Challenge 2. Writing with a non-disclosure agreement 
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Signing the non-disclosure agreement agreement (see: appendix 1) was what 
Guber (2014) refers to as a successful  entrance in the community being studied. 
It transformed my role from an external observant to a part of the community, part 
of the ‘thing’ itself. While the NDA had key benefits for the research, such as access 
to first-hand sources and confidential information, it limited what I could say and 
share. This is because the document ensured privacy and confidentiality for the 
Company. However, as the data I could use became smaller and smaller, I found 
that the complex governance framework was useful in more than one way. It 
described the creation, governance and demise of the Project, but it also enabled 
me to show, through the three chosen features, the other side of the story, the 
public side of what I could not share.  
 
More specifically, the concept of nestedness and multiple stakeholders reflected 
some of the issues included in the legal study relating to the many institutions that 
needed to be untangled or dealt with when creating the floating Zone. I do not cite 
the legal study nor disclose what concessions or specific areas of regulations the 
Company sought. However, nestedness serves as the conceptual tool for 
conveying to the reader the idea of the existence of many regulations and 
institutions that needed to be taken into account for creating the SeaZone. To make 
sure that nothing included in this thesis went against the NDA, I shared with Blue 
Frontiers founders those phrases included in the thesis that mention the legal study 
as well as those parts that convey that the legal study mentioned that specific 
institutions that regulate certain topics in French Polynesia. The description of the 
regulations and institutions of French Polynesia and France that apply in Polynesia 
was not confidential. However, I did this to make sure that the Company was ok 
with the information I used relating to the legal study. The Company was ok with it. 
In the end, I was able to mention existing national and supranational institutions 
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and regulations and how they would shape the SeaZone.  but without ever 
disclosing specific regulations that Blue Frontiers sought for the SeaZone This 
explains  why in Chapter Five I do not discuss what the Project sought in terms of 
concessions, but I only mention some examples of regulations and institutions 
which would have framed the Project, based on information publicly available that 
referred to the type of policies the Project could have.  
 
Similarly, the concept of waves was also instrumental, in that it showed the 
critiques and controversy the Project was facing without disclosing confidential 
information within the Project. The concept even helped to tell the story in a way 
that put at the centre the most important perspective, that of locals. And most 
importantly, the apparently descriptive concept (and chapter) on multiple levels of 
stakeholders is a place where publicly-available information tells the story of 
problems within the planning of the Project that were relevant since its beginning. 
This concept enabled me to construct dissonances within the image of the Project 
with what was publicly available. The same applies for the way I tie together the 
evidence and the work of Ostrom in Chapter Six. Ostrom’s emphasis on local 
stakeholders supports the idea that the Project presented issues related to lack of 
long-term community engagement, involvement and planning of the project with 
and for locals. I was able to say this without ever mentioning why was that the case 
or decisions within the Project that led to it. And while one could argue that my 
participation in the Project made me an accomplice, these three complex 
governance concepts were my way to criticise and show my position towards the 
Project, without violating the NDA.  
 
The non-disclosure agreement impacted the Project in other ways. As I have 
mentioned, I could not share the content of the legal study. To overcome this 
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limitation, I resorted to legal scholars who had written about the Project from a legal 
point of view, such as Lallemant-Moe, and who had discussed similar possibilities 
and limitations for making the SeaZone similar to those mentioned in the legal 
study. Something similar applied to information that was important internally and 
externally. When in the thesis I describe internal issues, for example, when I 
describe that someone no longer formed part of the Company, I made sure I had 
public information to back it, such as the person’s photo disappearing from the 
website or someone else mentioning it online. The only exception to this is 
information found through this research. The complex governance framework 
turned the agreement’s limitations into an advantage and an opportunity to engage 
more in-depth with complexity and case study in question. It pushed me to show 
how complex frameworks and institutions come to be.  
  
Challenge 3. Two simultaneous hats 
Having two simultaneous hats was an additional challenge for this research. This 
is because, as Van Maneen (2011) explains, ethnographers are simultaneously 
outsiders and insiders. These roles, as the author argues, need be negotiated. 
Indeed. In my case, throughout this research it was sometimes difficult to set limits 
to my participation in the Project, define my position, and even to solve time issues. 
At times it felt as if I was playing for opposite teams. To best execute my role as a 
doctoral candidate, I tried hard to be objective, critically engaged and reflective. 
However, my role in Blue Frontiers, especially once I started working as the 
communicator, entailed promoting the idea in a neutral and often positive manner. 
These two roles were clearly contradictory. The negotiation for these roles was 
many times, 'awkward'. This was particularly the case during my time spent in 
French Polynesia, when I lived and worked in the same house with members of 
Blue Frontiers. For example, I wrote this methodology chapter while being in 
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French Polynesia, living with and being surrounded by members of the Project. 
Because the methodology chapter required in-depth reflection, both of my role and 
my Project, I felt awkward writing it. I felt like a reporter taking notes for her next 
piece. However, my role as a researcher required objectivity. That said, I also felt 
sometimes uncomfortable with my participant role by being part of a project that, I 
was starting to see, had many flaws.  
  
The feeling was intensified by the power dynamics arising from my specific role as 
a volunteer and by being woman, especially being a young, 1.5mts tall, often 
smiling, woman from the Global South at that. My gender, together with 
assumptions about my personality made me appear non-threatening. Guber 
(2001) notes similar gender issues arising in ethnographic research. Easterday 
(1982) also explores precisely this idea of women being seen as less threatening 
researchers. This last idea was present in my participatory observation, and in 
more than one occasion required me to have to prove myself continually. While 
unfortunate, I tried to turn this into an advantage by working hard to achieve higher 
positions within the company, which led me to the role of “Seavangelesse”. This 
added more credibility to my role, opening the door to attend more confidential 
meetings, thus helping me understand the Project better. I also dealt with the 
simultaneous hats by trying to keep my two roles as separate as possible. The 
feelings of awkwardness went away as I my research skills made my work in the 
Company better. This is because doctoral research requires understanding in-
depth a phenomenon, looking at its different sides. This made the podcast better 
researched. However, it also led to instances such as the one I describe in the 
ethics section.  
 
 
   
 
99 
Although, generally, I think the fact that I had these ‘two hats’ was advantageous 
for this research, these were some instances where I experienced a clear ‘clash’ 
in my simultaneous roles. It is worth saying a little more about these here to 
illustrate further how I dealt with these tensions. The first instance where my role 
as a researcher for my PhD clashed a little with my role in the Company concerns 
a situation I found out about while doing research online for the thesis. Through a 
few paths Wikipedia search that took me to the French Polynesian president’s 
website, I found out that the political party of the French Polynesian president, who 
until campaign time had publicly supported the Project, used the Floating Island as 
the only negative environmental point of his re-election platform (Tapura, 2018a13; 
Paruru Ia Atimaono, 2018) – more on this in Chapter Seven below. This was 
important for the Project, as it coincided with the time where Blue Frontiers shared 
in its Medium account that it was conducting conversations with another 
archipelago in French Polynesia (Blue Frontiers, 2018n). I found this strange. To 
my knowledge, no one in the Company outside of French Polynesia was aware of 
this. Thus, I decided to share my preliminary research findings with the four  
managing directors of Blue Frontiers who were not in French Polynesia. This 
decision entailed prioritizing the research and the truth over the future of the 
company.  
  
The second instance were the two roles crashed consists of a Facebook video 
which I describe in Chapter Seven, in which I speak on behalf of the Project. Unlike 
the podcasts I did in the Project, this video was not so neutral and exploratory. I, 
instead, was defending the Project. At the time, I was working as a sea-vangelesse 
of Blue Frontiers and was still in the middle of the data collection process. I had 
not moved yet away entirely from the idea of writing the thesis about the how the 
SeaZone would govern itself, once established, to the attempted transition from 
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design to implementation. Considering that I was also a researcher when I 
recorded the video, the video could make me appear non-objective because I 
defend the Project I worked for, while it was already was evidencing several of its 
problems. However, after this video, I took a stronger and more critical stance to 
the Floating Island Project and the way it was carried out.  
 
Indeed, as the research advanced, and as the empirical chapters show, in this 
thesis my position towards the Project recognises various of its problems, 
especially those relating to the non-involvement of the local community. My final 
position is visible in the empirical chapters and conclusion. When the reader 
finishes reading this thesis, there will be no doubt that my position regarding similar 
projects is one which recognises the enormous potential of floating special 
economic zones. However, these projects need to be coherent to successfully 
move from design to implementation. Coherence cannot exist if projects do not 
make sense for their locations.  
 
Challenge 4. Reading Legal documents in French 
Conducting document analysis of legal documents in French was very difficult. So 
much so that it constitutes the fourth big challenge of my methodological approach. 
Although this thesis predominantly uses English-speaking literature (a limitation of 
this research), there were numerous French regulations which I had to read and 
skim for writing Chapter Five. The legal feasibility study was a very useful starting 
point for getting a general understanding of the regulatory and institutional context 
of French Polynesia. However, this document, one of the most important ones of 
the Project, and all regulations it referred me to, was in French. French is not my 
native nor second language so doing this took a significant amount of time. 
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Understanding these documents became harder because French Polynesia uses 
civil law. Civil law regulations can sometimes be difficult to follow. Each document 
calls back to other legal documents that the regulations in question modify or 
derogate. Since my main background discipline is not law nor French Law, 
understanding this information took me longer than researching any other part of 
the Project. Translating was not always an option because many of the regulations 
uploaded to Polynesia’s legal repository were scanned documents that were not 
easy to select.  
  
Challenge 5. Writing about a failed project involving former colleagues 
Lastly, the final challenge of this thesis was writing about a failed project involving 
former colleagues. While the Project’s fading made the research and case study 
arguably smaller in that there was an end to it, it also led to writing about the 
reasons why it faded. In some cases, explaining events in the Project’s fading 
meant naming specific people. For example, in the thesis I describe an 
inconsistency in the Project's messaging concerning one of Blue Frontiers’ co-
founders, his new company and French Polynesia. This led to a series of 
messaging discrepancies, which I discuss in the empirical Chapter 
Seven.  Although I encountered this data through my doctoral research, I shared 
this preliminary research findings with the other co-founders of the Company. Blue 
Frontiers stop being involved with this co-founder shortly afterwards. In a case like 
this one, where there are clear public discrepancies, it is at times challenging not 
to mention specific people when discussing specific events involving the Project. 
Those instances are not as awkward as others that are more general. For instance, 
in Chapter Six, I point out the few attempts to involve Polynesians in the Project. 
Since it is not a specific decision, point in time or person involved in a single event, 
arguing for it becomes more difficult. Six.  
 





For conducting this research, ethical approval was granted by the university 
committee. Of particular importance from an ethical point of view was the Non-
Disclosure Agreement document and my two simultaneous roles. 
 
Participant Observer 
The question of my two roles surfaced often. And so did the contradictions. In 
several occasions I found myself having to explain that I was a participant-observer 
and that being part of the Project gave me better access for a more informed 
research. That said, it was only once the Project begun fading and I stopped doing 
the podcasts and attending events that I focused more on putting together all the 
thesis pieces and data collected. I was clearly confronted with contradictions of my 
role as the Project’s spokesperson  while doing document analysis on the 
foundational seasteading text by Friedman and Gramlich (2009) and reading the 
way the authors spoke about the “third world”. I briefly highlighted key ways in 
Chapter Three. Through my dual role, I, a woman from the Global South, a 
“subaltern”, as Spivak (2003) calls it, who had decided to do a PhD in the first place 
to improve my (and mine) position in the international landscape, was promoting 
the same types of power dynamics that I had worked and studied to so hard to 
break away from. While I knew the role of a participant observer, as stated in 
previous sections, is inherently full of contradictions, it pleased me not to have the 
dual role anymore. From that moment on, as a way to balance out my own 
involvement in a neo-colonial Project, I came up with five simple principles for the 
types of projects I would get involved in the company I was already starting to plan 
for when I finished the PhD. These principles accompany me to this date and have 
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marked a difference between traditional seasteading-like projects and the type of 
floating real estate and zones that I work with.20  
Other instances in which the participatory observation, and specifically the 
simultaneous internal and external roles it came with, conflicted was when 
researching for this thesis led me to come across publicly available information 
about the Project that contradicted what its own social media channels said. I am 
referring to when I found out that a Blue Frontiers co-founder started a parallel 
competing company or when the Polynesian government distributed pamphlets 
against the Floating Island and the Project and its audience outside of French 
Polynesia did not know. Both times, I decided not to keep this secret. I knew I had 
to do the right thing, and my researcher hat prevailed.   
  
Overall, my dual role, while awkward, influenced my final position in this thesis 
regarding the creation of the Project and SeaZones. That is, on the one hand, I 
recognise and discuss several of the problems the Project had. On the other hand, 
I acknowledge the potential impact of special jurisdictions and floating architecture 
when these mix in the right way. This starts by understanding the implications of 
existing complex governance systems and those being created. In that way, this 
thesis might be one of the few texts about the topic which do not take an entirely 
critical nor favourable approach to the topic, but a mixture of both. At the moment, 
there are two types of writing about seasteading-like and floating zones: there are 
authors who believe in seasteading almost fundamentally and there are others who 




20 The principles can be found on the company’s website: www.seaphia.blue.   
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As already noted, the type of data I can present in this thesis as empirical evidence 
is constrained by a non-disclosure agreement. I signed this document when I 
became a volunteer of Blue Frontiers and it applied for all my time after it. 
Consequently, information arising in meetings, minutes, unpublished documents, 
confidential documents, formal and informal conversations involving Blue Frontiers 
or related people, in person or online, are not part of this research.  
 
From an ethical point of view, signing this document could have meant putting the 
researcher objectivity at risk, because I was constrained in what I could say.  
However, I found ways to tell the story and to speak of some of the Project’s 
problems with what was available. The instances where my internal and external 
hats clashed, described above in this section, reflect that I did not negotiate the 
responsibility I have as a researcher and a researcher from the Global South, in 
telling the story the way it happened. Additionally, as I have explained in the 
complex governance section of the previous chapter and here, the concepts of 
complex governance enabled me to say via the three features (nestedness, 




This chapter described the methodology and methods used to conduct the 
research and collect the data. These were online and offline participatory 
observation and document analysis. The chapter presented the research design 
and the role that the planning phase of the case study played in the evolution of 
the research methods. I additionally reflected on the advantages and challenges 
of the methods and expanded on ethical aspects of my two hats and of signing the 
non-disclosure agreement.  
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PART II. EMPIRICAL CHAPTERS 
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CHAPTER 5. INSTITUTIONAL NESTEDNESS 
 
5.1. Introduction 
To support this thesis’ argument that the Floating Island Project exhibited three key 
features of complex governance, in this Chapter, I focus on nestedness and the 
institutional and regulatory framework of the Floating Island. Nestedness is a 
fundamental property of complex governance forms, in the same way that nested 
structures constitute the makeup of other complex systems. Simon (1962) explains 
that when systems exist within other systems, they are nested. In a governance 
context, authors such as Vella and Baresi (2017), Gómez Lee and Maxfield (2017), 
Haarstad (2016), Zia and Koliba (2011), Hamilton and Lubell (2017) and Lubell et al. 
(2017) each explain that multiple institutions and layers within others make up a 
complex governance structure. That said, there are two main ways to see 
nestedness in the Floating Island. One arises from its location and the other one 
from its institutions. However, they both come together in governance because of 
how they mutually shape, as we shall see.  
 
In this chapter, I show how the Floating Island, from a legal point of view, would be 
structured as a nested system formed by several institutions. The nested institutions 
in this structure would be the SeaZone Authority, the municipality of Teva I Uta, 
French Polynesia, France, the European Union and the United Nations - plus China 
and the United States.21 The nested structure of these domestic, international and 
supranational institutions, and their corresponding tangled regulatory networks, 
 
21 I do not include Tahiti in this list because, while Tahiti is the island where the Project would 
locate and, therefore, is geographically relevant, it does not have a government. Moreover, it 
was not so much the institutions and inhabitants of Tahiti, but of the specific municipality within 
the Island, which were part of the Project’s nested structure and which played a key role in 
the Project. That said, from a location point of view, the Project would also be nested: 
Floating Island, Tahitian lagoon, etc. 
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would have framed the Project. Some of these other institutions are also nested 
within each other. However, the Project’s situation was special because it would be 
a private actor providing governance functions. The Project it would be framed by, 
and create exemptions to, institutions in the nested structure and their regulations. 
Here, I additionally show how, in the nested framework, the Floating Island Project 
would follow the regulations of some these institutions in some aspects and in others 
no.   
 
Here I explain how the Floating Island Project’s nestedness can be traced back to 
its decision to be an enclave in French Polynesia which has an extended colonial 
history. This was compounded by The Seasteading Institute’s decision to go from 
SeaZones to seasteads. An important starting point for this chapter is the Project’s 
legal feasibility study which The Seasteading Institute submitted to the government 
in 2017. As agreed in the Memorandum of Understanding, the Assembly would 
examine this study, together with the economic, environmental and location studies. 
The purpose of these studies entailed convincing formal French Polynesian  
stakeholders, such as members of the Assembly, of the Project’s viability and benefit 
for French Polynesia. Had the government approved it, the Floating Island Project 
would have a special regulatory package called ‘the SeaZone Acts’. These Acts of 
the Assembly would give the Project certain autonomy to self-govern. Although the 
Project submitted the studies to the government on time, the Assembly did not 
discuss them. However, looking at the formal institutions and regulations which 
would frame the SeaZone is interesting, insofar as they shed light on how complex 
frameworks do and do not manifest. Moreover, these institutions help to understand 
complex governance in this particular special jurisdiction, which would have been 
the first one of its kind.  
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That said, this chapter’s primary focus is formal stakeholders, despite that, as 
Chapter Two suggested, the literature on complex governance systems emphasises 
diverse stakeholders and institutions, formal and informal. The reason for focusing 
on these stakeholders is that the studies that drove the Floating Island Project, 
especially the legal study, also concentrated on them, so it makes sense that they 
feature prominently here as well. I explore informal (rather than formal) stakeholders 
in the next chapters. In the following sections, I show nestedness as it presents itself 
in this particular Project. More specifically, I discuss organisations, governments, 
coded jurisdictions, written regulations and government stakeholders framing this 
SeaZone attempt. 
 
The chapter is structured as follows: I first elaborate further on the concept of 
nestedness used here, as used by the complex governance field. Following this, I 
trace back the origin of nestedness in French Polynesia’s colonial history with 
France. Next, I look at the history of SeaZones to suggest that how the story of the 
Floating Island and its desire to nest within a state also explain the origin of 
nestedness in the Project. Subsequently, I offer several examples of domestic and 
supranational institutions framing the Floating Island Project which evidence 
nestedness. Next, I describe one implication of the nested framework, namely the 
existence of tangled regulations. Afterwards, I focus on additional government 
stakeholders that were part of the Project’s nested structure. These particular 
stakeholders were brought into the Project’s framework by how Blue Frontiers’ 
planned the Project’s token, Varyon, and not by French Polynesia’s colonial history 
and present. After highlighting some limitations of taking this formal approach to 









This section explains the concept of nestedness by summarizing what key authors 
say about it. I do this in order to understand the governance of the Floating Island 
Project. This concept is helpful for the thesis because, as I show in this chapter, the 
Floating Island Project’s institutional framework was going to be a nested system in 
all its various socio-political, institutional, spatial, economic and environmental forms. 
The nestedness of the Project would not have arisen only from its location within 
Tahiti, French Polynesia, etc., but from the type of inter-relations within and among 
institutions governing each of these places. Bear with me, as the following section is 
highly theoretical. 
 
I noted earlier in the literature review that the key idea of nestedness should be 
understood in terms of the structure of complex systems. As Simon (1962) sums up, 
this structure has systems containing other, smaller systems that are ‘within’ larger 
ones. Nested hierarchies are ubiquitous across complex social systems. Byrne and 
Callahan (2013) convey that nestedness in the governance context means the 
existence of many levels of institutions. Brenner (2001) explains this type of structure 
with the example of Russian dolls – matryoshkas. However, there is a fundamental 
difference between complex nested systems and non-complex nested systems such 
as these dolls. While matryoshkas only have contact to the doll enclosing them and 
the one they enclose, in complex nested systems every level can communicates with 
others, even with those levels which are not physically close. Brenner (2001:606) 
uses this example of matryoshkas to explain that the difference is a matter of 
information flow. Unlike matryoshkas, information flow in complex nested systems 
forms tangled networks communicating each level of the structure. This is something 
we will see in this chapter with the regulations framing the Floating Island Project.  
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This type of information flow of nestedness is one reason why Cilliers (1998:5-7) 
states that complex systems’ structures cannot be reduced to static levels stacked 
upon each other. This is an idea Byrne and Callaghan connect and understand 
through discussions about micro and macro perspectives, or between restrictive and 
general complexity. Byrne and Callaghan cite Morin (see Morin, 2006), known for his 
‘general’ approach, as a way to distinguish between restrictive versus general 
complexity. Restricted complexity refers to a focus in complexity for microscopic 
behaviours and their nonlinear interactions. Restricted complexity allows, for 
instance, modelling of complex systems through a few simple rules. However, Byrne 
and Callaghan highlight that focusing on the specific details leaves aside key 
concepts of complex systems, such as randomness or unpredictability. These are 
concepts that, as argued by Luzeaux (2013), scientists still struggle to model in a 
meaningful way in applied settings. As Byrne and Callaghan add, when models try 
to capture the complexity of a phenomenon, there needs to be coding of a limited 
set of behaviours which give way to the emergent complexity, even when random 
behaviours are programmed. This, in turn, overlooks not only unpredictability but 
also that the modelled elements might be complex themselves. The authors argue 
that similar limitations occur when the focus is only on general complexity or global 
structures: fundamental local interactions and agents which give rise to complex 
behaviours tend to be ignored.  
 
However, like Byrne and Callaghan, I argue that nestedness, in many ways, can 
diminish the division between restrictive and general complexity. Nestedness avoids 
this division by acknowledging that the reality of many complex systems 
encompasses both micro and macro levels. Several authors previously approached 
this epistemological division, albeit from a less social science perspective, such as 
Murray Gell-Man (1995) exemplified in his work, The Quark and the Jaguar. Other 
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authors, such as Gerrits (2012) address this problem from a more social systems 
point of view. Gerrits argues that complex systems cannot be separated in their 
scales because the multiple levels in their nested structures are integrated. Again 
this chapter shows the extent to which this is true. I will explain this by engaging with 
the way in which French Polynesia is constrained by France, and how each level of 
the Project’s nested structure would have, indeed, constrained or, better said, framed 
the Floating Island. 
 
However, important in the context of this thesis, is that despite the recognition that 
social systems can be nested, the social sciences, including political science, have 
traditionally focused on one level, and at most three when discussing governance. 
Yet, here, complex systems arguably require governance structures that are n-
dimensional. Limiting studies to a few levels is usually accompanied by another 
problem, one which Gerrits (2012) points out: many approaches to complex 
governance ignore a fundamental property of complex systems, emergence. 
Ignoring emergence is similar to what occurs when modelling and simulation studies 
of complex systems focus only on the micro perspective - or macro, for that matter -  
they forget about randomness and unpredictability. That said, emergence, as Urry 
(2004:21) explains, is not the opposite of these reductionist perspectives. Instead, 
as Byrne & Callaghan (2013) likewise argue, the concept of emergence integrates 
levels, since it is the result of a mutually influencing process between micro and 
macroscopic systems. 
 
As the previous discussion suggests, the field of complex governance, with its focus 
on nestedness and emergence, tries to and has, indeed, broken away from political 
science’s traditional focus on a few levels of governance. To a large extent, the state 
still occupies the central role in mainstream political science. In contrast, the complex 
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governance field is frequently focused on forms of governance composed by 
modular structures interacting at various levels, instead of only studying a single 
level, centralised or hierarchical systems. This is why, in the complex governance 
field, concepts such as network models of governance and policy appear. To briefly 
explain these, these are networks involving several groups and entities which 
participate in policy creation, together with governments (Papadopoulos, 2003). This 
idea connects to Gerrits (2012:63) advocacy for the systemic understanding of 
policymakers’ roles, by looking at them, not as single individuals, but as whole 
populations. He calls this a “policy action system” and explains that this system can 
be a subset of other complex adaptive systems – they are nested. Urry (2000:8) 
brings out a similar idea: “complexity means that states have increasingly shifted 
away from governing a relatively fixed and clear-cut national population residing 
within its territory”.  
 
A similar notion is presented by Dobbs et al. (2011) in reference to the governance 
of complexity to manage marine environmental resources and the inter-lapping of 
federal and state regulations. However, the existence of multiple ways of 
communication does not mean there are no power hierarchies among different levels 
of a nested system. They exist and sometimes form what Pagano (2007:7) refers to, 
as “spheres of influence over which distinct levels of government have control and 
authority”. Alike, Ostrom argues, nestedness entails more rules within institutions 
and rules to modify those rules. In her words: “all rules are the result of decisions 
made in a deeper arena that define how rules may be changed” (Ostrom, 2005:32).   
 
Yet, especially in governance, these rules come from the nature of the system and 
its function to govern and not only from nestedness itself. We can, therefore, speak 
of two forms of hierarchies present in this case study, one coming from complex 
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governance as a structure and one from the governance institutions involved in it. 
This last one, more than nestedness, explains top-down relations in complex 
governance systems.22 As stated above, nestedness in complex systems implies 
hierarchical architectures in the sense of a structural property of organisation, but 
not necessarily in the sense of top-down information processing or control (Gerrits, 
2012; Simon, 1962). This is because, in nested systems, the local and global 
mutually influence each other. This, in turn, can be explained by how complex nested 
systems are characterised by their networks with multiple levels and many directions 
of information flow. This is a fundamental characteristic of nested, complex systems 
and of complex governance - one whose importance becomes more evident as this 
chapter, and the other two empirical chapters, progress.   
 
In relation to this last idea (multiple directions of information flow), a notion that 
frequently appears in the literature when discussing nestedness and multilevel 
governance systems, is “tangled”. It is commonplace for authors in the literature of 
complex governance to discuss ‘tangled, multitiered hierarchies’ (Brenner, 
2001:608), ‘tangled hierarchies and dispersed multiscalar networks (Brenner, 
2001:605), ‘tangled political hierarchies’ (Rowe and Bavinton, 2011:812), and 
“complex and uncertain setting of tangled networks and blurred boundaries” (Clarke, 
2007:60). Jessop, a prominent author of multilevel governance and the one whose 
governance concept I use in the thesis, highlights the importance of the notion of 
tangled. 
 
22 It is because of this function to govern that I have opted for presenting a view of nestedness 
related to institutions which are tied to jurisdictions more than to geography, even though 
recent debates recognise the limitations of each of these approaches in isolation. With my 
choice of a ‘jurisdictions point of view’. I am not suggesting that what Brenner (2001) describes 
as scalar geography does not matter in complex governance. It simply means that I followed 
the direction of the case study’s data, whereby Tahiti almost did not appear in the case study, 
as opposed to Teva I Uta. However, I did not separate institutions from location, but the 
contrary, because these two are coupled in complex governance systems, as the empirical 
chapters and this one in particular shows.    
 




 The author writes that complex governance can “display tangled hierarchies in so 
far as lower levels are constrained by higher levels yet simultaneously help to shape 
the latter” (Jessop, 1997:6). Elsewhere, Jessop (2004:12) writes: “in contrast to the 
clear hierarchy of territorial powers associated in theory with the sovereign state, 
multilevel governance typically involves tangled hierarchies and complex 
interdependence”. Jessop gives the example of the European Union, explaining it is 
a: “nodal point in an extensive and tangled web of governance operations concerned 
to orchestrate economic and social policy in and across many different scales of 
action with the participation of a wide range of official, quasi-official, private economic 
interests, and representatives of civil society” (Jessop, 2004:12). While multilevel is 
different from nested, Jessop links the two concepts with the notion of tangled. 
Nested and its implication, tangled, are important for this research and as a way of 
appreciating this particular case study, for they help understand how extraterritorial 
systems like the Floating Island Project both adhere to ‘traditional’ regulatory 
structures and simultaneously contravene those same structures in novel ways. The 
Project’s nested structure helps better illustrate this complicated idea.   
 
Before proceeding, I should remind the reader that, as I remarked in this chapter’s 
introduction, the most local level in the Project’s nested structure would have been 
the SeaZone Authority. Several materials of the Project (Blue21, 2017; Blue 
Frontiers, 2018a) and the location study (Blue Frontiers and Blue21, 2017) suggest 
Atimaono, a lagoon between the municipalities of Papara and Teva I Uta (MLA, 
2014),23  as one possible location. In this case, the SeaZone Authority would be Blue 
 
23 Here, however, I focus on Teva I Uta and not on Parara as a way to bound the case study and the 
actors involved. Teva I Uta and not Papara was more visible in the Project’s fading and stakeholders, 
formal and informal. Papara did not appear in the regulations studied and there were no protestors 
of the Project which identified themselves as “from Papara”. This was not the case for Teva I Uta, 
where there were a politician and a fishers from Teva I Uta protested against the Project.   
 
   
 
115 
Frontiers (2018e). The Floating Island’s host municipality would frame this Authority 
in the nested structure. Had the Assembly approved establishing the Project there, 
then Teva I Uta would have been the municipality framing the Project. However, this 
municipality, located in the island of Tahiti, is part of French Polynesia. This means 
that French Polynesia encloses Teva I Uta in the Project’s nested institutional 
framework. Nevertheless, France rules French Polynesia from afar, making it a level 
above its former colony in the Project’s nested structure. The levels of the nested 
structure continue, from the European Union to the United Nations, and other 
supranational organisations.  
 
The interactions of the regulations of these institutions would show what I defined 
above as tangled. This is because nestedness in complex systems implies 
communications across levels in every direction. Information flows are bottom-up, 
top-down, etc. In this case study, top-down information flows would take place when 
considering that international treaties signed by France also apply in French 
Polynesia (EU, 2012). These treaties prevail over French regulations and can even 
modify the French constitution (Const Fr; 54- 55). Thus, there is top-down 
information flow from treaties to France to French Polynesia.   
 
But because I am referring to a complex, nested system, the information flow is 
bottom-up too. In the nested framework of the Floating Island Project, for example, 
bottom-up relations was evident in how French Polynesia and local institutions can 
create exceptions to these treaties. Local concerns can also turn into documents and 
influence global institutions, making concerns which locally started, turn global. For 
instance, some key documents which influenced the Floating Island in Polynesia 
started as local concerns. But later, they would shape specific regulations which 
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would have applied in the SeaZone and also by adding cultural significance to some 
issues. I am referring specifically to the Taputapuatea P.A.C.T. (2015).  
 
The P.A.C.T. was a document signed by leaders of Pacific Islands Small States, 
based on their concerns to climate change and sea-level rise. This consortium of 
leaders sought to give Small Island States a voice in Paris. It influenced Paris 
COP21’s position and the agenda on climate change that has, since then, created 
more awareness of sea-level rise and climate change around the world. This Pact 
motivated the French Polynesian government to sign the Memorandum of 
Understanding. Therefore, in a way, this document was a key starting point for the 
Floating Island Project to include sea-level rise to its concerns, alongside 
governance issues. This mutual shaping of bottom-up information flows, from 
Polynesia to COP21, and top-down, with France ruling in Polynesia, will show in this 
chapter how bottom-up and top-down can mutually influence each other. Most 
importantly, it reveals how the concept of nestedness is a powerful way to 
understand the Project’s institutional and regulatory framework. In the next section, 
I explain the origin of French Polynesia’s own position as a system nested within 
France, to better understand the overall nested institutional structure of the Floating 
Island.    
 
5.3. Origin of Nestedness in French Polynesia’s History 
There were two main origins for the SeaZone’s nestedness. The first one was French 
Polynesia’s colonial relation to France. The second one was The Seasteading 
Institute’s strategy for overcoming the legal challenges of setting up seasteads in 
international waters. In this section, I explain the former and some of its implications 
on the Project.  
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To better understand nestedness in the case study, it is important to become familiar 
with the history of French Polynesia and its present colonial and jurisdictional 
situation. As its name suggests, French Polynesia was colonised by France. This 
process began around two hundred years ago, and has not really ended. In 1842, 
France turned Tahiti into a protectorate. Forty years later, it made Polynesia a 
colony. Today, French Polynesia is an overseas collectivity of France. The term 
‘collectivity’ is used here as it is meant within the French Constitution (Const. Fr, Art 
74), whereby a collectivity is analogous to an ‘offshore country inside France’ - 
collectivité d’outre-mer - in French. Polynesia holds this title since 2003, the year it 
became ‘autonomous’ (Loi no. 2004-192). But the extent of its autonomy is, and 
should be, contested. In reality, Polynesia has almost the same level of autonomy 
as regions and departments of France (Const., Art 72), not that of a country. In fact, 
it appoints the same number of representatives to the Senate, the French 
Parliament, and the Economic, Social and Environmental Council as French regions 
and departments.  
  
French presence in French Polynesia’s affairs is ubiquitous. Today, French 
regulations prevail in French Polynesia, albeit with limitations. The limitations arise 
because, as the legal study highlighted, the principle of legal specificity rules in the 
Collectivity. This principle specifies that French laws need to clearly state they apply 
in French Polynesia for them to be valid (Loi No. 2004-192: Art. 7). As an example 
of what I mean by bottom-up information flows in nested systems, the Polynesian 
Assembly can modify French regulations before they become enforceable (Loi No. 
2004-192, Art. 11). Additionally, French Polynesia can call a referendum for 
modifying its political system and its powers regarding France. However, such a 
change can only happen if it the French Constitutional Council approves it (Const., 
Art 46) and if the French prime minister allows it. Because of its contested autonomy, 
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Polynesia is still in the United Nation’s list of territories to be decolonised 
(Aencyclopedia Britannica, ND; UN, 2018a). This, of course, creates tensions inside 
the Collectivity.  
 
The autonomy of French Polynesia is an ongoing point of debate between the 
government and the opposition. In 2018, at a meeting at the United Nations, 
President Edouard Fritch insisted that French Polynesia was an independent state 
(G.A.UN, 2018). He based his claim on the existence of a democratically elected 
government which was able to make its own rules (see Const., Art 73). The 
opposition, rightfully so, had a different opinion. Valentina Hina Cross, one prominent 
voice among Fritch’s opponents, maintained that the Collectivity is not so democratic 
(G.A.UN, 2018). Cross argued that the administering power controlled the past 
elections and highlighted milestones before French Polynesia could be considered 
autonomous. For instance, the government needed more indigenous participation, 
since 65% of Polynesians are indigenous (World Population Review, 2019). As later 
chapters show, Cross’s opposition to Fritch was crucial for the fading of the case 
study. She was an Assembly representative for the commune of Teva I Uta. As such, 
she protested the Project in the first quarter of 2018 during what I refer to as “the 
protests wave” in Chapter Seven.  
 
It is worth noting that existing regulations back Cross’s critique. The Autonomy 
Statute of French Polynesia (Loi 2004-194), the law that formalised the Collectivity’s 
‘autonomy’, strongly constrains it. For example, Article 14 states that in every French 
Polynesian island, France’s jurisdiction covers the following aspects: civil services, 
nationality, civil rights, electoral rights, marital rules, justice, administrative 
procedures, criminal law, security, foreign policy, defence, law enforcement, military, 
imports, exports, commerce, immigration, telecommunications, audiovisual 
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communication, radio electric frequencies, capital, credit, treasury, financial markets, 
money laundering, aerial space, fishing, navigation, ship registration, passenger 
ships, security of large ships, university education, research, university titles, national 
diplomas, procedures for private learning establishments, regulations of some 
professions, social security programs, national airports, management of the 
communes, their budget, and the public function. These are not minor categories hat 
France is in control of. However, because this is a nested system, the top-down 
relation from France to French Polynesia is not entirely straight-forward.  
 
In Article 47, the same Statute of Autonomy specifies that, except for defence, 
security, law enforcement and public order, French Polynesia has the authority in 
many issues including marital systems, inheritance, criminal offences, entry and 
residence of foreigners (Loi 2004-192:Art 47). For the Polynesian doctor of law, 
Lallemant-Moe (2017b), this complex overlapping of jurisdictions made the Floating 
Island feasible but challenging. Lallemant-Moe highlighted that competences 
between French Polynesia and France are often unclear, sometimes divided and 
other times shared. Similarly, Bell (2017b), legal consultant of The Seasteading 
Institute and Blue Frontiers, asserted that French colonisation created ambiguous 
jurisdictions. Bell explains that the root of this jurisdictional ambiguity is France’s dual 
role. On the one hand, France acts as a former conqueror and occupying power. On 
the other hand, it is a patron and benefactor. Bell brings out this legal ambiguity by 
examining that, among the aspects that would be of concern for seasteaders, French 
Polynesia has competence over taxation, ships, and labour laws; it has no 
competency in currency, defence and judicial aspects; and it is unclear who would 
be in charge of civil aviation, customs and resident visas.  
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The jurisdictional ambiguity becomes more evident when diving into each of the 
aspects mentioned in Article 14. One example is radioelectric frequencies. These 
are frequencies from 30 to 300 GHz in which internet, mobile, radio, television, and 
satellite signals travel. Blue Frontiers sought to provide for all infrastructure in the 
Project, including cable (Blue Frontiers, 2018e). At the moment, only two companies 
in French Polynesia have a license to operate cable. Had this been the case, then 
the existing regulatory framework for radioelectric frequencies would have been 
important for the Project. The legal study noted that, during the planning phase of 
the Project, these frequencies fall under the competence of the Council of Ministers 
of French Polynesia (Loi 2004-192: Articles 4, 6, 7, 91). Accordingly, local regulations 
about this topic are stipulated in the Telecommunications and Post Code of the 
Collectivity (APF, 1999). However, if these signals and radio communications come 
from vessels, it is not French Polynesia, but the French National Frequency Agency 
who is in charge. However, because French Polynesia is itself nested within France, 
and France frames Polynesia, the Collectivity’s Code of Telecommunications follows 
guidelines of the French National Table of Distribution of Frequency Bands. Only in 
2019, once the Project had already faded away, was French Polynesia  granted 
autonomy over the allocation of its frequencies (TNRBF, 2019). However, the 
regulation which states that France determines fees did not change (CE, 2002).  
 
Another example of the jurisdictional ambiguity involves maritime traffic. The Council 
of Ministers of French Polynesia generates rules for safety, traffic and navigation in 
inland waters. This appears in Article 90 of the Statute of Autonomy (Loi 2004:192, 
Art 90). However, Article 14 of the same regulation states France has competence 
over police and maritime traffic safety, monitoring of fishing and coordination of 
rescues at sea (Loi 2004:192, Art 14). The next section discusses other institutions 
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in the nested framework, brought by Blue Frontiers, and not by France’s presence in 
Polynesia.  
 
5.4. Nestedness in The Seasteading Institute’s strategy 
The second place where nestedness is visible in the case study involves the creation 
of SeaZones in territorial waters instead of seasteads in international ones. Several 
reasons arguably led The Seasteading Institute to this decision: reducing 
engineering costs by placing the platforms in shallower waters, being closer to urban 
hubs, and benefiting from the legal regulatory framework of a host nation (TSI, 2014). 
This last was point intended to avoid the pitfalls of previous seasteading attempts 
and was the most substantial reason mentioned by foundational seasteading 
authors, Balloun (2012), Mutabdzija and Borders (2011a) and by The Seasteading 
Institute (2015).  
 
Having a state’s backing was crucial for these projects because, as Mutabdzija & 
Borders (2011a) point out, even entities without jurisdiction to enforce laws, such as 
the United Nations, the International Seabed Authority and the International Maritime 
Organisation could interfere with seasteads in international waters through specific 
states. Hence, law enforcement in international waters of countries such as the 
United States would be a significant obstacle for seasteads (Balloun, 2012). Other 
authors, not related to the Institute, such as Reham (2015), agree that the main 
challenge for seasteads in international waters is transnational law - as opposed to 
existing technologies. In this section, I explain The Seasteading Institute’s legal 
reason for finding a host nation to ‘nest in’.  
 
As I mentioned in Chapter Two, The Seasteading Institute‘s desire was to establish 
floating human settlements on the ocean where individuals could create their own 
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rules. At the starting point of the Institute, its co-founders thought that international 
waters could allow more freedom to experiment. International waters could facilitate, 
among other things, medical research treatments that countries forbid on land, such 
as stem cell treatments or human enhancements (Friedman & Gramlich, 2009). 
However, researchers at the Institute realised that international waters are not blank 
slates (Mutabdzija & Borders, 2011a:5). For instance, Mutabdzija and Borders 
(2011a) convey that seasteads in international waters would be required to follow 
international conventions signed by states, international custom, nation-states laws 
and jurisprudence. In the words of Bell (2017a:57): “seasteads will likely not generate 
all their laws from within. Instead, seasteads will likely include clauses in their 
carriage, residency and ownership agreements that invoke the laws of some larger 
legal system”. Nevertheless, for this to ever become a problem, the physical 
infrastructure first needed to be first created. In the words of Steinberg et al. 
(2012:1543): “There can be no seasteading opportunities before there is a physical 
seastead of some sort”. 
 
The problem, however, with creating the physical buildings without following 
legitimate and specific regulations is that international law lacks a definition for 
seasteads. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS, 1982) 
is the treaty that regulates international waters or the high seas, but it does not 
include seasteads. Nonetheless, it does refer to two classifications which could 
potentially apply to them. Galea (2009) and Lallemant-Moe (2017) indicate these are 
vessels and artificial islands. Lallemant-Moe (2017) explains that, according to this 
United Nations Convention, coastal states can authorise the creation of artificial 
islands in their Exclusive Economic Zone (UNCLOS, 1984:Art 56). States can 
designate safety areas of up to 500 meters around artificial islands where vessels 
with flags from other states cannot navigate (UNCLOS, 1984:Art 60). While this gives 
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artificial Islands certain autonomy, states ultimately have exclusive jurisdiction over 
the structures in these islands (UNCLOS:Art. 56). Therefore, in these artificial islands 
states would also be in charge of regulations regarding immigration, health, safety, 
customs and taxes (UNCLOS, 1984:Art. 60). These are all aspects in which 
seasteading seeks autonomy. Thus, a problem with classifying seasteads as artificial 
islands is that they would lack autonomy. Therefore, the Institute agreed that artificial 
islands might not be that attractive for seasteading enthusiasts.  
 
Mutabdzija and Borders (2011a:24) point out the additional problem that there is no 
accepted international definition for artificial island. About this, Galea (2009:19) 
writes: “Artificial islands are normally associated with fixed structures of a permanent 
nature. On the other hand, floating platforms can be anchored to the seabed as can 
fixed installations whose nature is considered of a more temporary nature” (Galea, 
2009:53). Galea (2009:19) in another part writes: “Since artificial islands have been 
expressly ruled out from the definition of ‘natural islands’ in the LOSC,24 their status 
is one which is neither a ship nor as an island in international law”. Furthermore, 
artificial islands in international waters cannot be permanent. Lallemant-Moe (2017) 
quotes Pancracio (2016) and points out that, if they are permanent, they risk 
classifying as an illegal occupation. There is an additional limitation: the Law of the 
Sea only allows states to build artificial islands in the high seas. That the Law of the 
Sea (UNCLOS, 1984:Art. 80, 87) mentions that only states can install artificial islands 
in international waters meant that a non-profit like The Seasteading Institute could 
not. And while the Convention does not specify if a private entity can or cannot build 
an artificial island on behalf of states, Lallemant-Moe (2017) points out that not even 
states can claim sovereignty over the international territory where they create these 
 
24 LOSC is another abbreviation for the Law of the Sea or United Nations Convention of the 
Law of the Sea, besides UNCLOS.  
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islands because international waters are common heritage spaces (UNCLOS, Art. 
89).  
 
The other concept which could apply to seasteads, in general, and as observed in 
this research relating to the Floating Island, in particular, concerns the blurred 
distinction between ships and vessels (Bell, 2017a; Lallemant-Moe, 2017). 
Mutabdzija and Borders (2011a:23) revealed a lack of clarity in differentiating a ship 
from a vessel and how their definitions would apply to seasteads. The authors quote 
the United States Code (title 47) to explain it: “The term ship or vessel includes every 
description of watercraft or other artificial contrivance, except aircraft, used or 
capable of being used as a means of transportation on water, whether or not it is 
actually afloat” (Mutabdzija & Borders, 2011a:23). The authors write that, in another 
part the same code, on Title 18, a ship means: “a vessel of any type whatsoever not 
permanently attached to the sea-bed, including dynamically supported craft, 
submersibles or any other floating craft”. Both definitions reflect another problem 
which Lallemant-Moe (2017) raised: ships should navigate. Indeed, Lallemant-Moe 
use the works of several authors and regulations to explain that ships are floating 
structures designed for navigation (Dalloz, 1974), exposed to the dangers of the sea 
(Gouilloud, 1993) and which navigate the flag of a country (UNCLOS, 1982: Art. 91). 
But, as Lallemant-Moe states, the first iterations of seasteads would probably not 
navigate the oceans or be mobile.  
 
Even if navigating was not a problem for seasteads, classifying them as a ship would 
bring out another issue: if seasteads are classified as ships or vessels, then they 
would need a state-owned flag. After all, every ship needs a flag to cruise the high 
seas (Strauss, 1984). Lallemant-Moe (2017) recalls that flags define the nationality 
of ships and that the Law of the Sea reads that states should have a genuine link 
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with the flag they navigate (UNCLOOS, 1982:Art. 91). Ships are also required to 
follow the regulations of the country whose flag they sail with (HG, ND; UNCLOS, 
1982:Art. 92). Marty and Borders (2011) and Hickman (2012), former researchers at 
The Seasteading Institute, suggested that ‘shipsteads’ could be flagged in a country 
with favourable regulations. This is a practice called ‘flag of convenience’. However, 
Lallemant-Moe (2017) and Bell (2017), both lawyers, were doubtful of the likelihood 
of success when using a ‘flag of convenience’ to establish a seastead in international 
waters. Both authors agreed that flags of convenience would not make seasteads 
autonomous. In any case, for flags of convenience to apply, the platforms would 
need to qualify as vessels (Lallemant, 2017). Not having a flag would not be a viable 
option either, since having a flag is the difference between being and not being a 
pirate. These legal problems, added to the cost of construction,25 ultimately led to 
The Seasteading Institute’s change of strategy for attempting seasteads in 
international waters.  
 
Given legal challenges, eight years before the Memorandum of Understanding with 
French Polynesia, a marine lawyer suggested to P. Friedman that the Exclusive 
Economic Zone of small island nations could be a suitable space for seasteads. With 
all  these points against seasteads, Friedman & Gramlich (2009:89) began 
considering territorial waters as a place for platforms without sovereignty, but with 
some autonomy. Following it, in 2011, Mutabdzija & Borders (2011b) and Marty and 
Borders  (2011), outlined the legal and institutional benefits and strategy for creating 
seasteading-inspired maritime Special Economic Zones. In these maritime Special 
Economic Zones, seasteaders would negotiate with host nations, exchanging 
 
25 The Seasteading Institute (2014) wrote that building for shallow waters in territorial seas is 
much cheaper than constructing large breakwaters in the open ocean. From an engineering 
standpoint, shallow waters make projects significatively cheaper than international waters, 
since they do not need to deal with high waves.  
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revenue, investment and expertise for a location, political autonomy and legal 
certainty.  
 
Being an enclave nested within the territorial waters and legal framework of a nation-
state, as the Floating Island Project sought to be, would mean being close to the 
coast. It would also facilitate trade with shore. Furthermore, it would entail having 
protection from other nations, from pirates and avoiding bureaucratic procedures for 
seeking international autonomy or recognition from other nations (Mutabdzija and 
Borders, 2011a). SeaZones would, then, be planned as floating enclaves legally and 
physically nested within the territorial waters and jurisdictions of states. As 
Lallemant-Moe (2017b) explains, creating politically autonomous communities on 
the high seas seems too complicated with the current state of international law. 
However, creating Special Economic Zones in the aquatic area of a state or an 
autonomous collectivity such as French Polynesia is more realistic.  
 
The maritime Special Economic Zone of The Seasteading Institute would have a 
special regulatory framework on top of these protections. Mutabdzija and Borders 
contemplated a single purpose corporate vehicle or offshore corporation which 
managed such Maritime Special Economic Zone. In the Floating Island Project, this 
vehicle would become the SeaZone Authority. This is how The Seasteading Institute 
decided to take an incremental approach from SeaZones to seasteads. Seasteading 
would start in the territorial waters of a nation-state. With time, it would then move 
far away from the coast. As Quirk (2018b), a contemporary, yet foundational 
seasteading author, conveyed, SeaZones are an incremental step to more freedom 
on seasteads in the high seas (TSI, 2015). The plan seemed simple: a state would 
physically enclose and legally frame the first seastead. A Former Executive Director 
of the Institute wrote: 
 




At our 2015 Board of Directors meeting, I received unanimous approval 
to press forward with our Floating City Project. Specifically, we all agreed 
that the strategy to secure an arrangement with a coastal state to host 
our development, while authorizing the seastead to have administrative 
control over its own affairs, is the quickest most realistic path forward to 
developing the first bonafide seastead.  
(Hencken, 2014) 
 
Since 2012, five years before the Project in French Polynesia, The Seasteading 
Institute began searching for a host nation. The incremental strategy from maritime 
Special Economic Zones - today called SeaZones - to seasteads would come with a 
compromise between the ideal legal regulatory framework inspired by seasteading 
and other regulations which nesting within states can allow.  
 
While territorial waters seemed to offer a more straightforward path, some 
foundational authors of seasteading, such as Mutabdzija and Borders (2011b:17), 
highlighted that some seasteaders would find territorial waters the least appealing 
location. This is because, as Patri Friedman (2009) explains, this deal involved 
complying with policies not entirely focused on liberty. Yet, as Mutabdzija and 
Borders (2011b) explain, such an arrangement could potentially accommodate 
seasteading ideals while working with existing regimes. For Friedman and Gramlich 
(2009:29), projects in territorial waters would, at least, lead to the normalisation of 
the concept of floating communities on the ocean. Overall, The Seasteading Institute 
saw the benefits of such a compromise, as a legal strategy for progressively gaining 
political autonomy. About this, the Institute wrote: “A coastal nation may be interested 
in offering to host a floating community in their territorial waters and allow substantial 
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political independence in exchange for economic, social, and environmental 
benefits” (TSI, 2014:7). Delta-Sync explained the incremental strategy from 
SeaZones to seasteads with the following nature analogy:  
 
Some species, like salmon, spend their infancy in calm and protected 
waters and migrate towards the seas as they grow stronger. 
Analogously, a seastead is most likely to start in protected waters. After 
acquiring sufficient size and strength, the seastead will make its way to 
deeper waters, and finally the open ocean. 
(Delta-Sync, 2013:45) 
 
Keeping the incremental strategy and the compromise in mind, The Seasteading 
Institute’s (2014) search preferred countries with Special Economic Zones, Open 
Flag Registries and Free Trade Zones. These countries would seem more willing to 
create laws to favour foreign investment and to “franchise sovereignty” (TSI, 
2014:30). In a nutshell, the shift from seasteads in international waters to SeaZones 
nested within the regulatory framework of a host nation was strategic. Nesting within 
a state was seen as a step for seasteading in international waters (TSI, 2015). Years 
later, this idea became the starting point of the Floating Island Project in French 
Polynesia, in terms of strategy and the tensions that came with it. 
 
 For instance, Friedman & Taylor (2010:10), referring to Strong & Himber (2009), 
wrote in relation to the strategy: “Many third world governments, for example, create 
or allow entrepreneurs to create “free zones” with rules different from those of the 
broader polity”. However, I claim, this ‘foreign’ type of framing is problematic. Chapter 
Seven shows how this kind of thinking, one where late-development countries are 
seen as places without local stakeholders, desperate for giving away their self-
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respect in exchange of economic development, did not help in making the Floating 
Island. This is because SeaZones would need to navigate nested domestic and 
international regulatory frameworks, and more.  
 
The following section shows how some assumptions which led to the incremental 
SeaZone-to-seastead strategy do not hold. For example, Mutabdzija & Borders 
(2011a, 2011b) explained that projects within host nations would not be a need to 
deal with international lawn in the same way as seasteads. On the contrary, the next 
section shows how both, international and domestic, institutions which are part of the 
Project’s nested structure, would frame the Floating Island Project’s SeaZone too.   
 
5.5. Domestic and Supranational Institutions  
In this section, I provide examples of how nestedness explains the institutional and 
regulatory structure of the Floating Island Project. I first focus on the SeaZone 
Authority, and I then give two examples. One example concentrates on the physical 
aspect of the Floating Island. It shows the institutions and regulations of its nested 
framework. Another example is health. From health, I highlight the institutions of the 
nested framework but also their regulations.  
 
As I discussed in this chapter’s introduction, the smallest institution within the 
Project’s nested institutional framework would be the SeaZone Authority (Quirk, 
2018b). Blue21 (2017) explains that this private entity would be in charge of 
governing in the 7.500m2 of the Project’s area. It would be the “one-stop-shop” for 
every administrative aspect of the Floating Island. For instance, Blue Frontiers 
(2018e:28) explained that the SeaZone Authority would be in charge of the rules, 
design, construction, selling and development of the floating infrastructure. It would 
additionally organise the provision of goods and services for companies and 
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residents of the SeaZone, including cable and utilities (Blue Frontiers, 2017c). 
Moreover, this lower level in the nested structure would monitor the marine 
environment, searching for the adequate physical, biological and chemical 
parameters in the water, such as levels of oxygen, nutrients and PH (Blue21, 2017). 
Additional roles would include privately mediating conflicts, solving disputes and 
managing the only medium of exchange accepted for services within the Island, the 
Project’s ‘currency’, Varyon (Blue Frontiers, 2018e). Blue Frontiers would also 
become the central provider of utilities, cable, infrastructure and even financial 
transactions (see Blue Frontiers, 2018e).  
 
As this distribution of tasks suggests, one-Stop-Shop approaches in Special 
Economic Zones imply that one organisation manages an entire Zone. The World 
Bank (FIAS, 2008) recommends one stop-shop approaches as an established best 
practice for effective Zone management. This is because having only one entity in 
charge of a Zone’s administrative processes creates less bureaucratic procedures 
for businesses and tenants seeking to establish or invest in them, compared to 
elsewhere in the country (Frazier and McKinney, 2019b). However, the World Bank 
recalls that when the same authority is in charge of operating and monitoring a Zone, 
this leads to conflicts of interests (FIAS, 2008:6). Indeed, while having one Authority 
at the smallest level of the nested structure is usual among Zones, the Project took 
the idea further. In some ways, it even contradicted the ‘decentralising governance’ 
ethos where the Floating Island originated. In a way, the Project suffered from the 
irony of centrally planning governance decentralisation. The idea that Blue Frontiers 
would centralise every aspect of the Project seemed dissonant with the Project’s 
original intention of replacing centralised states for decentralised markets. 
Nevertheless, this is how the Company leading the Project foresaw the smallest 
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institutional level of its nested structure, the SeaZone Authority. The Project’s floating 
buildings would also show the concept of nestedness in the Project’s governance.  
 
While Blue Frontiers would manage buildings in the Floating Island, the Project 
required authorisations from government institutions to generate exceptions to 
standing regulations for sustainable technologies. For example, the Project sought 
autonomy to provide for utilities and infrastructure privately. An Energy and Water 
report analysed the possibility for the Floating Island to desalinate its own water, 
manage its own waste and produce its own energy (Blue Frontiers, 2017c). In 
addition, this report explored off-grid options, such as energy micro-grids and closed-
loop cycles for waste management, involving water desalination and rain-capture. 
For this to be possible, the Project needed to have French Polynesia’s approval. The 
legal study mentioned that French Polynesia is in charge of utilities. It added that the 
Office of the Environment, following the guidelines of the Environmental Code (CDE, 
2017), enforces the regulations. This Code is framed by regulations of France. 
Similar authorisations were needed for floating buildings and every other aspect of 
the Project which was not currently allowed by French Polynesia.  
 
The first regulations to consider concerning floating buildings were those framing the 
possible location of the Floating Island, a Tahitian lagoon. Lallemant-Moe (2017a) 
explains that lagoons are part of the territorial waters of French Polynesia. Therefore, 
as other water bodies in French Polynesia, they are part of its maritime public 
domain26 (Loi 2004-192:Art. 47; Loi 94-631; CC, 1994; APF, 2014). For Lallemant-
Moe (2017a), an Island floating in Polynesia’s public domain would have meant that 
 
26 The original text in French, as it appears on Article 47 of French Polynesia’s Statute of 
Autonomy, reads: “Le domaine public maritime de la Polynésie française comprend, sous 
réserve des droits de l’Etat et des tiers, les rivages de la mer, y compris les lais et relais de la 
mer, le sous-sol des eaux intérieures, en particulier les rades et les lagons, ainsi que le sol et 
le sous-sol des eaux territoriales”.  
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the floating part of the Project would fall under Polynesian competence. Similarly, 
the legal study pointed out that being part of the public domain means that lagoons 
belong to and are managed by the state. Therefore, it is the Assembly that regulates 
and authorises developments, leases, occupations and concessions in Polynesia’s 
public domain (see: Loi 2004-192, Art, 91; CM, 2015s8: Arts. 4-5). Nonetheless, the 
legal study highlighted that, with the existing institutional framework, the Project 
would have also required approval by the mayor of the commune and the Ministry in 
charge of finances and valorisation of the public maritime domain, as the Statute of 
Autonomy of French Polynesia states (Loi 2004, 192, Art. 50).  
 
The study added that, given the potential environmental impact of the Project, it 
additionally needed approval by a commission formed by other domestic government 
stakeholders, including the minister and director in charge of land affairs, the head 
of the urban planning department, the director of the environment department, the 
president and other competent authorities (CM, 2015; Loi 2004-192: Art. 6). But 
because oceans are regulated by the Environmental Code of French Polynesia (see 
Loi 2017-25; CDE, 2017; CM, 2018b), the Project also required approval by other 
domestic government stakeholders, such as the Council of Ministers of French 
Polynesia, the entity which oversees the Code’s compliance and the protection of 
the environment. All these examples illustrate how we are dealing with a nested 
system and, therefore, that the concept of nestedness is useful to understand 
governance in the Floating Island. Indeed, not only the Floating Island required 
French Polynesia’s approval by default, it also needed approval by a lower level in 
the structure, the municipality. Without such approval, Polynesia’s endorsement 
would likely not matter. The same applied to ‘higher levels’.  
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I previously explained that one way in which nestedness manifests is in how different 
levels in the nested structure communicate and shape each other. Here, for instance, 
one function of the Council of Ministers of French Polynesia, as the Environmental 
Code states, is making sure that environmental practices comply with international 
treaties signed by France. But because France is framed by the European Union, 
regulations of the European Union that apply in French Polynesia would have applied 
too in the Project. The legal study made particular emphasis in the existence of 
regulations referring to rights of the ocean which ratify conventions of the United 
Nations (Loi 95-1311, 1995). Perhaps, the Project’s maritime aspect would also be 
framed by regulations that Gónzalez (2015:12) mentions would apply for seasteads. 
These include regulations of the International Maritime Organization and regulations 
from the International Maritime Committee such as the La Haya-Visby rules. 
González further mentions the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 
(SOLAS, 1974) and the International Convention on Salvage (IMO, 1989).  
 
Two additional environmental documents mentioned in the Memorandum of 
Understanding (2017) would introduce other international government stakeholders 
into the Project’s governance structure. These were the documents ratified by 
countries of the Pacific regarding climate change, such as the Declaration of the 
Ocean, Te Moana O Hiva and the Taputapuatea Declaration on Climate Change, 
P.A.C.T. -Polynesian Against Climate Threats (Polynesian Leaders Group, 2015; 
Blue Frontiers, 2018c). Although these were non-binding, they hold significant 
cultural weight in French Polynesia and the Pacific.   
 
Health regulations also reflect the nested institutional framework of the Project and 
its corresponding regulations. According to the literature of seasteading dated before 
the Floating Island, health regulations would be important for these projects because 
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many seasteading enthusiasts see the ocean’s extraterritoriality as a means to 
experiment with new medical treatments with fewer or no regulations (Quirk, 2017: 
221; Hunter, 2018). Authors such as Quirk (2017:222) explain that treatments using 
stem cells could benefit from places with more flexible regulations, cheaper costs 
and more competition. Others, such as Joffe (TSI, 2012), state that medical tourism 
will be one of the most promising businesses on seasteads. While researchers at 
The Seasteading Institute (see: Marty & Borders, 2011) suggested that the first 
iterations of seasteads should not focus on medical tourism to avoid tarnishing their 
image, they argue that medical tourism, biotechnologies and pharmaceutics would 
be among the industries which could most benefit from the ocean’s extraterritoriality.  
 
Had the SeaZone sought to be autonomous in health aspects, these would have 
been framed by domestic health regulations of French Polynesia, France and the 
European Union. The legal study noted that the European Union would have framed 
the SeaZone regarding imports, exports and production of medications for humans, 
regulations for preventing illness and dealing with cross border threats (see: EU, 
ND). It would have additionally been framed by World Health Organisation 
regulations (see WHO, 2017, 2019). Given that France has signed and ratified 
several international health treaties, the legal study noted that the Project would have 
been framed by United Nations conventions too, such as the Convention on Narcotic 
Drugs (UN, 1961) and the Oviedo Convention of 1997. The existence of institutions 
within institutions which would have regulated the SeaZone show how the concept 
of nestedness can be useful to describe the governance structure of the Floating 
Island. More importantly, it contributes to seeing some implications of dealing with 
nested systems. I describe some of these implications in the next section, relating to 
regulations being ambiguous and “tangled”.  
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5.6. Untangling Regulations 
As complex governance authors argue, The existence of multiple institutions and 
their regulations would imply that some of their regulations are tangled. In the 
Project’s nested framework, tangledness is visible in two main ways, in the existence 
of ambiguous jurisdictions and in the regulations framing the Floating Island, which 
it had to simplify to create new regulations or exceptions. Creating new regulations 
or exceptions constitute “untangling”. Both reasons, ambiguous jurisdictions and 
networks of regulations, can be traced back to the framework comprised of multiple 
institutions and their corresponding regulations. This is because it is nestedness and 
multiple, overlapping levels of institutions what makes jurisdictions and regulations 
be this way.  
 
Tangled regulations would have existed for each aspect of the Project. But 
untangling would have been more important in the cases where the Project sought 
to be most innovative, such as its floating and Zone components. It was inescapable 
not to untangle regulations for these parts of the Project because, as Stopnitzky et 
al. (2011) suggest, without a special regulatory framework, there would be few 
reasons for placing a seastead in territorial waters. Likewise, without a part that 
floats, then there would have not been any difference between the Project and 
traditional zones on land. Moreover, the Project, as originated in The Seasteading 
Institute, was seen as a step towards the normalisation of the seastead concept. 
Having special regulations would also be necessary to attract the demographics the 
Project targeted as residents. Here I provide examples of regulations which the 
Project would have to untangle.  
 
Immigration and residence permits were aspects where the Project would likely seek 
for special regulations. Simple residence processes would attract the type of digital 
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nomads, entrepreneurs, tech companies and real estate investors that have shown 
interest in seasteading since its inception. Evidence that these were the traditional 
supporters of seasteading includes the result of a survey by The Seasteading 
Institute (2014). The survey positions good internet connection as the top priority 
when moving to a seastead. 60% of people who answered this survey were between 
18 and 29, 55% of them were from the United States, 70% were not married, and 
82% of them had no children. Additionally, the top words that appeared in the 
profession answer were: student, engineer, software, consultant, entrepreneur, web 
developer, manager, programmer and marketing. Moreover, with regard to living 
space size preferences, the survey shows that the highest-ranked is approximately 
27m2. This is the size of a small, efficient apartment for a single person. The second 
voted option was 55m2, the size of a one-bedroom apartment. These characteristics 
and the traditional seasteading demographics of seasteading supporters (see 
Simpson, 2016) are reasons to state the Project would search for easy residence 
permits. Obtaining French Polynesia's approval for easy residence suiting these 
demographics required navigating and untangling a network of domestic and 
supranational institutions.  
 
Today, obtaining residence permits in French Polynesia is a very bureaucratic 
process. As most with places in the world, residence permits are given to those 
studying or working in a specific company or institution. The legal study conveyed 
that the Council of Ministers of French Polynesia is the entity that approves all work 
permits (Loi 2004-192, Art. 91) and follows regulations of the Labour Code (CM, 
2011b). The Council of Ministers forms a domestic institution, meaning that the 
Project required domestic endorsement. However, as I pointed out in the section of 
Polynesia’s colonial history, it is not uncommon that jurisdictions involving French 
Polynesia and France are ambiguous. Indeed, Article 14 of Polynesia's Autonomy 
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law (Loi 2004-192) states that France is in charge of immigration. Thus, while the 
Council of Ministers approves work permits, as pointed by the legal study, these fall 
within French jurisdiction too (PM, 2010). Creating exceptions to existing rules, or 
new ones for the SeaZone, in terms of residence and immigration required dealing 
with this unclear scenario. Once the Project had French Polynesia's approval, it 
would have had to negotiate with France. Obtaining France's approval would have 
taken longer than the Project's 2020 goal.  
 
The situation would not have been different for real estate investors of the Floating 
Island. The legal study noted that foreigners seeking to buy real estate in Polynesian 
islands need authorisation from the Presidency (see APF, 1996; CM, 2011a). This 
would have added more regulations to untangle because the whole idea of a special 
Zone is that it has regulations that are easy. The topic of taxes presents its own 
issues to untangle.   
 
Regarding taxes, the Project never publicly confirmed that it would benefit from 
different tax regulations, although it did mention it in some of its marketing materials 
(Blue Frontiers, 2017c). Likewise, the Memorandum of Understanding asked The 
Seasteading Institute for its suggestions on tax policy. It is the most common practice 
that Zones exempt or reduce tax loads for companies and residents for some taxes 
such as property, income, customs, duties and even services for financial 
transactions. For the Project’s tax framework to position the Floating Island as 
globally competitive, the Project would likely follow what every Zone around the world 
does: exempting companies and residents from what in French is called 
“contributions” of the host country. Some examples of existing French Polynesian 
contributions mentioned in the legal study were salary, wage and pension funds (see 
APF, 1994; APF, 2012ACGI, 2019), maternity leave and unemployment programs 
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(CC, 2003). During the data collection process, Polynesia regulated contributions, 
taxes and customs (Loi 2004-192; Arts. 20, 23). The legal study mentioned some 
present-day tax exemptions in Polynesia (see CGI, Art 211) for real estate (see CGI, 
4B, APF, 2012b) and income taxes (see CDI, Art. 178). Likewise, the study pointed 
out that exceptions applied to some productive investments (see Loi 2003-660). 
Specifically, those advancing the country's development (see CDI, Art 112) or 
involving priority sectors for the economy (see Loi 86-824, 1986), such as hotels and 
tourism (see Loi 2004-192; Loi 2014-12). Polynesian lawyer Lallemant-Moe (2017) 
asserted that tourism taxes could be abrogated with little hesitations for the Floating 
Island because tourism is the primary source of revenue for Polynesia. The lawyer 
stated that many hotels already enjoy favourable tax arrangements (APF, 1995) and 
even subsidies. But this does not mean that taxes would not be subject to what I 
here refer to as untangling.  
 
For the above-mentioned tax exemptions, the Project required French Polynesia's 
Council of Ministers ratification (CGI, Arts. 911-913). Nevertheless, overall, taxes, 
customs, and investments in French Polynesia obey the French Tax Code (CGI, 
2019a24:Art. 199; Loi 2004-192:Art. 7-8), given that France regulates economic 
aspects. However, France is not entirely autonomous either because it sits within the 
European Union, and, as the legal study mentioned, France adopts European Union 
regulations (EU, 2012O26:Art. 198). Therefore, the Project’s framework would have 
been required to navigate regulations by several institutions in order to create the 
regulations and exceptions that appealed the Project’s supporters and that wiuld 
make the Zone competitive. Now, as Moberg (2015a) writes, taxes alone do not 
make a Zone successful. Frazier and McKinney (2019b) stress that it is, instead, the 
quality and stability of a Zone’s regulations and institutions. Nonetheless, Moberg 
states that exempting companies (and residents) in a Zone from paying taxes is the 
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baseline to make a Zone attractive towards investment. The concept of untangling 
also applies for granting the Floating Island Project the overarching Special 
Economic Zone title.  
 
Like tax exemptions, Free Zones are a type of Zone framework which already exist 
in French Polynesia. The legal study indicated that these Free Zones comprise "any 
territorial enclave established for the purpose of having the goods located there 
considered as being outside the customs territory" (CDD, Art 286). Lallemant-Moe 
(2017) argued that the Free Zones in French Polynesia provide a precedent for the 
SeaZone. Because they already exist, he explained that the Assembly could legislate 
a Zone framework for the SeaZone with existing regulations. This could include more 
flexible labour regulations given to touristic areas. It could additionally comprise more 
flexible regulations for immigration and public services, because it is the Polynesia, 
not France, which approves Free Zones (see CCD: Art 2). Nonetheless, this 
Polynesian lawyer highlighted difficulties for creating such Zone on the water in the 
absence of a legal precedent.  
 
Regarding the floating part of the Project, French Polynesia is known for maritime 
hotels on stilts. Polynesia has regulations for floating dwellings. These dwellings 
comprise ships or structures that float and are intended for habitation (Vice-
président, 1983, Art. 2). Usually, they are home-boats. Indeed, in 1983, floating 
dwellings in French Polynesia were not allowed, as stated by a government order of 
August (Vice-président, 1983). In July 1994, a new order established that placing 
them would entail a temporal occupation of public the domain. People who did this 
would be fined. However, in 1985 floating dwellings were allowed in Bora Bora (CM, 
1985c). Bora Bora is today one of Polynesia’s most touristic islands. The condition 
was that the company in charge of them would keep them pristine and that they 
 
   
 
140 
would not contaminate the environment. Later in 1987, the Council of Ministers 
allowed floating dwellings in the Touamotu archipelago. These precedents suggest 
that the country could create government orders which allowed floating constructions 
such as the Floating Island. However, Lallemant-Moe (2017a) conveyed that, while 
French Polynesia has competence for deciding about floating dwellings and for 
developing artificial floating islands, building inside the maritime area of the SeaZone 
would be more challenging. This is because, as pointed out by the legal study, the 
Management Plan of Maritime Space of Polynesia does not cover the lagoons. On 
the other hand, French Polynesia's ocean is part of its public domain and private 
individuals cannot own the public domain (Lallemant-Moe, 2017a). This is a similar 
problem to that encountered by seasteads in international waters, consisting of not 
being able to occupy a common heritage space.   
 
Again, Atimaono was never confirmed as the final location. However, it was the 
location that first appeared, and appeared the most, in the design materials of the 
Project (see Blue Frontiers, 2017d). Moreover, it was the place of work or recreation 
for many of the Polynesians who protested the Project. To place the Floating Island 
in this lagoon, the Project would need, either to create exceptions to regulations 
regarding Polynesia’s maritime public domain, or create new rules which do not 
currently apply for this lagoon. As pointed out in the legal study, these could include 
the management plan and cadastre registration documents. Other regulatory issues 
that needed to be untangled related to the land area of the Project.  
 
Land areas near the Floating Island, called anchor zones, would be fundamental 
components of floating special jurisdictions. According to Bell (2017b), anchor zones 
would serve as physical and legal transition points, from earth to water and from the 
regulations of the host nation to those of the SeaZone. One potential anchor zone in 
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the Atimaono lagoon was zoned to propel the economic development of the country 
(Loi 2014-32). This, in principle, made Atimaono compatible with the economic goals 
of the Project, as Blue Frontiers' co-founder, Collins Chen (TNTVb, 2018) told the 
press. However, during the data collection process, existing regulations made 
Atimaono incompatible with innovative some financial activities the Project sought. 
During the planning phase of the Project, regulations restricted activities to only 
include golf, tourism, archaeology, culture, leisure, relaxation, small commerce or 
agriculture (MPF, 2018; CM, 2009; CM, 2010). Hence, to create a SeaZone which 
could offer “a special governing framework allowing the creation of the Floating 
Island Project located in an innovative special economic zone” (MOU, 2017:7), more 
regulations needed to be untangled. Regulations which forbid drastic modifications 
in the landscape were among them (CM, 2010: CM, 2019b: 114) and they brought 
additional challenges.  
 
This is because, during the Project's planning phase, coconuts populated Atimaono. 
Lead architect of the Floating Island, Roeffen (2018), expressed that in designing the 
Floating Island, his intention was to build something that did not look like an alien 
invasion (Marris, 2017). For this reason, Blue21's design of the Floating Island 
resembled traditional Polynesian cultural elements. The design looked like an island 
from shore, it was shaped as Maoui's hook from above and villas alluded to 
Polynesian traditional canoes, called va'a. Despite the Polynesian-inspired design 
and the integration of this one with the current landscape, the Project still required 
approval by the local regulatory body of the commune, L' Etablissement pour la 
Gestion et l'Aménagement de Teva, by the Office of Agriculture. The legal study 
noted that this Establishment regulates the communes of Papara and Teva I Uta, 
oversees zoning, and authorises the construction, financial plans, land valorisation 
and real estate property developments in Atimaono. The Project also required 
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approval by the Minister of the Economy, Finances, Large Projects and the Blue 
Economy. At the time this was Vice president Teva Rotfritch. Thus, for the Floating 
Island to be placed in Atimaono, and to have an anchor zone near the lagoon, the 
Project would be required to navigate institutions involved in the Zoning of Atimaono, 
as suggested by the legal study, and to untangle the regulations which would have 
applied to it (see APF, 1985; CM, 2014jl5), in both land and water.  
 
5.7. Additional Government Stakeholders and Limitations of Formal 
Strategies 
I want to discuss two other government stakeholders in the nested, complex 
governance structure of the Floating Island Project, namely the United States and 
China. Unlike examples of previous sections, these two countries would be part of 
the Project’s nested governance structure as a result of Blue Frontiers wishing to 
manage governance in the Floating Island using the Project’s cryptographic token, 
Varyon, and not because of Polynesia’s colonial history. In order to follow 
internationally known and influential cryptocurrency regulations, the Company opted 
to abide by United States and Chinese regulations. This section shows the n-
dimensional structure of nestedness in complex systems. This is because the use of 
a cryptographic token in the Project created another, parallel, nested framework. We 
can argue that, once regulations were untangled, each of the aspects in which the 
Project had its own regulations could be seen as nested within a particular set of 
institutions because different regulations would apply for each aspect. For example, 
regulations about institutions in the nested framework for health would not be the 
same as the institutional structure for financial transactions. However, it is possible 
to generalise, as I have been doing here, by pointing out the main actors. In the next 
chapter, I discuss the uses of Varyon and its implications; Here, I discuss some 
regulations framing it.  
 




As I mentioned above, the United States and China would be part of the nested 
structure because Blue Frontiers decided that the Varyon sale followed the 
regulations of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) of the United States. 
For United States citizens, investment contracts and taxes, independently of their 
residence, fall under this country’s jurisdiction (See: Clayton; 2018, SEC, 2013; 
Securities Act of 1933). Only accredited investors can buy securities in the United 
States. This is important for the case study because, during the Varyon pre-sale, in 
the first two quarters of 2018, the Securities and Exchange Commission of the United 
States prosecuted several tokens crowdfunding through Initial Coin Offerings27 
because these resembled securities or investment contracts, and were selling to 
non-accredited investors. To protect itself, Blue Frontiers (2018e) decided that 
United States citizens could not purchase Varyon unless buyers were accredited 
investors. In the Varyon purchasing document, Blue Frontiers warned against future 
categorisation of Varyon as a security:  
 
Blue Frontiers does not take a position and cannot predict whether 
Varyon tokens will be regulated as securities in the hands of Purchaser. 
Purchasers are solely responsible for complying with all applicable laws 
of all applicable countries with respect to any transfer or sale of Varyon. 
Blue Frontiers has no plans to register Varyon as a security.  
(Blue Frontiers, 2018e:36) 
 
 
27 An Initial Coin Offering is similar to when investors buy shares of a company in Initial Public 
Offerings -IPO (Bitcoin, n.d). However, the main difference is that Coin Offerings sell tokens 
and public offerings sells shares. Moreover, coins live in a distributed ledger technology or 
blockchain⁠. For a comprehensive account on what is blockchain and what it enables, the work 
of Mélanie Swan provides a very good introduction (Swan, 2015). 
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While such a clarification was legally relevant in the context of the pre-sale, framing 
the Project with these regulations limited the pool of buyers. Given that, historically, 
at least 55% of seasteading supporters were United States citizens (TSI, 2014), this 
might have been one decisive factor for the pre-sale’s lack of success and in the 
cancellation of Varyon, a leading moment in the Project’s fading. This idea shows 
how the nestedness concept is useful here, for it can explain the communication that 
takes place among various levels of the structure. The previous example involving 
Varyon and pool of buyers shows how a “lower level” in the nested system (the 
Project) connected to an “upper level” (the United States) and how the United States 
also constrained the lower level in the nested structure. However, as a way of further 
analysing the implications, an additional factor in the sale’s failure might have been 
what I refer to as the ‘tension of decentralisation’ in nested systems: 
 
Varyon’s goal was decentralising governance, according to Blue Frontiers (2018h). 
Yet, the Company tried to comply with regulations of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission. Calling back to Jessop’s (1997:1) definition of complex governance, 
one where parts and whole are autonomous but interdependent, we can speak of a 
tension in some nested governance systems for how larger levels influence, shape 
or limit smaller ones. But the relationship goes both ways. Here, the same 
regulations which constrain governance innovations, such as cryptographic tokens, 
are the same reasons used to back their creation and proliferation (see: Nakamoto, 
2008). Similar implications apply for the Project’s decision to bring Chinese 
regulations to the Project’ governance structure.  
 
China, indeed, was the other state which Blue Frontiers took into account for the 
Varyon pre-sale. Chinese blockchain regulations (CAC, 2019) give the Chinese 
government control of everything published on every blockchain. It can delete, ban 
 
   
 
145 
and prosecute, based on its anti-anonymity norms. This has not stopped 
cryptocurrency transactions in China. However, it did lead Blue Frontiers to forbid 
Chinese citizens from buying Varyon. About this, the Company wrote: “We welcome 
buyers from all over the world excluding China. US buyers must be accredited” (Blue 
Frontiers, 2018e:13). Velasco (2018) explains the role played by the United States 
and China in the Varyon pre-sale with his argument that the cryptocurrency industry 
is shaped through friction with regulatory agencies. Here, this space is shaped with 
tensions, not only because of the novel nature of cryptocurrencies, but also because 
they exist within larger systems with more established governance systems, namely 
states. However, these two would not have been the other two governments part of 
the Project’s structure for reasons not related to Polynesia’s colonisation.  
 
The model of ‘peer countries’, a term defined by Bell (2018) and mentioned by Quirk, 
was an additional way in which regulations by other international governments, 
disconnected to Polynesia’s colonial history, would have framed the Project. In 
Quirk’s words:  
 
We and future host countries will define a Peer Group of countries from 
among the most peaceful, prosperous, and well-run nations on earth. 
Those Peer countries will provide the regulations for the SeaZone. How 
much freedom will we have? If an activity is illegal everywhere in the 
Peer Group, it won’t be legal in the SeaZone. If one member of the Peer 
Group dissents, and has demonstrated that a certain freedom works out 
fine in their country, it will be legal in the SeaZone. That way the SeaZone 
will be maximally inclined toward business and personal freedom.  
(Quirk, 2018b).  
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Having peer countries as a legal reference would mean that for each aspect included 
in the SeaZone Acts (labour, customs, immigration, etc., the Project would adopt 
regulations from places different from the institutions already its complex governance 
framework, such as French Polynesia and France. This idea of having different 
regulations of different countries for each aspect of the SeaZone brings out the n-
dimensionality of the Project’s regulatory framework, and it would have made the 
governance structure of the Project nested in more ways. Even if other states would 
not have enforcement power in the Floating Island Project, this would have added 
more formal government stakeholders and their corresponding regulations to the 
Project’s structure. Indeed, in the context of complex governance, some authors 
speak of constraining, but others, such as Jessop, speak of shaping. These two are 
not exclusive. Ultimately, what matters is that the ‘peer countries’ would mean more 
tangledness in the governance structure.  
 
My focus in this chapter has been formal stakeholders: states, regulations, 
institutions and governments. In one way or the other, each of them constitutes an 
existing national or supranational form of governance. This is because my starting 
point was the studies strategy of the Project, especially the legal study. As I 
explained in Chapter Three, there were two main strategies to make the SeaZone. 
The first strategy consisted of submitting studies to the government for 
implementation by the Assembly. This one was the starting point of this chapter. 
Therefore, the reason why I discussed formal stakeholders here is that the studies 
to set up the SeaZone targeted formal stakeholders.  
 
While addressing formal stakeholders was necessary, I recognise that focusing only 
on formal stakeholders is problematic in the light of what authors of complex 
governance argue regarding the multiple and diverse types of actors involved in 
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governance, from states to NGO’s, companies and other type of policy-makers. This 
is because legal regulations and formal, government stakeholders do not capture the 
implications of dealing with institutional nestedness. As I exposed when explaining 
the implications of nested complex systems, understanding the structures of social 
systems as fixed and top-down does not really reflect their nonlinearity. In practice, 
this means that government stakeholders and regulations do not represent the 
complexity of what and who they regulate. Why? Behind history, jurisdictions, 
regulations, institutions and governments, there are people. Government documents 
and regulations might refer to formal stakeholders, the territory and its uses. They 
might even mention people. This was the case, for example, with regulations 
zoning Atimaono for golf, tourism and agriculture. However, regulations do not 
directly involve the people using this lagoon daily, either for work or for recreational 
purposes.  
 
Therefore, legal strategies and formal stakeholders are insufficient to engage with 
the users and informal stakeholders of the desired location. Projects like this one are 
extraterritorial enclaves with both legal and physical components. Therefore, 
strategies for creating these special jurisdictions should not assume that the physical 
aspect and the stakeholders in it are dealt with through the legal one. Ultimately, this 
means that the Floating Island Project’s physical component required buy-in from 
locals of the municipality and future neighbours of the Floating Island, not only 
approved regulations and the government. Users of the beach are an example of 
informal users that were not accounted for by the formal strategies. Had the final 
location been Atimaono, then it would have been specifically Atimaono fishermen 
and women, neighbours or residents of Teva I Uta, Papara and Tahiti those informal 
users. After all, all of these different stakeholders who used the beach for work and 
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recreation embodied the key informal stakeholders that the Project needed to 
engage with to create local grassroots support.  
 
I, therefore, claim that ‘Informal’ stakeholders, such as neighbours of a project are a 
core component of their institutional nested systems. It is virtually impossible in 
democratic regimes not to deal with them. This applies even in projects with an active 
international audience like the Floating Island. Informal stakeholders complement 
formal ones. As the next chapters suggests, in many cases, they are of much greater 
importance. Duit & Galaz (2008) highlight this value of informal stakeholders by 
explaining that interactions in complex systems are nonlinear. Thus, while on paper 
rules might exist, informal relations might have primacy in the long-run. Cilliers work 
compliments this idea; he writes:  
 
alternative routes of communication are vital in order to subvert 
hierarchies that may have become too dominant or obsolete. Cross 
connections may appear to be dormant for long, but in the right context 
may suddenly play a vital role.  
(Cilliers, 1998:7).  
 
That is to say, having to deal with formal and informal stakeholders is an implication 
of nestedness which accentuates when considering Gerrits (2012) and Klijn and 
Koppenjan (2015) perspective about institutions. These authors’ view them as sets 
of semi-stable relation patterns within a network and argue that governance is driven 
mainly by informal networks. According to the likes of Gerrits and Klin and Kppenjan, 
the strategy of the formal studies to make the SeaZone, one that addressed 
hierarchical jurisdictions, regulations, institutions and government stakeholders, was 
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consistent with existing formal structures but lacked informal relations in French 
Polynesia.  
 
The Floating Island Project should arguably have involved many more informal local 
stakeholders with continuous public grassroots or community engagement strategies 
paralleling the studies. Most importantly, the Project should have come up with ways 
in which the Project would directly involve and benefit Polynesians. Public 
community engagement strategies meant for involving and planning for local informal 
stakeholders generate honest grassroots movements. The Environmental Code of 
French Polynesia mentions something along these lines. As highlighted by the legal 
study, such Code states that the community should provide inputs in projects with 
environmental impact. However, other than a partnership with the Polynesian Non-
governmental organisation FAPE (LaDepeche, 2017), there is no sign of the Project 
doing anything public like this. This partnership, in any case, ended when the 
Polynesian woman who worked on both organisations (Tahiti-Infos, 2017) walked 
away from the Project and was, subsequently  taken down from Blue Frontiers’ staff 
website in the last quarter of 2017. The importance of informal stakeholders 
accentuates in the face of the notable cultural differences between the Project’s 
participants and the desired location’s. Thus, engaging, meeting, participating with 
and planning for the community was a must. Vallat, Chairman of the European 
Network of Maritime Clusters, warned at the First Seasteading Tahitian Conference 
in May 2017 how crucial it was to engage this demographic, saying that the culture 
of California was not the same to Polynesia’ (Vallat, 2017).28   
 
 
28 In terms of the Law of Requisite Variety which I explained in the introduction, it is possible 
to state that the studies’ strategy of the Floating Island did not have the requisite variety 
necessary to move forward. From this perspective, the approach focused on formal 
stakeholders did the opposite. It accepted the focus of governance was made up of 
government rules, as opposed to more material social systems underlying them.  
 
 




This chapter explained how the Floating Island Project would have been structured 
as a nested system, physically and legally. I dealt with both aspects by focusing on 
the institutions ruling these places. The general nested institutional structure would 
comprise the SeaZone Authority, the municipality of Teva I Uta, French Polynesia, 
France, the European Union and the United Nations. The United States and China 
also formed part of the Project’s complex governance structure, although not 
because of historical reasons associated with the colonisation of the archipelagos 
now known as French Polynesia. The chapter described this nested structure as 
being in part rooted within the colonial past and present of French Polynesia and in 
The Seasteading Institute’s incremental strategy to kick-start seasteads with 
SeaZones. It additionally discussed the implications of nestedness in the case study, 
such as the Project being framed by ambiguous jurisdictions and tangled regulations. 
The chapter explained that in order to get approval, the Floating Island Project would 
need to untangle these regulations. This meant either to establish regulatory 
exemptions or new rules.  
 
By dealing with key issues and institutions, the chapter showed the Project’s focus 
on formal, government stakeholders in the studies strategy. This focus led me to 
highlight that the strategy consisting of submitting studies  for the Assembly to deliver 
lacked true engagement with the nestedness of the system because a) it 
concentrated on targeting the Assembly for its approval and b) the regulations 
mention institutions and governing bodies, but there was not true focus on the people 
using of the lagoon. The next chapter goes deeper into the idea that to navigate 
nestedness more strategically, respectfully (see: de la Bellacasa, 2017), and to 
produce better results, it is necessary to engage with multiple levels of stakeholders, 
both formal and informal. This has, nonetheless, to be done with true care, with 
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honesty. As Puig de la Bellacasa argues, caring requires true care. And as she (Puig 
de la Bellacasa, 2017:198) points out when she quotes Murphy (2015), some 
projects masked under the “care” framework can serve colonizing goals. This thesis  
shows how not engaging more comprehensively and actively played against the 
Floating Island. For instance, the Assembly never reviewed the studies. However, 
there was a category of semi-formal, semi-informal stakeholders the Project 
addressed international stakeholders. How the Project concerned local and global 
stakeholders, targeting the latter to the detriment of the former, is the topic of the 
next chapter.
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In the previous chapter, I provided examples relating to the Project’s regulatory 
framework, which show how the governance structure of the Floating Island would 
structure as a nested system. I based several of the chapter’s claims on existing 
regulations mentioned in the Project’s feasibility studies submitted for the 
Assembly to deliver. Because of the formal nature of this strategy, the chapter 
discussed only formal government stakeholders. I concluded the chapter by 
pointing out how focusing on government and formal stakeholders does not reflect 
the diversity of the stakeholders involved in a nested system.  
 
In this chapter, I no longer concentrate on formal stakeholders. Instead, my focus 
here is on non-governmental stakeholders. To examine them, I analyse another of 
the Floating Island Project’s proposed key strategies. I call it the ‘governance and 
marketing strategy’. I place these two together, governance and marketing, 
because a significant part of the Project’s marketing strategy during the data 
collection process used the SeaZone’s innovative form of governance to target 
future tenants and potential Varyon buyers. The overall marketing push of the 
Floating Island was such, that one ex-Blue Frontiers volunteer and former 
Seasteading Institute's online forum manager, Elwatorski (2019), today Ocean 
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My overall aim throughout this chapter is to argue that the Floating Island Project 
exhibited one key feature of complex governance: it concerned local and global 
stakeholders. As we will see, the Floating Island Project tried to engage with both. 
However, I suggest that the marketing and governance strategy ultimately 
prioritised global stakeholders and ended up sidelining local ones, much to the 
Project’s detriment. Supporting evidence for this claim includes the lack of a Varyon 
purchasing document in French and superficial use of sea-level rise rhetoric in the 
Project’s marketing.29 It is not possible to claim, with absolute certainty, whether 
this sidelining was due to market demands. This is why I differentiate between 
concerning and targeting. When I refer to ‘targeting’, I mean a deliberate action by 
Blue Frontiers. When I write ‘concern’, I refer to an interest by stakeholders. Both 
concepts are similar, but they point to different directions. I discuss two 
stakeholders in this chapter: local and global.   
 
By local stakeholders, I refer to Polynesians from the municipality of Teva I Uta 
and the rest of Tahiti. These are the present-day appropriators of the water and 
land areas the Project would occupy. I group local stakeholders under the broad 
umbrella of Polynesians, although I recognise that this term may impose a 
generalisation upon a diverse group of individuals. And while this term 
encapsulates the broad set of local stakeholders related to the case study, the term 
in itself is problematic because it has colonial underpinnings. Indigenous of French 
Polynesian islands tend not to call themselves Polynesians, but Mã’ohi. But even 
Mã’ohi includes numerous subcultures and languages within the different 
archipelagos and islands. Nevertheless, I have opted for the term Polynesians 
because it is the broadest, yet ‘specific’ category I found to include Mã’ohi and non-
 
29 While this thesis is not about blockchain nor software studies, the data of the Varyon token 
inform this chapter. It backs the idea that Project targeted global participants them through the 
governance and marketing strategy. 
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indigenous natives from the islands, including descendants from first, second and 
third-generation immigrants born in Tahiti and surrounding islands. By global 
stakeholders, I mean the international participants of the project, which would buy 
or bought Varyon. As a further section in the chapter suggests, expected 
appropriators of the Project would be part of an international demographic of global 
project participants who survive on wifi and Airbnbs. However, all this does not 
mean an Ostrom's framework is not suitable for studying certain elements of the 
Project. As Ostrom herself explained, her principles and her theory can be applied 
to other scenarios involving the commons, including seemingly distant ones, such 
as neighbourhoods, associations, charities, gangs, and even to voting (Ostrom, 
1990). Her work is even central to what is known as digital commons, which include 
digital systems, such as Wikipedia and the blockchain (Davidson et al., 2016:13).30  
 
Ultimately, this chapter serves three purposes. First, it helps to grasp the idea that 
complex governance concerns diverse stakeholders at multiple levels. Second, it 
shows emerging tensions resulting from trying to establish a project like the 
Floating Island with digital forms of governance within a physical territory owned 
by and used by demographics different from the project’s intended participants. 
This is a tension between the project’s digital and spatial extraterritorialities, which 
I expand upon in the discussion and reflections chapter. And third, the chapter 
examines the potential significance and analysis of Elinor Ostrom’s work for private 
SeaZones, such as the Floating Island.   
 
30 Commons 1.0 refers to the commons Ostrom mostly focused on, natural resources. 
Commons 2.0 refers to the public domain and creative commons, such as Wikipedia. 
Commons 3.0 is the new iteration -blockchains. Davidson et al. (2016:13) explain why 
blockchains are commons. Blockchain is Commons 3.0 ⁠ in that it provides a technical solution 
(cryptographic consensus) to the problem of cooperation in joint or group production at scale 
while still maintaining the benefits of commons-type (i.e. polycentric) institutional governance. 
A blockchain is a thrustless commons in which effective rules are embedded in constitutional 
smart contracts that are cryptographically secure and crypto-economically implemented. The 
working hypothesis is that the structure of these rules is likely to be similar to the eight ‘design 
rules’ identified by Ostrom”. 
 




Ostrom’s work is important in the context of complex governance and for this 
chapter discussing stakeholders because Ostrom is recognised for her 
contributions to complex governance in socioecological systems (see Ostrom, 
1990, 1994, 2005). Ostrom’s publications explored the institutions, rules and roles 
of local and external stakeholders in the governance of the commons. ‘The 
commons’ are natural or human-made resources subject to overuse, 
overconsumption and destruction due to their size, geography and their open-
access nature (Ostrom, 1990). Water bodies, such as rivers, lakes, oceans and 
lagoons, including Atimaono, the first announced location of the Floating Island 
(Blue Frontiers, 2017d), are examples of the commons. Ostrom’s work is, 
therefore, suited for this case study, given the aspiration of placing the Floating 
Island in the Atimaono lagoon in Teva I Uta, Tahiti. Thus, an Ostromian perspective 
is helpful for interpreting this chapter’s empirical observations.  
 
Moreover, Ostrom’s work is particularly crucial for this thesis because sea-level 
rise was one of the main motivations of the French Polynesian government for 
signing the Memorandum of Understanding (2017). This document’s first point 
reads:   
 
The government of French Polynesia has expressed its interest in the 
issues of climate change. Its contribution to the PACT (Polynesians 
Against Climate Threats) is the manifestation of its political 
commitment to consider threats to the ocean and the islands as issues 
of the future. The government of French Polynesia recognizes that 
rising waters threatens the lands, its inhabitants and their previous way 
of life.   
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(MOU, 2017:6).   
 
In another part, the Memorandum adds: “noting that in 2016, the Government of 
French Polynesia invited The Seasteading Institute to present its concept of the 
Floating Island Project and their benefits to the islands and inhabitants of French 
Polynesia” (MOU, 2017:7). I bring Ostrom’s work to the forefront here to discuss 
the Project’s sea-level rise narrative because her work on governance of complex 
socioecological systems has shaped, in the last years, discussions about climate 
change (Johannesson, 2017) and sustainable development (Cogolati, 2016), in 
institutions such as the World Bank (Gallegos, 2012), the Global Commission on 
the Economy and Climate (GCEC, 2014) and the World Economic Forum (Delpero, 
2015). Here, I use Ostrom’s work primarily to back claims about why the Project 
necessitated, and should have tried to get, buy in from local stakeholders, and to 
explore the roles of various stakeholders of the Floating Island.   
 
This chapter proceeds with five sections. Section 6.2. discusses key elements of 
Ostrom’s work which are relevant for the chapter. In section 6.3., I use Ostrom’s 
work to explain why the Project concerned local stakeholders, how the Project 
minimally tried to engage with them and how it sidelined them. Section 6.4. looks 
at Varyon’s marketing to suggest that the target of the Project were global 
stakeholders. In section 6.5., I present additional examples of missed opportunities 
to incorporate local stakeholders in the Project’s governance.  
 
6.2. Complex Governance in Socioecological Systems  
Ostrom's work is extensive, and it would be impossible to summarise it in one 
thesis section. My aim here, instead, is to identify those elements of her work which 
are most relevant for this chapter's argument. The argument being that the Floating 
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Island Project exhibited features of complex governance. The feature in which I 
focus in this chapter is that the Project concerned multiple levels of stakeholders, 
including local and global. That said, specifically, I take three main elements of 
Ostrom's work: first, I look at some of here her design principles discussing users 
and boundaries in the commons; Second, I take parts of her position on the 
limitations of state and market governance of the commons; third, I present some 
elements of her theory of collective, shared governance, and her view on 
privatising the commons.  
 
Note that, in using Ostrom's work in this way, my goal is not to argue whether the 
Floating Island fits Ostrom's framework for governance of the commons and 
socioecological systems. Instead, my purpose is to explore which elements of the 
case study, when read from an Ostrom's perspective, contribute to explaining the 
concern of locals, their sidelining and problems with prioritising global 
stakeholders.  
 
The first thing to note about Ostrom's work is that it focused on the institutions 
governing the commons. Ostrom analysed institutions because she recognises 
that the characteristics of the commons vary from one to another (Ostrom, 1990). 
Therefore, Ostrom created an institutional analysis framework for understanding 
institutions governing the commons, based on identifying elements and 
relationships within them (Ostrom, 2009: 28). Ostrom defined institutions as:  
 
sets of working rules that are used to determine who is eligible to make 
decisions in some arena, what actions are allowed or constrained, what 
aggregation rules will be used, what information must or must not be 
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provided, and what payoffs will be designed to individuals depending 
on their actions.  
(Ostrom, 1990:65) 
 
This quote reflects how Ostrom emphasises on the type of users which can make 
decisions in the commons governance and how they relate to other types of users 
and their actions. Ostrom’s work on institutions and the relation between use and 
governance allows us to see the opportunities to include Polynesians in the form 
of governance proposed for a part of their lagoon, alongside the state and market 
actors.31 Central to Ostrom's work are her ‘design principles’, which discuss 
institutions for governing the commons. She extracted these principles from 
successful cases of institutions governing common-pool resources. For Ostrom, 
success means protection and sustainability. This is achieved through rules 
preventing a resource's depletion. Ostrom highlights how important it is for these 
rules to be coherent with the users’ social and cultural environment and the 
physical and biological characteristics of the common-pool resource.  
 
The first Ostrom principle useful for this chapter states that the commons needs to 
have clear boundaries. Boundaries are particularly important for the governance of 
the commons which, like oceans, are finite. The need for boundaries emerges from 
one of the main problems the commons suffer from: many are open-access. Being 
open access makes common resources are open for anyone's extraction (Schlager 
 
31 She was aware that in situations of nested governance, governance has multiple centres. 
This is the idea of polycentrism. Ostrom was a strong proponent of polycentric governance 
systems. Polycentric systems are, indeed, those where there exist multiple centres of 
decision-making (Ostrom et al., 2009b). This idea connects very well with the previous 
chapter, in that polycentric systems tend to be nested (Ostrom,1994:11). Dealing with nested 
complex governance systems entails engaging with local and global stakeholders. But 
polycentrism is not the main element of Ostrom which I use in this chapter. It is instead the 
emphasis on the local.  
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& Ostrom, 1992). Over extraction of natural resources tends to lead to depletion. 
Hence the first step to protect the commons is to establish rules that set boundaries 
(Ostrom, 1990).  
 
Ostrom (1990) at first did not specify if boundaries referred to physical limits or 
users. However, following a critique by Cox et al. (2010), she revisited her theory 
and clarified that the term suggested both (Ostrom, FC2012; p.98).32 Bounding the 
commons, therefore, means that only a set of users can extract units from a 
delimited physical resource. Nevertheless, bounding is difficult when the resource 
is open access, like lagoons - even if the lagoon is surrounded by coral reefs. 
Boundaries are Ostrom's ex-ante response to the "tragedy of the commons" 
(Hardin, 1968; Pennington, 2012).  
 
The tragedy of the commons refers to a situation where resources are depleted 
because self-interested users take as much as they can, without considering that 
other users need the resources too. Because of this tragedy, Hardin (1968), who 
formalised the Tragedy of the Commons, argued for the need of an external 
structure that governed the commons and their resources, such as the market or 
the state. Ostrom’s work debunked Hardin’s assumption that either markets or 
states are necessary to govern the commons. More importantly, she showed how 
these are not only the two alternatives. Ostrom started with a key distinction: 
 
32 In respect to this subject, Ostrom writes: “The authors (Cox, Arnold and Villamayor) then 
suggested a better way of framing the design principles than I had done originally. For 
example, when I talked about boundary rules, I did not make a distinction between a clear set 
of boundaries of the resource and a clear set of boundaries for the users. Sometimes systems 
have clear boundaries for the resources but not for the users or vice versa and, in some of the 
case studies that were reported, that was a problem. So Cox, Arnold and Tomas crafted and 
clarified three of the design principles. They distinguished between clear boundaries of the 
resource users (that is the membership) and clear boundaries of the resource itself (Ostrom, 
2012a: 9).” 
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Hardin’s work did not distinguish open-access commons from commons that are 
jointly owned by a community (Ostrom, 2008). About this, Pennington writes:  
 
The ‘tragedy of the commons’ should really be described as the 
‘tragedy of open access’. The type of scenario discussed by Hardin 
refers to a situation where there are no rules governing the use of the 
resource. This is a very rare situation. In practice, most common-pool 
resources are governed by a set of rules – but the origin of these rules 
differs. In some circumstances they are developed endogenously by 
the resource users themselves, but elsewhere they are imposed on 
resource users by an external governing body. The debate about the 
relative efficacy of internally generated versus externally imposed rules 




As Pennington notes, Ostrom brings in boundaries as a response to the open 
access nature of the commons. Boundaries, Ostrom argues, keep away free riders 
by imposing limits to who benefits and can extract units from the resource (Ostrom, 
1990). They also serve to create a sense of belonging and care for the common-
pool resource by those within its boundaries. This is the main idea of Ostrom I 
borrow for this chapter.  
 
As useful as Ostrom’s work is for understanding rules and users in the commons, 
there are limitations to how much certain water bodies, such as lagoons, can be 
bounded. This is because oceans tend to be transboundary water resources (see 
Dietz et al. 2003). As such, they exchange matter, energy and information with 
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their environments. Consequently, their resources do not stay in one location. This 
means that activities in a bounded area extend beyond it. For example: the 
boundaries of the Floating Island Project would have comprised 7.500m2 of the 
lagoon. However, because the water and lagoon are transboundary resources, 
activities in that area would have not only affected what would be inside this 
perimeter. Neighbouring communities and the Floating Island would have shared 
natural resources, such as the coral reef, water, marine life, among others. This 
transboundary nature of resources in the lagoon is the primary and foremost 
important reason for stating the Project concerned Polynesians, especially those 
living in the municipality neighbouring Atimaono, Teva I Uta.  
 
Ostrom's second relevant principle argues that the resource's rules should adapt 
and apply specifically to that resource. What this principle states and part of the 
reason why this principle can lead to successful governance is because individuals 
affected by the commons’ rules voluntarily choose the resources’ institutional 
arrangements. To clarify this, Ostrom proceeds to describe four categories of 
users: appropriators, providers, producers and monitors. Appropriators extract 
resource units and benefit from the use of the resource. Providers arrange the 
resource's provision and the conflict resolution mechanisms. Producers maintain 
the resource and the activities in it. And monitors observe and enforce. These roles 
can be fluid and, Ostrom (2008) explains, providers and producers tend to be in 
most instances the same.  
 
The natural resource, in this case, would be the Atimaono lagoon. By resources, I 
mean any extractable unit from the area. These might include fish (Blue Frontiers, 
2017d), energy, water (Blue Frontiers, 2017c), or others of more 'intangible' or 
extraterritorial nature, such as Varyon and the regulatory benefits and exceptions 
 
   
 
162 
which the SeaZone Acts would have included. The appropriators of Atimaono 
during the data collection process were Polynesians. More precisely, Polynesians 
living in the municipality of Teva I Uta. While Polynesians are not government 
stakeholders, nor formally part of the Project’s nested complex governance 
structure, they would be stakeholders of the Floating Island by virtue of geographic 
proximity, present-day appropriation and resource sharing in the transboundary 
lagoon.  
 
Despite Polynesian’s geographical future proximity to the Floating Island Project, 
the Project’s expected appropriators were Varyon buyers, as one of the next 
sections discusses. As for Blue Frontiers, the Company would provide, produce 
and monitor the lagoon area. This distribution of roles is why Ostrom's work is 
noteworthy for this chapter. One of the principle’s key messages is that present-
day users are the most suitable demographic to govern the commons in question 
because they have been appropriating them for longer (Ostrom, 2018). An 
Ostromian read of the Project would argue that Polynesians better represented this 
demographic than by Varyon buyers.  
 
Ostrom explains that the primary reason current appropriators should decide on 
the rules is that they have the most local knowledge of the resource's 
transformations over time. They also have greater incentives for the resource's 
subsistence, leading them to try to find the most coherent guidelines for the 
provision of physical, technological and institutional infrastructure. Consequently, 
these individuals and groups are more preoccupied with the emergence of long-
term and bottom-up conflict resolution mechanisms, embedded in day-to-day 
activities. In other words, these users have a sense of ownership and care. It is 
important to note that an Ostromian read pushes the claim further. Ostrom 
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advocated not only for local rules, but also for what she called “collective 
governance of the commons”. These collective arrangements are bottom-up 
institutions which emerge locally - I explain their origin below.  
 
Throughout her work, Ostrom (2008:17) criticises how the market and the state 
know little about the individuals using the commons. And, therefore, Ostrom argues 
that neither the market nor the state are good vehicles for their governance 
because both lead to excessive consumption of resources in common-pool 
resources (Ostrom, 1994:5). Moreover, Ostrom (1990, 2005) explains that  the 
market and the state have little incentives for the commons’ sustainability and 
maintenance (Ostrom, 1990; 2005). This accentuates when resources are 
transboundary (Ostrom, 2012:30; Giordano, 2003). This is why, seeking to 
overcome this problem, Ostrom’s first principle advocates for bounding the 
commons and why she formalised forms of governance whereby multiple 
individuals collectively govern shared resources.  
 
Nationally governed by states and internationally used by companies, oceans are 
some of the most evident examples of overuse and lack of protection ⁠. One of 
Ostrom's (2008:15) examples illustrating the state's and the market's insufficiency 
for successfully governing the commons is mentioned in a study by White and 
Martin (2007). The authors narrate a 1982's decision by the United Nations 
(UNCLOS, 1982) to decategorise one-third of the oceans as international waters 
to decrease overfishing by private companies. The purpose was to address the 
predatory nature of fishing outside waters governed by states. Trying to limit the 
open-access nature of international waters, the United Nations extended the 
Exclusive Economic Zone of coastal states from 3 to 200 nautical miles. It expected 
states would protect them more than private companies. The solution was 
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counterproductive: fishing in territorial waters increased. 33 Because of hundreds of 
cases she studied, Ostrom (1990) concluded that successful governance of the 
commons tends to occur through institutional arrangements from institutions that 
are neither the market and nor the state (1990, 1994).34 Instead, she advocated 
governance led by self-organised collective action institutions, with high incentives 
for the resource's long-term success. 
 
In a nutshell, Ostrom argues that successful governance of the commons tends to 
happen when resources are collectively owned, instead of being owned by no one. 
She stressed throughout her career that when resources are owned by the market 
or the state, it is as if no one owned them, because both, states and markets, are 
too far from resources to have incentives to successfully govern them or to have 
the local knowledge needed for how to govern them best (Ostrom, 1994). Ostrom 
notes that, on the one hand, the state with its overarching rules does not leave 
space for designing rules specifically suited to each common. On the other hand, 
the market tends to have resource misallocations by concentrating ownership. On 
the contrary, a community of appropriators who are familiar with the location are 
better equipped for governing the complexity a natural resource than institutions 
 
33 Some libertarians argue that the reason why there is resources depletion by the market is 
because the state does not create rules which market institutions would establish in their 
absence if they had to come up with their own framework (Klein et al., 2013:540). The 
interesting thing to note is that Ostrom would, partially and in general, agree. It is the lack of 
property rights of oceans which, added to their transboundary nature, leads to its depletion. 
Ostrom argued that the issue here is not so much the right to buy and sell derived from 
property rights, but a broader concept of ownership. These property rights, from an Ostrom 
perspective, can derive from the use. They can be de jure and de facto. What Ostrom 
specifically opposed was one-model-fits-all solutions. Examples in her work about this are 
numerous. For readers interested, one good place where she details benefits and downsides 
of de jure and de facto property rights in marine extraction is a publication with Schlager 
(Schlager and Ostrom, 1992:260) involving lobstermen in Maine.  
34 That said, Ostrom was not an anarchist - nor opposed free market either (Wall, 2014). 
Ostrom theorises a third approach, based on self-organised local institutions of collective 
action, where rules emerge locally, through time. Ostrom (1994:3) describes these collective 
governance institutions as follows: "complex property-rights systems that do not fit easily into 
neat and fashionable dichotomies. While there may be aspects of these systems that involve 
sanctions and coercion, they are not state entities. While there may be aspects of these 
systems that involve buying and selling resource units, they are not market institutions." 
 
   
 
165 
which are far, such as centralised states and extremely decentralised markets 
(Ostrom, 1994).35 It is because of this emphasis on locality that Ostrom's work 
backs my claim that governance of the Floating Island Project concerned local 
stakeholders.  
 
Specifically, Ostrom’s work helps to analyse the implications of the proposed rules 
for decision-making, provision and appropriation of resources in the Project’s 
SeaZone area – the area where the special regulatory framework would apply. 
That said, most cases analysed by Ostrom (Ostrom, 1990) detail rural communities 
where the users' subsistence depend on the resource itself. They usually involve 
farmers or indigenous communities and not Zone authorities. Because of their 
close link to the resource, these users have created their own rules of provision for 
the resource they collectively own. In this sense, Ostrom's ethnographies could 
seem too distant from this case study, since the expected appropriators of the 
Project’s area were demographically different from those recurrent in Ostrom's 
work. However, this dissonance between current and expected appropriators is 
why Ostrom’s work is key here.  
 
Most Varyon buyers were not indigenous, fishers, nor came from rural 
communities. Their economic subsistence was also not dependent on resources 
extracted from the Project’s lagoon. In most cases, it did not even depend on the 
thriving of the Project nor on Varyon. In fact, Blue Frontiers (2018e:37), advised 
against purchasing Varyon with money that potential buyers were not willing to 
lose. This is a common safeguard notice in Initial Coin Offerings and in other 
investments. Indeed, when Varyon was cancelled, only one user publicly sent 
 
35 Pennington (2012:25) clarifies that not in every situation Ostrom advocates for decentralised 
community-based approaches. In some instances it is not possible but to rely on state 
regulation (McKean and Ostrom, 1995). 
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aggressive texts to Blue Frontiers Telegram channel.36 The telegram user wrote 
that he had saved money for months to buy Varyon. The second key idea I want 
to highlight of this difference in demographics is that, unlike in Ostrom's examples, 
many potential appropriators of the Project’s area were expected to be temporary 
visitors (see TSI, 2014; Blue Frontiers, 2018e).  
 
6.3. Local “Informal” Stakeholders 
It is worth saying more about how the Floating Island Project concerned local 
stakeholders, but also how it sidelined them. As I explained in the previous section, 
the most important evidence for the claim that the Project concerned Polynesians 
is that the Floating Island and its SeaZone would be located in a Polynesian 
lagoon. Therefore, from the outset, the Project would touch and affect its 
neighbours. More importantly, during the project’s planning phase, Polynesians 
were the owners and appropriators of Atimaono. Many Polynesians use this lagoon 
for their subsistence or recreation. As I noted during my trips to Tahiti, fishermen 
and women fish in this area, and the beach is visited by families and couples on 
the weekends. Despite this and how the daily lives of Atimaono’s neighbours would 
be directly impacted and transformed by the project (it would be naïve to state 
otherwise), few public initiatives tried to involve them in the Project’s vision, future 
and planning. Several Polynesians reacted negatively towards this. And with 
reason.  
 
Public community engagement is crucial for special jurisdictions to get local and 
government support (Frazier and McKinney, 2019b). It allows Zone developers to 
 
36 Telegram is an encrypted app similar to Whatsapp, but with more privacy. It can be used 
without a phone number, only with a user name. In 2017 it became one of the preferred 
platforms for Initial Coin Offerings and blockchain projects to communicate directly with their 
audience. Blue Frontiers had a Telegram channel where interested buyers posed questions 
about the purchase and the state of the Project. 
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plan with the local community or neighbourhood in mind. Frazier (2016) and Frazier 
and McKinney (2019b) argue that listening sessions, workshops and other 
initiatives enable the transfer of know-how and resources between the Project and 
the local community and, most importantly, between the local community and the 
project. Indeed, listening sessions allow local informal stakeholders to input in the 
planning phases. They also provide routes for integrating the project within the 
community, and ensure projects if they are or not welcomed before they spend 
considerable resources in a location that will not work out (Frazier and McKinney, 
2019b). Using a notion found in Puig de la Bellacasa (2017) work, involving locals 
in the project and planning for them and with them is the responsible thing to do.  
 
In principle, the conference in Tahiti on May 2018 provided an excellent opportunity 
for listening, involving, integrating and projecting locals and their vision into the 
Project. To get the most local participation, Polynesians did not need to pay to 
enter the conference. In contrast, international visitors paid approximately 2.800 
USD, including flights. The first day, the main conference room at Le Meridien Hotel 
in Tahiti, which could sit approximately 500 people, was full. However, in the next 
days, the room was less crowded, and a significant portion of the remaining 
attendants were international. While attendance was free for locals, this 
conference was, in hindsight, not a sound way to launch the project. It did not have 
a flavour of community engagement, nor was it a place for listening to the 
community. Instead, experts, mostly foreign, including myself, spoke. One problem 
with the conference is that, like most conferences, it was structured as a tree 
topology (see Figure 2). In this structure, information only flows from the speaker 
to the attendees, but not in the opposite direction. This makes communication 
unidirectional and instructive rather than generating a two-way interaction. While 
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there were some additional meetings with the community the days following the 
conference, these did not have continuity.  
 
Figure 2. Tree topology in conferences 
 
Something similar occurred with the workshops of October 2018.37 Not only they 
lasted two days and had no follow-ups, but participation was also limited to 25 
attendees (Actu.fr, 2017; Tahiti-Infos, 2017). These two did not represent long-term 
community engagement strategies and did not manage to generate local 
grassroots support. Additionally, the Project organised weekly parties at the 
Tahitian headquarters. However, the guests were members of the Polynesian elite, 
and not grassroots. The lack of further community engagement led to visible 
responses against the Floating Island since the launch at Le Meridien. These were 
mostly unfavourable. 
 
For example, one user wrote on Facebook: "You want the protection of our lagoons 
without participating in the community effort!!" (FacebookUser1, 2018; my 
translation). Another example was a photo uploaded by a Polynesian on the 
 
37 In the Methodology Chapter I explained my participation in both of these events. 
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Project’s French Facebook page (Iles Flottantes Fenua, 2016)38. It contained a 
survey by Polynesians (Illes Flottantes en Polynésie, 2017) asking whether they 
wanted the project. The two highest voted options were "no", "leave our islands as 
they are"39 and "no way"40, with 262, 94 and 80 votes, respectively compared to 24 
"why not"41, 22 "yes"42 and 7 "I'll think about it"43. Given the obvious Polynesian 
concern regarding a new project in their lagoon, a place Polynesians call their 
refrigerator, Polynesians felt the Project did not speak to them.  
 
But critiques also surfaced in the press and in protests at the Assembly. Valentina 
Cross, leader of the opposition representing the commune of Teva I Uta, told the 
press:   
 
It is not so much against these Americans as we have, it is rather the 
way in which it is disposed of our lagoon without us having been 
consulted either at the level of the municipal council or at the level of 
the population. It’s all. It can be a nice project, but not at home, and not 
the way it was done, that is to say without any consultation. 
(Actu.fr, 2018; my translation)  
 
The disengagement with local stakeholders was evident even within the project. In 
the fourth quarter of 2017, Polynesian participants in the Project moved away from 
it (Ventury, 2019). Subsequently, the profiles of the only three Polynesian women, 
who previously appeared on the Company's website, were taken down. Their 
contributions to Blue Frontiers seemed to be a strong pillar in the local community 
 
38 The original question in French reads: iles flottantes en Polynésie pour ou countre???? 
39 The original text in French reads: “lesse not iles tel key sont”.  
40 The original text in French reads: “jambs de la vie”. 
41 The original text in French reads: “pourquoi pas” 
42 The original text in French reads: “Oui”.  
43 The original text in French reads: “a réfléchir” 
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engagement, as I perceived during my first trip to Tahiti, before becoming a 
volunteer of the project. Alexandrine Wang, one of these young Polynesian 
women, organized and managed the entire conference, volunteers and events. 
Another of them, Pauline Sillinger, helped organise the workshops months later 
(see Tahiti-Infos, 2017). The third one, Lenick Perenou, was an architect who 
brought the Polynesian worldview and symbols to the project. This included 
designing canoe-shaped homes and orienting the main floating building towards 
stars that Polynesian ancestors used as navigation maps (see Perenou, 2017). 
There is little evidence after their exit, besides a Facebook page in French (Blue 
Frontiers, 2016), of public community engagement strategies in Tahiti.  
 
Only one half-Polynesian remained in the project, Marc Collins Chen, the person 
who first did the liaison between The seasteading Institute and the Polynesian 
government. This co-founder, who lived in Tahiti and was, by default, the person 
in charge of everything related to Polynesia, told the press that the Project had not 
talked to the community because it was waiting for the government to read the 
studies first (Actu.fr, 2018). In one occasion, during the peak of the waves I 
describe in the next chapter, Collins Chen tried to talk to Cross, the politician from 
Teva I Uta. However, this was during the peak of the Facebook and protest waves 
involving the Project. The situation in Tahiti was so heated that the mayor, Tearii 
Alpha, forbid Collins to meet the community (Actu.fr, 2018).  
 
Besides not having continuous, public and ‘engaged’ community engagement 
aiming to make a project Polynesians would directly benefit from, the second 
aspect showing how the Project sidelined local stakeholders was that people were 
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required to own Varyon before entering the Project’s area.44 About this need, Blue 
Frontiers writes: "Varyon will be required for staking a person's presence, and 
residency (or virtual residency if available) in a SeaZone" (Blue Frontiers, 2018j; 
2018e, 2018h). A verification algorithm would check if visitors or residents had 
Varyon locked in a smart wallet (Blue Frontiers, 2018e:19). The Varyon purchasing 
document further adds: "Anyone who spends time in a SeaZone will be required to 
own Varyon and stake an amount for the duration of their visit or residence" (Blue 
Frontiers, 2018e:19). These quotes by Blue Frontiers are relevant, not only 
because they request anyone, resident or visitor, to have Varyon to enter the 
project, but also because they mention the SeaZone, not the Floating Island.  
 
As I explained in the introductory chapters, foundational seasteading authors call 
the floating buildings either ‘seastead’ or ‘floating islands’. However, the term 
‘SeaZone’ refers to the entire area covered by the regulations, the area where 
these buildings were located. In this case, the term covers the water too. This 
distinction is highly important because it raises questions about whether and why 
Polynesians would and should require a cryptographic token to use a water body 
they now appropriate. This is why I use the verb “sidelining”, as a way to 
communicate the Project’s exclusion to locals. I explain more below.  
 
The sidelining arises from words used in the Project documentation and the 
definition of each term in it. To be more specific, Blue Frontiers defined seastead 
in the Varyon purchasing document as "mobile floating homes, businesses, and 
community spaces that can be moved and reconfigured in relation to other 
seasteads" (Blue Frontiers, 2018e:2). However, the Varyon ownership requirement 
 
44 As a reminder of the terms, the difference between floating island and SeaZone is that 
SeaZone refers to the entire area of the Project where the special regulatory framework of the 
SeaZone Acts would apply, whereas Floating Island refers to the buildings. 
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applied for the SeaZone, not seasteads. Blue Frontiers described SeaZones in the 
same document as "Special Economic Zones at sea" (Blue Frontiers, 2018e:2). 
Considering these two definitions suggests that Varyon would have been needed 
to enter the 7.500m2 of the entire area for which the Special SeaZone framework 
would apply, and not only for the 1% of this total space that the economic study 
(see EMSI, 2017) explains floating buildings -mislabelled seasteads- would occupy  
 
The Project did state that some categories of users, such as local boaters or 
French Polynesia's coastguard would have been exempt from holding Varyon in a 
digital wallet (Blue Frontiers, 2018e:20; 2018j18). For them, Blue Frontiers, or third 
parties, would manage the Varyon needed to enter – referred to as ‘the stakes’. 
These third parties would include employers, the municipality, a seastead 
association, tourism and transportation operators, among others (Blue Frontiers, 
2018e:18).45 But even this alone is problematic because it suggests rules and a 
prohibition to move in a place they now freely use.  
 
One argument against this being problematic could be that Polynesians could 
purchase Varyon. As a matter of fact, 1 of the 50 nationalities that bought it 
corresponds to French Polynesia (Blue Frontiers, 2018n). Nevertheless, and to 
restate, the artificial barrier created by holding Varyon raises questions about why 
Polynesians should or would choose to use it to enter what is now their own 
territory and which they appropriate at will.  Moreover, cryptocurrency transaction 
volumes in Tahiti, during the planning phase of the project, and to date, were so 
 
45 It is important to note that this would have not excluded public servants, such as custom 
agents, to be able to enter the project. Current regulations state that all custom agents are 
able to inspect ships anchored in the costs of France, because it is a matter of national security 
and public safety (CC, 2013). This was disputed in court on the basis that doing so violated 
the right to have a private life (Funke v France, Feb 25 1993). The final ruling was that an 
unexpected inspection could be done only with an authorisation and if not doing it violates 
national security. Something similar could have maybe been extended to the Floating Island. 
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minimal that the Collectivity tends not to appear in country-wide metrics. Likewise, 
back then French Polynesian cryptocurrency regulations were rather non-existent 
or unknown (icotokenseconomy, ND). Therefore, this use of Varyon does not come 
natural. Instead, it seems a neocolonial tool which would have resulted in 
strengthening an islander form of orientalism (see: Said, 2002) in Tahiti.  
 
We can read the implications of this situation more in-depth if looked from an 
Ostromian perspective. Holding Varyon as a requirement to enter the SeaZone 
aligns with Ostrom's principle concerning the need to bound a resource. However, 
Ostrom's principle suggests that individuals who are already occupying the 
physical space are those who should create the institutions governing them. From 
an Ostromian perspective, the desire to bound the resource should have come 
from Polynesians, not from a potential enclave of foreigners. But here it was a 
foreign company which brough those rules. Therefore, requiring Varyon to enter 
the SeaZone was dissonant and not a sound strategy from an Ostromian 
perspective. It was not a responsible way to carry out a Project who stated in the 
Memorandum of Understanding it would directly benefit Polynesians.  
 
One way to avoid tensions between the need to bound physical resource and their 
users, while still bounding the 7.500m2 of the Project and keeping a Varyon 
entrance requirement, was differentiating - as Ostrom (2012) did - between 
physical and user boundaries. This would have restricted access to the Floating 
Island building to non-Varyon holders, but not to the ocean covered by the 
regulations of the SeaZone. In that way, non-Varyon holders fishing, surfing, 
paddling and swimming in the area covered by SeaZone could have been allowed, 
even if they found themselves 1 centimetre away from the Floating Island. 
However, in the planning phase reached by the project, it was unclear what exact 
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rules would apply to Polynesian non-Varyon holders who were swimming or fishing 
in the SeaZone. It is not clear in the public documentation if non-Varyon holders, 
for instance, paddling or swimming were expected carry their smartphones with 
them in the ocean to show proof of Varyon holding or identity when entering the 
SeaZone, an area they own. Overall, other key documents of the project, such as 
the energy and water (Blue Frontiers, 2018e) and food reports (Blue Frontiers, 
2018f) barely mention current Atimaono users.46 Problems and unclear issues like 
this one were contributing factors to why the waves I discuss in the next chapter 
gained, rightfully so, such momentum.  
 
Another important read of Ostrom’s work to this issue relates to the concept of 
`appropriator'. In a legal context, the term refers to: "a person who has a particular 
legal claim to withdraw resource units" (Ostrom, 1990:220). Hence, appropriation 
does not derive from ownership, but use. Here, the real appropriators of the 
project’s total area were fisher men and women and families who use the beach 
 
46 One thing to note where the Project went beyond traditional projects in terms of 
appropriators in the commons concerns marine life in the SeaZone area. In the environmental 
study of the Floating Island (Blue21, 2017), non-human animals were seen as current 
appropriators of the lagoon. One example that reflects this discusses artificial light. Blue21 
(2017) explored ways in which artificial light coming from the Floating Island could disturb fish 
living nearby. To reduce light pollution, Blue21 recommended that the exterior lights of the 
buildings were orange or red. These light tones, which are above 600nm, cannot be seen by 
most coral reef fish species (Job and Shand, 2001). Blue21 (2017: 4) explains: "outdoor 
lighting at wavelengths that are less likely to disturb fishes can be used. Orange and red light 
are known to reach only limited depths (at 1 m depth red light intensity is already reduced by 
90%, and orange light by 50%)". Additionally, to avoid collisions between vessels with fish and 
corals and minimising noise during construction, Blue21 (2017) recommended to build the 
Project on land. Blue21's perspective fits with a complexity framework of systems ecology in 
that it detaches from anthropocentrism. While, to my knowledge, Blue21 was not considering 
Ostrom's work, their non-anthropocentric perspective even surpasses Ostrom. This is 
because Ostrom's views non-human animals and other species as resources or as part of the 
natural environment, whereas Blue21 (2017) sees non-human animals as appropriators of the 
resource. This perspective is important in light of another author I have mentioned in separate 
parts of the thesis. Puig de la Bellacasa (2017) goes against anthropocentrism, arguing for 
matters of care that come form a more ecological and integrated and web perspective of 
humans and non-humans. This approach is similar to the systems ecology perspective 
proposed by the architects, Blue21. This position is highly valuable for SeaZone projects 
because its potential to lead to forms of planning, managing and using, calling back to Ostrom, 
that are not exploitative.  
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and lagoon to fish, swim, leisure, and other activities. However, the expected 
appropriators, given that owning Varyon was needed to enter the area, were this 
cryptocurrency’s buyers. This is one important reason why I argue that the Project 
targeted, through its token uses, demographics outside of Polynesia. It, indeed, 
went against Ostrom's findings for successful governance of the commons.  
 
A third point about sidelining local stakeholders also relates to Varyon. Varyon, a 
core aspect of the Project’s governance, seemed disconnected from the other half 
of the project’s mission and one reason why the Polynesian government signed 
the MOU in the first place. That is, helping communities adapt to sea-level rise 
(see: Blue Frontiers, n.d.-c). With exceptions such as the Project’s design brief by 
Blue21, in the Project’s marketing, the message of communities threatened by 
rising seas was not crafted for Polynesia, even though this was the location of the 
Project and that sea-level rise was one of the top motivations of the government to 
sign the Memorandum. Authors such as Ranganathan (2019:211) criticised that 
the Floating Island's interest in sea-level rise was mere rhetoric. She writes: "this 
disaster, extracting wealth from new commons – the common concerns of climate 
change, sea-level rise, and biodiversity loss".  
 
Evidence seems to back Ranghanathan’s idea. As the following quotes show, 
superficiality in the use of the climate change narrative or absence of it and a lack 
of general coherence characterise some uses of Varyon. For example, the Varyon 
slogan was “Increasing variation in governance”. Accordingly, the Varyon 
promotional video said:  
 
7.6 billion people live under the authority of only about 192 land-based 
governments, and only 180 national currencies. To solve humanities 
 
   
 
176 
greatest challenges, we need innovative governance, as fluid as our 
world. Blue Frontiers, the first seasteading company, is proud to 
announce Varyon. A token of exchange to increase variation in 
governance.  
(Blue Frontiers, 2018h)  
 
In this main promotional video of Varyon, there is no mention of the role played by 
Varyon in sea-level rise adaptation. Similarly, the threat of rising seas is 
disconnected from the governance aspect in the description of Blue Frontiers’ 
mission:  
 
Blue Frontiers is making it possible to decentralise governance by 
launching a seasteading industry that will provide humanity with new 
options for organising societies and governments. Seasteads will 
provide environmental resilience to the millions of people threatened 
by rising sea levels. Through Varyon, we invite people to participate in 
realising this fascinating endeavour.  
(Blue Frontiers, 2018e:8) 
 
In another part of the Varyon purchasing document (2018e:2), Blue Frontiers did 
join together both parts of the project: "the same technologies we are developing 
for seasteads will provide environmental resilience to the millions of people 
threatened by rising sea levels". But in another section, seasteads, the ‘floating 
buildings’, are described only as a dynamic geography mechanism and a way to 
get to achieve anarcho-capitalist oriented freedom, as follows:  
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mobile floating homes, businesses, and community spaces that can be 
moved and reconfigured in relation to other seasteads, allowing for the 
formation, reformation, and dissolution of networks, neighbourhoods, 
cities, and eventually nation-states in international waters. Seasteads 
will offer residents and businesses liberties and regulatory frameworks 
that allow for rapid innovation in societal and political structures.  
(Blue Frontiers, 2018e:2)  
 
Likewise, the Company explained the purpose of SeaZones, the regulatory aspect 
of the Project, in the following quote, one which does not include sea-level rise: 
 
SeaZones will create legal and regulatory environments within the 
territorial waters of host nations, granting seasteaders substantial 
flexibility or exemptions in fiscal, customs, labour, permits, and other 
select regulatory matters. Cryptocurrency and blockchain technology 
users and companies will benefit from these regulatory regimes for 
certainty, liberty, and taxes.  
(Blue Frontiers, 2018e)  
 
Another example of superficiality in messaging is:  
 
Beyond Sustainable. By living on the seas, humans will have a strong 
incentive to stop treating them as hunting grounds and ocean highways 
for supertankers, and start taking better care of them. The seasteads 
are designed to attract and revive coral and marine life habitats.  
(Blue Frontiers, 2018e:16).  
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As evidenced in these few quotes, the mentioning of sustainability in the Varyon 
documents is either absent or, when present, rather superficial. Despite the 
proposed core use of Varyon in the project, it was never stated how Varyon would 
be useful for users of the Tahitian lagoon, sea-level rise adaptation nor locations 
and communities in danger. Hence, one important additional way in which the 
governance and marketing strategy sidelined local stakeholders was through 
superficial use of sea-level rise in the key promotional and purchasing 
documentation of Varyon and key definitions. This reflected some disconnection 
between Varyon - the project’s most marketed aspect, funding mechanism, means 
of exchange and governance tool- with finding sustainable ways for Polynesia to 
adapt to rising seas.47   
 
Overall, sea-level rise and the local culture seemed to be mentioned merely to 
appease the project’s future neighbours. Examples of this are included in the 
dissonances between the project’s French Polynesian and international Facebook 
page profile pictures. The Project’s French Polynesian Facebook profile picture 
had a design of the Floating Island inspired by French Polynesian seafaring 
tradition, which resembled Maoui's hook from above, showed the stars, and it had 
words in Tahitian and in French. It was meant to speak to locals. In contrast, the 
English-speaking profile picture had the company's logo. 
 
Moreover, each Facebook post on each page seemed to portrait an entirely 
different aspect of the project. The French one shaped around sustainability and 
 
47 The Project’s sustainability narrative seemed to have shaped around the work of the 
architectural partner, Blue21 (2017db), and by the work of the Polynesian architect, Perenou 
(2017:66), who had previously worked on floating architecture for sea-level rise in French 
Polynesia. It is important to note that Perennou's work only appeared in the French website 
of Blue Frontiers, and was never translated to the English speaking one. This suggests its 
inclusion could have been for "show" in the Collecitvity, rather than genuine. 
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the English one on governance. This was also reflected in the type of images the 
pages used. For French Polynesian audiences, the image shown of the Project 
was the design which resembled one natural island. For internationals, an 
additional design was used. As in the case of the Varyon promotional video (Blue 
Frontiers, 2018h, Blue Frontiers, 2017c) shows, this second design was architect’s 
Simon Nummy’s more modular version of the Project - elucidating  more easily the 
idea of dynamic geography than the static floating island. Similarly, the French-
speaking Facebook (Iles Flottantes Fenua, 2016) ‘about’ page describes the 
Floating Island as "ecologic floating islands".48 However, the English-speaking 
(Blue Frontiers, n.d.-a)  “about” page, which was more used, had more posts, 
followers and traction, read: "Realising the promise of seasteading. Resilient 
floating islands and innovative governing frameworks". 
 
But the fact is that the proposed Floating Island Project never actually materialised. 
Therefore, it is not possible to know how the relationship between the Project and 
local stakeholders would have unfolded once built. However, the tacit notion of 
nautical displacement behind the marketing of Varyon seemed to embody one of 
Bach's critiques to some Zones -and one of the many problems with 
neocolonialism. Bach recalls that some of these have evicted local residents to 
give way to "global creative talents" (Bach, 2011:115). I expand on this category of 
users in the next section.  
 
6.4. Global (Non-Local) Stakeholders  
In addition to local stakeholders, the Project also involved non-local, non-
government stakeholders, whom I will refer to as ‘global’ stakeholders. It is 
 
48 The text in French reads: Page officielle du projet d'îles flottantes écologiques, du 
Seasteading Institute, en Polynésie française 
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essential, therefore, to discuss the global level of stakeholders that the Project also 
concerned. After all, once the Project was established, these global stakeholders 
would be more entrusted with the Project’s governance than the local stakeholders. 
This is mainly because they would participate in the Project’s governance by voting 
and emulating dynamic geography with Varyon. Unlike the local stakeholders 
discussed above, the SeaZone did not concern global stakeholders by virtue of 
spatial proximity. Instead, it was Blue Frontiers’ decision to have Varyon as a core 
part of the Project what made them stakeholders. The involvement of global 
stakeholders can be seen in the marketing channels for the Floating Island Project 
and the languages in these channels, social media activity, the use of Varyon for 
voting, for dynamic geography and as a funding mechanism. 
 
Varyon was a utility token built on the Ethereum blockchain.49-50 It was a token 
exchangeable for services and other cryptocurrencies, with similar uses to fiat 
currency, and stored in a smart wallet. Varyon was one of the most marketed 
aspects of the Project and would be a central component of its governance and 
funding. Overall, this token would be a funding mechanism, a means of transaction, 
and a governance tool (Blue Frontiers, 2018e). People from almost every country 
could buy Varyon, even if they were not in or from French Polynesia. Over fifty 
nationalities bought Varyon (Blue Frontiers, 2018k). Innovating with governance 
using Varyon was one of the main ways the Project tried to attract international, 
 
49 A utility token means: a cryptocurrency or digital token that is issued in order to fund 
development of the cryptocurrency and that can be later used to purchase a good or service 
offered by the issuer of the cryptocurrency sold utility tokens as a method of fundraising for 
the start-up (Merriam-Webster, 2016).  
50 Ethereum is a cryptocurrency like Bitcoin. Its blockchain is the network or distributed ledger 
technology (Evans, 2014) where it exists. Blockchain is the distributed ledger technology 
where cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin (and Ethereum) exist (Atzori, 2015; Swan, 2015). 
Blockchains work as a descentralised database, which do not have central servers to store 
funds nor record transactions (Velasco, 2017). Bitcoin, for instance, uses a universal database 
distributed in a public decentralised peer-to-peer network (Bitcoin Wiki, n.d.). As Velasco 
(2017) writes, the distributed nature of blockchains means cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin 
exists in several places. They exist in users' phone or laptop, but also on the ledger. 
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global stakeholders. To back my claim that the Project concerned, and targeted, 
global stakeholders, it is important to look at the different uses of Varyon and their 
implications.  
 
First, through Varyon, buyers could have purchased: "seasteads, fractional 
ownership of seasteads, seastead residency, and other products and services from 
Blue Frontiers" (Blue Frontiers, 2018j). Blue Frontiers would only receive Varyon 
for its services. The services included utilities such as electricity, cable, sanitation, 
business registration and physical or virtual residences (Blue Frontiers, 2018j). 
That the Company would only accept Varyon suggests that the token would have 
monopolised exchanges in the Floating Island. More importantly, economic 
exchanges involving the Island, between Blue Frontiers and Polynesians would 
have been challenging for locals without a digital wallet.  
 
About the use of cryptocurrencies in the Project, Blue Frontiers' (2018e:11) wrote: 
"Our SeaZones will offer cryptocurrency users and developers significant latitude 
for experimentation within a legal framework that provides certainty and protection 
from hostile regulatory regimes elsewhere". ‘Elsewhere’ in this statement suggests 
a focus on stakeholders outside of the location of the Floating Island –French 
Polynesia. It seems to allude to the traditional demographic of seasteading 
supporters, since it is a core part of seasteading is that individuals can go to places 
with regulations they prefer51 – in this case they could potentially change their place 
of residence for the Floating Island.  
 
Second, Besides the core use of Varyon to the Project, the amount of activity in 
English-speaking social media, compared to channels targeting a French-speaking 
 
51 This is the idea of foot-voting or jurisdictional arbitrage.  
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audience or French Polynesians, further suggest that the Project concerned - and 
targeted - global stakeholders. Several of the Project’s marketing materials, such 
as the Medium blog, Telegram channel, YouTube channel, Varyon promotional 
video, Varyon purchasing document and even the Project’s podcasts were in 
English, not in French or Tahitian – the two main languages of French Polynesia. 
As the podcast host, I played my own role in this problematic topic. In the 
concluding chapters, I discuss how my participation influenced my current way of 
working, my projects and current business. Blue Frontiers' main Facebook page, 
with participation from users with names from many parts of the world, was one of 
these English speaking channels. This page had significantly more activity than 
the Project's page in French for French Polynesians. It had 121,000 subscribers, 
contrasted to 1,683 for the French-speaking one. Likewise, the last post from 
French page was on February 2018. This was during the peak of the waves. In 
contrast, the English-speaking Facebook, for the international audience, continued 
to be active until April 23rd 2019. This was much after the Project in Polynesia had 
faded away. Likewise, the French-speaking Facebook featured 3 public events in 
Tahiti, compared to 21 on the English-speaking one, in San Francisco, Indonesia, 
Texas, Australia, Switzerland, New York, Boston, London, among others. I also 
orchestrated several of this, failing to see at the time the neocolonial aspects of the 
Project. Added together, these numbers back this section’s main claim that the 
Project targeted global (that is, not local) stakeholders.   
 
The Varyon purchasing document was another example of how the English 
language had priority over French. Almost everything related to Varyon suggested 
the targeting of a non-local demographic. For instance, although the Varyon 
website was translated into 10 languages, including French and Tahitian, the link 
to the Varyon purchasing document opened this document in English (Blue 
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Frontiers, 2018d). This is an important point, given that the purchasing document 
was the main public purchasing material for the overall Project and that Varyon 
buyers would become residents of the Island. The English focus arguably 
contradicted what The Seasteading Institute wrote after signing of the 
Memorandum of Understanding: the Institute would seek for local and global 
investment (TSI, 2017k). Yet, without a Varyon purchasing document in French or 
Tahitian, it seemed as if it did not matter if investment came or not from French 
Polynesia. Polynesian Varyon holders were essential to democratise the origin of 
the funding and, most importantly, to provide locals with access to resources within 
the Project and the regulations of its SeaZone. While some might say that the 
priority given to English was understandable, to a certain extent, because the 
largest pools of seasteading supporters were historically in the United States and 
because English is the most common second language spoken across the 
Western world, English is not an official language of Polynesia. Local languages 
should have been as crucial or more for the Project as the English language 
employed in digital mediums. This is not important because it would have been 
one step taken to avoid the Project becoming a foreign enclave. It would have 
meant that behind the Project’s planning was a real sense of responsibility for 
implementing something that would directly and foremost benefit the local 
community.  If I had to sum up one reason why the Project failed, it would be this 
one. As a Ventury (2019), who briefly participated in the Project as volunteer said: 
fishermen need ice; the Island could have at least think about hosting an ice station 
for fishermen and women.   
 
The international target audience of the Project was clear for many French 
Polynesians who wrote negative public comments on Facebook against the 
Project. Relegating local languages, namely French and Tahitian, while trying to 
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set up the Project in Tahiti made the Floating Island Project an enclave. In Chapter 
Seven, I expand on these comments in what I call the 'Facebook wave'. Here, I 
shall mention that around the time critiques about the foreign enclave surfaced, 
Blue Frontiers responded it would prioritise 25% of the residences on the Floating 
Island for Polynesians (Quirk, 2018a). However, this would not have made local 
stakeholders have significant or more participation in the Project than global 
stakeholders, especially because of the central role of Varyon. As several 
Polynesians during the Facebook wave would poitned out, 25% is insignificant 
participation for an area which is now appropriated entirely by Polynesians.  
 
Third, Varyon would be a bidding token for implementing Friedman's (2002) idea 
of dynamic geography (Blue Frontiers, 2018k). As I explained in previous chapters, 
Friedman (2002) states that dynamic geography is a way to vote with the feet - or 
with the floating house. In order to emulate a small scale and centralised version 
of dynamic geography, geographical locations in the SeaZone would be 
periodically auctioned using Varyon (Blue Frontiers, 2018b;1). Therefore, in the 
Floating Island Project, dynamic geography would be the capacity to float a house 
or platform to another part of the SeaZone. Likewise, to move a floating vehicle, 
the owner would have needed to stake Varyon (Blue Frontiers, 2018; 2k). From an 
Ostromian perspective, there was a problem with dynamic geography in the 
SeaZone.  
 
The main problem arises from how, as Blue frontiers pointed out, some Varyon 
holders would be visitors. Blue Frontiers writes that for a proposal about the 
SeaZone to be approved, it needed not to have “simple majority veto from either 
the pool of presence stakes or the pool of surface stakes, taken separately” (Blue 
Frontiers, 2018e:21). That means that voting results needed to satisfy the two 
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categories of residents and visitors – note that Polynesians are not mentioned. The 
text reads:  
 
Proposals to change the SeaZone charter pass when there is no simple 
majority veto from either the pool of presence stakes or the pool of 
surface stakes, taken separately. The proposal can be voted down by 
individuals with presence stakes, with more than 50% of the weighted 
stakes required to veto a proposal. Simultaneously, the proposal can 
be voted down by individuals with surface stakes, with more than 50% 
of the weighted stakes required to veto a proposal. Either group of 
stakeholders can veto the proposal, so in order for it to pass it needs 
to broadly satisfy individuals visiting and living in the SeaZone as well 
as owners of infrastructure in the SeaZone. The weighting algorithm 
will take into account the amount of Varyon a voter was required to 
stake, not the amount of Varyon a person owns. Stake requirements 
will presumably be higher for owners and residents than for visitors, 
allotting more veto power to the owners and residents. Additional 
weight will be granted to persons who have had Varyon staked for 
longer periods of time, so that seniority will play a factor in decision 
making".  
(Blue Frontiers, 2018e:20) 
 
What this proposal indicates is that Varyon holders who were simply visitors 
staying at the Floating Island would have more opportunities to influence decisions 
than local Polynesians without Varyon neighbouring the Project. This means that 
the governance and marketing strategy of the Project, and the central use of 
Varyon in it, would have given more decision-making power about the Project’s 
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lagoon area covered by the SeaZone regulations and its transboundary resources 
to foreigners than locals who have been using the lagoon for centuries. This would 
have not been a sound practice, form an Ostrom perspective. Users' lack of 
permanence in a common, while participating in their governance, decreases the 
possibility to build trust and reduces long-term environmental commitment. It also 
makes it more difficult to monitor the resource and enforce rules.  
 
Ostrom explains that one of the hardest problems in governing the commons is: 
“solving commitment problems of the appropriators and the assignment of spatial 
and temporal access to the resource, arranging for the supply of new institutions 
and monitoring individual compliance with sets of rules” (Ostrom, 1990; 27). This 
is why she promotes the strengthening of local institutions through individuals who 
are already set in a place:  
 
Appropriators who have lived and appropriated from a resource system 
over a long period of time have developed relatively accurate mental 
models of how the biophysical system itself operates, since the very 
success of their appropriation efforts depends on such knowledge. 
They also know others living in the area well and what norms of 
behaviour are considered appropriate. 
 (Ostrom, 2001:178).  
 
The topic of permanence, however, has its own limitations in contemporary 
globalising and networked world. However, what is problematic with granting 
temporary visitors voting capacity is that Varyon holders visiting for a few days 
would be able to input more directly into what happened in the Project’s lagoon 
area than Polynesians. Nowhere does the purchasing document state that 
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Polynesians in neighbouring communities would also be able to vote in aspects 
about the Project which concerned them by virtue of proximity, such as the Island's 
infrastructure and marine activities, despite their proximity. In contrast, the Project 
expected Varyon buyers to form part of the governance of the Project area, as the 
following quote shows. Blue Frontiers wrote that: "individuals visiting and living in 
the SeaZone, as well as owners of infrastructure (Blue Frontiers, 2018e:20), could 
participate in the Project’s governance, by deciding on aspects related to changes 
in the SeaZone's charter. The charter meant the regulations of the SeaZone.  
 
From an Ostrom perspective, the use of Varyon to decide on something as 
important as the SeaZone's charter, the rules that would apply within the Project 
itself, would be an insufficient mechanism to govern the commons in question. The 
reason lies in one of Ostrom's (1995:3) critique to market governance: "Finding a 
legal method to achieve the buying and selling of flow units, however, does not 
solve the problem of enhancing, maintaining, or regulating the facility or stock 
system". Despite limitations like this, where rules regarding users do not correlate 
with the environmental conditions of the resource, the use of blockchain was 
central to governance in this special jurisdiction.52 
 
52 Blockchain has become one of the preferred tools for several alternative forms of 
governance that are inspired by anarcho-capitalism and anarchism. Frazier (2018) explains 
that blockchain allows voluntary communities to innovate in governance, in aspects such as 
land registration, smart contracts, e-governance and arbitration. This is why McDonald (2013) 
describes blockchain as a non-territorial decentralisation of state functions. Blockchains can 
provide some of the functions state provide with its transboundary jurisdiction, whereby 
jurisdictions are decoupled from geographical locations (McDonald, 2015:1). The potential of 
blockchain is such that Davidson et al. (2016) ⁠1 argue that since 2009 -the year Bitcoin was 
created- the blockchain added a new institution to capitalism -besides markets, clubs, 
relational contracts, governments and commons ⁠. This is because such institutions are no 
longer exclusively in charge of law, property rights, contracts, money and finance. The authors 
stress that the Ethereum blockchain is a not a new market technology. Instead, it is: “a self-
governing organisation with the coordination properties of a market (Hayek 1945, 1978), the 
governance properties of a commons (Ostrom 1990), and the constitutional properties of a 
nation state (Brennan and Buchanan 1985)" (Davidson et al., 2016;2). Similarly, Atzori (2015) 
recognises, to certain extent, the potential of blockchains to decentralise governance by the 
state using market mechanisms. While these author's position in respect to how blockchain 
adds a new institutions to existing main ones is, to a large extent, a reality with potential, in 
this thesis I place blockchains as an extension of the market because its use in the case study 
 




Fourth, using Varyon to fund this SeaZone attempt was another way in which the 
use of Varyon targeted global stakeholders. The financial goal of the Project was 
to raise 15 million USD from private buyers through an Initial Coin Offering. 5 
million would be raised in a pre-sale and 10 in the main sale. However, the pre-
sale took place in the middle of the cryptocurrencies bear market of 2018.53 Given 
that it is common practice for cryptocurrencies to be bought with other 
cryptocurrencies, the fall of Bitcoin and Ethereum prices during the 
cryptocurrencies bear market impacted the Varyon sale. By extension, it impacted 
the project's funding. This additional factor further reflects the idea that, in complex 
nested systems, levels constrain or influence each other. This time, a global 
phenomenon impacted placing a project in a specific location. The Varyon sale had 
to be cancelled.  
 
The Varyon cancellation happened as follows. During the pre-sale, in May 2017, 
the minimum price to buy Varyon was 40 Ethereum (ETH) (Elwar, 2018; Blue 
Frontiers, 2018m). At the time, this was approximately 10,000 USD (Blue Frontiers, 
2017g). One month after the pre-sale began, Blue Frontiers (2018l) announced 
that the new minimum price to buy Varyon was 1 ETH. This equalled 400-600 USD. 
When this pre-sale closed on July 14th, token buyers had purchased 
approximately 3.5 million USD (3100 ETH) (Blue Frontiers, 2018k; 2018n). This 
total was 1.5 million less than the 5 million USD goal.  
 
was instrumental to establish a particular political economy of governance via the market and 
to serve as a means of transaction. Likewise, its use in decisions in the SeaZone, as I showed 
in the previous chapter, was not independent from domestic, supranational and international 
state institutions. While this does not mean blockchain does not have the potential to establish 
itself as a competing institution, in its infant state it seems to be an instrument as opposed to 
an end. 
53 The bear market of cryptocurrencies begun at the beginning of 2018. This was when bitcoin 
went from being around 19.000 USD per Bitcoin to half of the price in one quarter, and stayed 
there throughout 2018. 
 




Mentioning the minimum investment requirement is vital for the claim that, among 
the stakeholders the Project concerned, Blue Frontiers targeted global 
stakeholders. French Polynesia’s economic situation makes 10.000 USD too high. 
I recognise that there are people in French Polynesia with enough disposable 
income to invest $10.000 USD in a high-risk project. However, in general, French 
Polynesia has been falling economically since the sixties and has been suffering 
from a recession since 2009. Likewise, 22% of individuals of working age are 
unemployed (ISPF, 2018) and 20% are below the poverty line (NationMaster, 
N.D.). Moreover, the average salary is 1,352 USD54 (SalaryExplorer, N.D.); and 
cost of living is 39% higher than France due to tourism (IEOM, 2018:39). Therefore, 
it is possible to suggest that the entry barrier to the Floating Island Project of 10,000 
USD was too high for many local stakeholders. Even the lower minimum 
investment requirement, 400-600 USD, would still be half of the average monthly 
salary. In the next section, I provide examples of missed opportunities for involving 
local stakeholders in the Project’s documentation.  
 
6.5. Missed Opportunities for Involving Locals  
Here I present missed opportunities where the Project’s documentation could have 
explained how to engage with Polynesians in the Project’s governance, share 
resources with them and plan a project that would benefit them directly. Some of 
these opportunities arose from the management of utilities, discussed in the energy 
and water and food reports. Others emerged from the coexistence of hybrid 
regimes of property and ownership within the Project’s area. I additionally explain 
different notions of ownership in the Project, in order to understand where these 
opportunities lied. This last point requires some unpacking before getting to the 
 
54 In In French Polynesian Francs, this equals 145,297 XPF. 
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main point, so bear with me while I get there to mention the opportunities one by 
one.  
 
The first missed opportunity involves the management of utilities and Project’s 
infrastructure. Documents of the Project referring to the SeaZone (using the term 
used by the Project) mentioned shared forms of governance for some utilities and 
infrastructure. For example, the energy and water and food reports (Blue Frontiers, 
2017e, 2017f) analysed the advantages and disadvantages of being self-sufficient 
or dependent on the French Polynesian grids and infrastructure. They explored the 
benefits and downsides of having decentralised or centralised utility platforms, 
keeping in mind The Seasteading Institute’s long-term vision of having fully self-
sufficient seasteads. One proposal, by Blue Frontiers’ volunteers working groups, 
consisted of having collective governance of utilities and management of resources 
for some cases. Collective governance would be shaped an elected board which 
approved energy technologies used by residents who opted out from energy 
provision on the Island, in case Blue Frontiers’ monopoly prices were elevated 
(Blue Frontiers, 2017c:5). Reports analysed this too for wireless communications.55 
I discuss, again, the infrastructure and utilities topic because, as I explained in a 
previous section, the SeaZone and lagoon’s transboundary nature mean that 
activities in the Floating Island SeaZone would have impacted the parts 
appropriated by Polynesians. Therefore, discussions about the utilities’ board 
could have, at least, mentioned including local NGOs or collectives of Polynesians, 
independently of whether utilities connected to Tahiti.  
 
 
55 While the reports contemplated a possible monopoly by Blue Frontiers, explanations for 
why this would not be the case were rather superficial. One example is the following quote:  
“BF has a very strong disincentive against overcharging people for electricity - the 
Seasteading principle of “vote with your house” applies here. If people think they are being 
cheated, they will just leave and go back to where ever they came from” (Blue Frontiers, 
2017c:6). 
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The second missed opportunity relates to rainwater. The reports looked at whether 
the green roof design, which would be on top of the Floating Island, would collect 
enough water from rain to supply to all the Floating Island’s residents while leaving 
space for the solar panels (Blue Frontiers, 2018c:5). One recommendation by the 
working groups was to optimise resources by sharing them. Although it was 
unknown if there would be water surpluses, this part of the reports provided 
opportunities for considering sharing resources with neighbouring communities.  
 
The third missed opportunity was in the anchor zone. One of the few documents 
which mentioned Polynesians was the energy and water  report. It did so in the 
context of the anchor zone. The part of the document read: “we can establish a 
farmer’s market that will provide local producers the opportunity to come and sell 
goods in the Anchor Zone and interact with our community” (Blue Frontiers, 
2017c:5). The anchor zone could have been thought or planned as a place for 
interaction, exchange and for developing projects with locals. However, as 
presented, it was thought with an enclave mentality where there would be a clear 
distinction between locals and the Floating Island residents. Thus, even this idea 
represented a segregated and disengaged version of community engagement.  
 
The fourth missed opportunity relates to the existence of hybrid property regimes 
in the overall Project, which we can read they would exist based on the Project‘s 
intention of implementing dynamic geography. As explained in previous sections, 
to emulate dynamic geography, the organisation of space in the SeaZone would 
be periodically arranged (Blue Frontiers, 2018e). Because of this periodic 
arrangement, it is reasonable to assume that Varyon buyers would have owned 
their homes, but not the plots of water underneath. For dynamic geography to work, 
the water underneath private properties would have had to not belong to any 
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individual in particular. Instead of owning the water, floating homeowners would 
likely temporarily claim, but not own, the water underneath, so floating homes could 
periodically move.56 As for the entire 7.500m2, Blue Frontiers might have been 
given concession for certain amount of years, similar to the standard lease 
agreements that applies for many Special Economic Zones. Public documents, 
indeed, do not spell out the relation between ownership of the properties and 
ownership of the water. They only read that Blue Frontiers would manage all 
marine resources in the SeaZone underneath them (Blue21, 2017). But we can get 
to the likely hybrid ownership model by analysing Varyon.  
 
Another reason to believe that Varyon holders would have not owned the main 
Floating Island building nor the water underneath it lies in the type of 
cryptocurrency Varyon would be. The Varyon purchasing document clarifies that 
Varyon would be a utility token, not a security. This is important because, unlike 
securities, utilities do not represent equity, tradable financial assets nor real 
ownership - of the Project in this case. For a similar reason, Polynesian lawyer 
Lallemant-Moe (2017) further explained that, even though the 7.500m2 of the 
SeaZone would have been governed privately through a SeaZone Authority with a 
monopoly of the project, the state would not transfer real rights to Blue Frontiers. 
This transfer would require a constitutional change involving France. Therefore, it 
is likely to argue that, despite a SeaZone concession and Varyon holders owning 
floating homes, the water in the total project area would have continued belonging 
 
56 A similar model of mixed regimes exists for floating homes in the Netherlands. Mixed 
regimes were created by the municipal government to give incentives to private innovations 
on water (De Graaf, 2009). Rotterdam has innovated with regulatory frameworks for floating 
constructions (de Graaf, 2012). The lead architect of Blue21, Roeffen (2018), explained that 
Rotterdam sells plots of water. Owners own the buildings, but the water boards own the water 
underneath them (Roeffen, 2018). The Water Boards, Waterschappen in Dutch, are the 
municipal-level in charge of the water and water space itself. These boards recognise usage 
and institution property rights without giving away the ownership itself of the natural resource. 
In a way, they use Ostrom’s concept of appropriation derived from claiming, nor ownership.  
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to the state. This means that, despite the SeaZone’s inspiration in anarcho-
capitalism, private property, as in the rights to buy and sell, would not be the 
Floating Island Project’s only model of ownership. 
 
The coexistence of privately owned homes which rest upon a public lagoon with 
no rights transfer means that, in the Project, two different ways to understand the 
private space would overlap. Each had governance implications. One would 
resemble how privatisation is understood by anarcho-capitalism and the other one 
by Ostrom. The SeaZone’s ideological inspiration, anarcho-capitalism, 
emphasises individual rights and protecting private property (Lynch, 2017). Lynch 
describes the relevance of property rights in anarcho-capitalism in the following 
quote:  
 
In this discourse, the role of government is solely to create and enforce 
the basic rules and rights deemed necessary for the functioning of the 
market economy. As discussed before, in libertarian philosophy more 
broadly, private property rights are seen as the most basic and 
fundamental of rights from which all others derive.  
(Lynch, 2017:86)  
 
The Project would have enabled this form of privatisation, inspired anarcho-
capitalism, thanks to the approval of French Polynesia for the construction of the 
development and selling of floating dwellings in it. This arrangement would have 
allowed individuals to use Varyon to buy properties on the Floating Island. As 
stated above, Varyon would be used in this way. Whether the homes and platforms 
would be individually or collectively owned depended on what Blue Frontiers 
(2018e) called ‘buying seasteads’, or a fractional ownership of them. As for the 
 
   
 
194 
management of the platforms, this would depend on ownership. Some residences 
and platforms would be for single-use and ownership. However, the Project would 
also have forms of ‘privatising’ closer to Ostrom because other platforms and 
spaces would be used for shared uses and ownership. If a platform was owned 
collectively by several Varyon holders, it would most likely be managed collectively. 
If owned by a single person, that person would manage it.  
 
However, while buildings could be owned by private individuals, the ocean cannot 
be parcelled as easily as land. This is the case even though some anarcho-
capitalist authors (see Block and Nelson, 2015; Tannehill, 1970; Ruwart, 1993) 
have advocated for the privatisation of the ocean, where privatisation is understood 
as the right to buy and sell, in contrast to Ostrom’s, concept of ownership that is 
derived from use. Block and Nelson (2015) explain that doing so would promote 
liberty, increase GDP, and avoid the tragedy of the commons. Block & Nelson’s 
(2015) proposal was to divide the oceans with parcels. Their argument is that, 
because water is moving land, it is feasible to delimit private property in oceans. 
The underlying assumption is that parcelled plots in the open ocean would 
incentivise to take care of the space. While parcelling could, indeed, happen in the 
ocean, these authors do not recognise that resources in oceanic complex systems 
tend to be transboundary (see: Dietz et al., 2013). Nevertheless, there is an aspect 
of this idea that does not distant from Ostrom – and that add to my argument about 
missed opportunities related to the hybrid forms of ownership and property in the 
Floating Island.  
 
The idea that the Floating Island Project would present both Ostromian and 
anarcho-capitalist privatisation (Ostrom in some platforms, anarcho-capitalism’s in 
the SeaZone – and even state on the ocean) might be counterintuitive. In 
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McKenzie’s (2011) terms, few people would disagree with condominium 
associations and gated communities being a form of privatising collective goods. 
However, stating that these communities are collective governance à la Ostrom is 
harder to digest. Nevertheless, both types of governance, anarcho-capitalism’s 
and Ostrom’s, involve forms of privatising, even though, as mentioned above, 
anarcho-capitalism’s view of privatising involves parcelling (Block, 2016) and 
Ostrom’s entails sharing. “Common property regimes are a way of privatising the 
rights to something without dividing it into pieces” - McKean and Ostrom (1995:6) 
point out. It is interesting to note that in this complex governance structure involving 
multiple stakeholders, local and global, the collective governance proposed by 
Ostrom and the private governance by anarcho-capitalism would coincide in more 
than one aspect. This would be the case, even though seasteading is usually 
associated with anarcho-capitalism and, as Carson (2013) conveys, Ostrom is 
largely appreciated by left-wing libertarians. One of the aspects where both 
approaches meet is in how they approach the payment of residential fees.   
 
To recapitulate: the Island’s residents would pay Blue Frontiers in Varyon for 
administering the Floating Island and shared spaces. These shared spaces 
included the ocean and some buildings, community gardens on the rooftops (Blue 
Frontiers, 2018d:6) and energy grids approved by the elected board of residents. 
Blue Frontiers was going to destine 35% of total Varyon reserves to the purpose 
of administration of the Project (Blue Frontiers, 2018e). This form of administration, 
i.e. governance, in the Project led Quirk (2017) to state that some forms of 
ownership in the Island would be similar to a condominium owners association. In 
this model, residents pay fees for the administration of services and management 
of shared spaces. Bell (2012:475) wrote that homeowners associations, 
condominiums, multiple-tenant income properties, cruise-ships and other private 
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institutions already provide private governance services, many of which resemble 
those sought by this Project. This voluntary contribution for some governance 
services entailing fees for shared spaces in private residential communities, is, 
indeed, a form of governance via the market through anarcho-capitalism inspired 
privatisation. However, as I suggested above, it also resembles collective, i.e., 
shared, forms of governance as in Ostrom because it comprises a “third form of 
governance” that is neither the market nor the state, and which would provide some 
governance services such as the rules that apply for the users.   
 
While both ways to understand the fees payment differ, both “sides”, Ostrom and 
anarcho-capitalism, would, in principle, agree with this position favouring 
privatisation. A resource is in better shape if it belongs to someone. However, the 
main difference between both approaches, governance by parcelling and by 
sharing, lies in how privatisation is done and by who. In reality, as mentioned 
above, the ocean is not a closed system but a transboundary resource. Thus, 
parcelling can delimit areas, but it does not make the water underneath stay in one 
place. This means that activities in the maritime area of the Project governed by 
Blue Frontiers would have affected neighbouring Polynesian communities, beyond 
the Project‘s 7.500m2, even if some forms of ownership would not have been 
governance à la Ostrom. This flowing materiality of the area encompassing the 
SeaZone, which not even Varyon holders would own, is one key reason, the most 
fundamental one, for mentioning missed opportunities to include Polynesians in 
documentation referring to the Project’s governance. Since neither Blue Frontiers 
nor Varyon buyers would own the lagoon where the Floating Island would situate, 
because the Project would likely have shared ownership for some aspects of it, 
and because resources in it, there are transboundary, Polynesians could have 
been included as part of the Project’s board. That is, leaving aside the also 
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fundamental argument that Polynesians appropriate, work and enjoy the space 
today.  
 
All this exposition buttresses the claim that the Project, by virtue of having a hybrid 
regime, had several opportunities to, clearly and directly, involve Polynesians in 
the SeaZone and to plan a project where they would benefit more directly. While 
private properties would have been governed by the owners of the buildings, 
shared form of governance, which included Polynesians, could have managed 
space, utilities and infrastructure involving marine resources. Existing regulations 
in French Polynesia mention a similar idea to involve local stakeholders in 
discussions and large infrastructure projects. The legal study pointed out that the 
Environmental Code of French Polynesia supports involving the local community 
in the planning of projects built by one sole owner that increase the number of 
residential buildings. The Code states that these projects should make a public 
inquiry. The Floating Island, however, never did this. This lack of involvement of 
Polynesians is key in the events I describe next chapter. In it, I give a 
comprehensive account of the events which followed and how the Project dealt 
with these two demographics it concerned, local and global.  The chapter explains 
why certain events gained such momentum, and how come the government turned 
against the Project, despite initial support.  
 
6.6. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I explained why and how the Floating Island Project concerned 
local and global stakeholders. I used Ostrom’s work to highlight why the Project 
concerned locals, and I employed data about Varyon to show how and why it 
concerned global ones. Despite concerning these two demographics, the empirical 
evidence presented suggested that the Project’s governance and marketing 
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strategy targeted global stakeholders, sidelining locals ones. The evidence based 
on the uses of Varyon, the language of the Project’s marketing, the focus of the 
documentation on governance and the lack of a central role of sea-level rise in 
various project materials. It seemed that the target demographic were individuals 
interested in cryptocurrencies, seasteading and in anarcho-capitalism, instead of 
average Polynesians who will be affected by sea-level rise.  
 
Superficial use of sea-level rise in the Project’s governance and marketing strategy 
was an important issue to point out because half of the motivations leading to the 
signature of the Memorandum of Understanding implied contributing to sea-level 
rise adaptation. However, the Project lacked grassroots movement with local 
stakeholders who will be affected. It also fall short of strategies and ways to involve 
Polynesians in the Project and plan it in ways that they would benefit directly. This 
indicates that, while, indeed, sustainable floating architecture can be used in 
places with rising sea levels, this first iteration of SeaZones is not targeting this 
specific population. 
 
The chapter also suggested that, while fundraising for the SeaZone through 
Varyon would be one of the Project’s critical steps, it concentrated the attention to 
a demographic of participants outside the desired location. Without a sound public 
community engagement strategy accompanying the Varyon marketing campaign, 
Blue Frontiers’ efforts proved insufficient. As shown in the next chapter, the right 
social conditions and timing need to exist for marketing and legal strategies to be 
successful. When creating special jurisdictions which involve an alternative form of 
governance in a physical space, a strategy focused on international stakeholders 
is an important first step to attract internationally qualified professionals, but it is 
not sufficient to create local grassroots support. Ironically, while the SeaZone 
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originates from seasteading, a theory for governance which advocates for local, 
smaller governments and decision-making, the Floating Island Project did not 
publicly and repeatedly engage with the local stakeholders of the main possible 
location. And while the Project did weekly parties in its Tahitian headquarters, 
these parties were not meant for average Polynesians. This aspect of the Project 
reflected Ostrom’s critique that the market on its own misallocates when governing 
the commons. Targeting global stakeholders and sidelining locals became a crucial 
starting point for the developments of the subsequent chapter, where I discuss the 
implications of not engaging continuously with local, informal stakeholders.  
 
My general aim with this chapter in discussing stakeholders was to connect it to 
the next one and to show a large shortcoming of the Project’s strategy. As I argued 
in the previous chapter, complex governance involves nested systems. It 
additionally entails engaging with multiple levels of stakeholders. Strategies taking 
nested systems and multiple stakeholders into account would have emphasised 
local stakeholder engagement, as much or more than global. Local stakeholders 
might have included, for example, Polynesian fishers or families, the government’s 
opposition, decolonisation institutions and French Polynesian ‘s environmental 
NGOs and not just government and elites. Although these stakeholders would not 
have necessarily formed part of the formal government institutions I discussed in 
the previous chapter, they have social and cultural influence in French Polynesia. 
Hence, they represent a crucial demographic with which to engage for a project, 
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7. CROSS-TEMPORAL AND CROSS-SPATIAL WAVES 
 
7.1. Introduction 
This chapter wraps up the empirical observations of the case study. The concept 
of waves is the feature of complex governance I explore in this chapter. The 
chapter uses Sylvia Walby’s (2003, 2002b, 2003c, 2009) concept of ‘waves’ to 
interpret evidence for how the interaction of networked cross-temporal and cross-
spatial events pervaded the Floating Island Project and contributed to its fading. In 
doing so, I discuss three waves as they played out here in this research on the 
Floating Island Project and the attempt to set up the world’s first SeaZone. These 
are the waves of colonisation, the Facebook wave and the protests wave.57 The 
chapter shows how the cross-temporal and cross-spatial interaction of these 
waves pervaded the project. This chapter narrates how local stakeholders self-
organised, online and in person, in these waves. This chapter builds on the 
previous ones by explaining the fading of the Project in connection with the 
concerns of local stakeholders who intended to avoid the nesting of the SeaZone 
within Polynesia’s regulatory framework and the Floating Island in their lagoon.  
 
As I mentioned in the Introduction, the term I use to refer to the Project’s lack of 
materialisation is that it ‘faded’ rather than ‘collapsed’ or ‘failed’ per se. With the 
concept of ‘fading’, I convey the idea that the Project was never officially cancelled. 
Instead, it slowly dimmed its initial shine and media attention, as the French 
Polynesian government withdrew its support and the Varyon sale was cancelled.  
 
 
57 While the Facebook wave can constitute a wave of protests itself, I have separated 
Facebook and protests because of the different type of medium.  
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The chapter proceeds as follows: section 7.2. contains a theoretical exposition of 
Sylvia Walby’s concept of Waves. Section 7.3. details the first wave that influenced 
the fading of the Floating Island: the wave of French colonisation which took over 
French Polynesia. My goal with this section is to emphasise how a phenomenon 
that started almost two hundred years ago, and which has not ended, affected the 
development of the Floating Island in 2018. Section 7.4 discusses the Facebook 
wave. These were a series of Facebook posts, videos and comments in favour and 
against the Floating Island that went viral in Tahiti in the first quarter of 2018. This 
wave peaked approximately three months before French Polynesia’s presidential 
elections. The purpose of section 7.4 is to highlight how online and offline spaces 
and waves mutually shaped each other on the fading of the Floating Island. Section 
7.5 describes a series of protests organised by the government’s opposition and 
by the fishermen and women of the municipality which would have neighboured 
the Floating Island. The section shows how the protests wave reinforced the 
Facebook wave. Section 7.6 describes the accompanying ripples which 
contributed to giving momentum to the waves; these include distrust towards the 
government and the Project’s representative in Tahiti. Section 7.7 wraps up the 
empirical chapters.  
 
7.2.Theory: Waves 
I borrow the concept of waves from Sylvia Walby (2003, 2003a, 2003b, 2003c, 
2009). Walby chose this nautical metaphor because of how it reflects the 
movement and power of social processes. Furthermore, she selected it because 
the concept carries with it the notions of nonlinearity, spatiality, temporality, 
gradualism, escalation and rupture (2003b:2). Walby uses several analogies and 
explanations to support her choice. One of these reads: 
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A wave is a distinct set of social processes with a particular kind of 
temporal and spatial characteristic that can suddenly transfer social 
practices from one location to another; it can build suddenly, interact 
with a social system, and either produce change or decay or hybridize. 
It is especially important to understanding the implications of emergent 
civil societal projects on established social formations.  
(Walby, 2009:100) 
 
To explicate the idea that waves are processes and movements, rather than 
institutions and systems, Walby makes an analogy with the wave-particles model 
in quantum physics. She writes:  
 
Light is energy that is without mass and takes the form of a wave, while 
particles have mass and organization. Likewise, the concept of waves 
is likewise concerned with the transmission of energy – this time social 
energy – in a form and process that are not heavy with institutions.  
(Walby, 2009:96)  
 
Besides quantum physics, Walby explains that the term waves draws inspiration 
from theories of social movements. For instance, from the Feminist movement, 
Walby extracts its peaks of visible activism, and that the absence of peaks during 
some periods does not mean that the movement has disappeared. It lies there, 
slowly building up, dormant, ready to burst at any time. In Walby’s (2009:96) words: 
“Like an ocean, feminism is with us always as long as there is gender inequality, 
but there are waves of visible activism only some of the time.” Other examples of 
peaking waves are environmentalism and protests in social movements (Biggs, 
2001). Further examples Walby mentions occur over larger periods. Globalisation 
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(Chase-Dunn et al. 2000) is one of them. Walby (2003b) stresses that waves can 
sometimes be powerful enough to dwindle the foundations of societies. She 
discusses four characteristics which make them potentially so powerful. Each of 
these came out in this chapter’s empirical observations. First, waves are 
networked. Second, they are cross-temporal. Third, they are processes. Fourth, 
timing is key for them to gain momentum. 
 
In this particular case study, I argue that we see Walby’s notion of waves in the 
form of the waves relating to colonisation, Facebook posts and protests. The 
interference of these waves, I suggest, led them to gain significant momentum58. 
Such momentum explains, from a complex systems perspective, the fading of the 
Floating Island Project, through a concept that is not mainstream in the complex 
governance literature. However, as we shall see in this chapter, waves can be a 
term with significant explanatory importance in complex social systems. One 
reason why it is so powerful is its relation to the concept of networks. In the words 
of Walby:  
 
The notion of wave bears some resemblances to the concept of 
network, in that it is an attempt to conceptualize linkages which are not 
simple, direct, and linear, and in which there are loose connections 
between individuals. But it is more specific in the nature of these 
linkages, with its specification of a beginning, of its stimulation of a 
concatenation of events, intensification through endogenous 
processes, and of the primary direction of its momentum.  
(Walby, 2009:98)  
 
58 Walby uses the term interference instead of interaction because this is the term to denote 
the action when waves collide with each other.   
 




It was precisely this networked nature of the waves which allows seeing how 
colonisation, Facebook posts and protests interacted with each other, reinforced 
each other, and built upon each other. The strength of such interaction solidified 
specific positions in French Polynesia towards the Project, ultimately leading 
towards its fading. It was the waves’ interactions, and not each wave in isolation, 
which critically influenced this process.   
 
The cross-temporality of the waves is also relevant for the case study, and 
fundamental to understanding complex systems. Uprichard (2017) writes that 
complex systems are time and space sensitive. She explains that this means they 
adapt and co-evolve in time in ways that bring out how the past is co-responsible 
for their present and future. However, Uprichard adds that the future and 
anticipations of it also impact whether a system changes in the present. In a similar 
way of thinking, Uprichard and Byrne (2006:668) highlight that people’s narrations 
involving complex places help understand the changes places have experienced 
through time. This is because people reflect into their accounts and narrations the 
projections they have of their present, past and future of the places and their 
relation to them. While this chapter is about waves and not about change through 
time per se, nor how agents perceive change, the quotes I present in the next 
sections give a sense of how Polynesians view the place in which they live, the 
relation they have had with it and the way in which they want or do not want their 
home to change. As Uprichard and Byrne write: “People’s stories matter. They 
matter because they allow us to see how people interpret the world and how they 
perceive themselves in that changing world” (Uprichard and Byrne, 2006:674). 
Polynesians’ written Facebook registries show precisely this. Their written and oral 
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opinions and registries about the Project are, thus, of specific importance for this 
chapter, for their reflect and link each of the waves.  
 
Indeed, it may seem that the French colonisation of the Pacific is too far removed 
to events which happened on Facebook in 2018. However, Walby conveys that 
waves are networks of events crossing different temporalities. To explain this 
temporality in waves, Walby writes:  
 
The concept of waves is an attempt to catch the way that a critical event 
can have repercussions on social formations elsewhere. A wave starts 
in one spatial location, builds rapidly through endogenous processes, 
then spreads out through space and time to affect social relations in 
other locations. These events are connected, but not rigidly, passing 
through networks and social institutions.  
(Walby, 2003b:14)   
 
In another part, Walby explains with an example:  
 
A wave of political activity may be initiated at one point in time and 
space, but it may travel to other places, probably at later times, and 
probably have somewhat different impacts, depending on the prior 
institutional structure at those locations. 
(Walby, 2003b:16) 
 
This cross-temporality becomes key in the developments of next sections 
regarding the Floating Island.  
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The fourth powerful characteristic was the timing of the waves. Walby explains that 
if a wave takes place too late, it is likely not to be impactful, even if it carries 
everything else needed to be potentially relevant. She adds that, unlike a badly 
timed wave, one that peaks in the right time, with the right environmental 
conditions, can lead to unprecedented chaotic results. This is visible in my case 
study. The climate of the upcoming French Polynesian presidential elections of 
April and May 2018 was a deciding factor in the waves’ momentum and in the 
Floating Island’s fading.  
 
The interference of the waves peaked approximately three months before the 
presidential elections. This timing was fundamental to the project’s politicisation, 
by making the Project more visible and subject to political campaigns, 
controversies and debate. Timing is the reason why critiques made in 2018 were 
more impactful than those of 2017. Indeed, since the government announced the 
signature of the Memorandum of Understanding in January 2017, the Tahitian and 
French media were generally sceptical and critical towards the Project. However, 
2017 ended smoothly for the Floating Island. In contrast, the closer the presidential 
elections, the more protests and critiques against the Project surfaced. 
 
In a nutshell, the concept of waves, their networked nature, their temporality and 
their timing provide explanations for why the French colonisation of Polynesia was 
fundamental to what took place on Facebook and in Tahiti two centuries later. The 
interaction and interference of these waves constituted the main stage of the 
Project’s fading. Such fading is the focus of this chapter.  
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7.3. Wave 1: Colonisation 
French colonisation of the island of Tahiti and its surrounding archipelagos was 
key in the Floating Island's fading, 176 years after it began. This is because 
colonisation and its impacts live vividly in Polynesian politics, culture and 
institutions. The constrained legal and governance autonomy consequence of 
colonisation left in Polynesian indigenous peoples, the Mã'ohi,59 feelings of 
vulnerability towards foreign actors (Al Wardi, 1998, 2009). Al Wardi (2009:86) 
argues that, due to this, Mã'ohi feel discontent towards the European and Chinese 
arrival in Polynesia – the two nationalities that have migrated the most to 
Polynesian islands. One significant reason for this is that these groups hold a 
higher socioeconomic status than Polynesian natives (WENE, 2012). Because of 
this, Polynesians' are often against foreign projects, especially those which can 
increase further their lack of autonomy and control over their territories. This is how 
the wave of colonisation became an important factor in turning the Floating Island 
into an enemy of many Mã'ohi and Polynesians. 
 
Before expanding on the role played by colonisation in the Floating Island's fading, 
I shall note that that this thesis acknowledges the extensive literature on 
colonialism, post-colonialism, neocolonialism and decolonisation. Up until now, I 
have referred to Said (2002) and his concept of ‘orientalism’ and Spivak (2003) 
and her work on the ‘subaltern’ in some parts of the thesis, but I should expand a 
bit more, specifically in relation to what authors say about French Polynesia. This 
literature is mostly covered by historians, anthropologists and social scientists. A 
significant portion of this literature speaks directly to several important issues of 
 
59 Mã'ohi are indigenous from Polynesia. However, here I refer to Polynesians instead of 
Mã'ohi because, in addition to the reasons I provided in the previous chapter, French 
Polynesia has received several waves of migration, from places like China and France. Thus 
I am trying to be more general.  
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this case study. For example, Miles (2005) highlights the limited political autonomy 
of former colonies that are still under French control. Similarly, Mrgudovic (2012) 
criticises one widespread definition of independence in French Polynesia, whereby 
it is understood as the capacity to self-govern. However, self-governance is 
exercised within limits to sovereignty and autonomy that France defines. Other 
theorists, such as Gagné (2015), highlight the sidelining that Polynesian 
indigenous have in France's affairs. Likewise, Newbury (1980), studying the 
cultural transformations of Polynesia after foreign settlement, highlights the 
substitutions of  religious and administrative institutions. In like manner, Riley 
(2007) writes that missionaries produced transformations marked by non-voluntary 
processes of legal, economic, religious and linguistic assimilation. The 
decolonisation of Oceania is also a topic extensively explored in the literature (see 
Aldrich, 2000), and one which could be relevant for this thesis. However, one which 
would likely be more applicable is neo-colonialism, used by Klein (2018) to refer to 
the waves of cryptocurrency enthusiasts that try to create enclaves in islands, such 
as in Puerto Rico. The same concept is applicable to the Floating Island.   
 
However, despite the trajectory and importance of this literature for the case study, 
it is not the primary literature of this thesis. While the adverse effects of colonisation 
are undeniable, my goal here is simply to show how the institutional legacy of the 
wave of colonisation of French Polynesia played a significant role in the Floating 
Island's fading and, therefore, pervaded the SeaZone. That said, the first way in 
which the wave of colonisation pervaded the SeaZone was by making Polynesians 
sceptic of "experimental" projects in their oceans. One origin of this lies in how 
French colonisation was detrimental to the Polynesian ecosystem.  
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From the mid-sixties to the mid-nineties, France used the Polynesian islands of 
Mururoa and Fangataufa as nuclear tests sites. Between 181 (Wright, 2008) and 
193 (G.A.UN, 2018) nuclear tests took place in these islands, during this period. 
The tests happened with the support of the French Polynesian government and 
despite the opposition of the population (Danielsson, 1990), NGOs' like 
Greenpeace and neighbouring countries such as New Zealand (Wrigth, 
2008). Nuclear testing in Mururoa and Fangataufa polluted the lagoons, caused 
species to die, generated physical malformations in newborn human babies, and 
increased cases of cancer (see Stanley, 1996). In 1979, one underground nuclear 
test broke one part of Mururoa, causing a tsunami. This accident contaminated the 
marine environment in French Polynesia, and exposed its habitat to radiation levels 
beyond normal rates (Livingston and Povinec, 2000). Today, Polynesians are 
concerned because there is still a nuclear reactor buried in Mururoa, which many 
Polynesians state is leaking, and is simply a “matter of time” before the island 
entirely collapses (RNZ, 2019b).   
 
The environmental effects of colonisation were essential for the case study 
because several Polynesians connected the Floating Island with nuclear tests, 
given their foreign origin and experimental nature. Several thought the Floating 
Island would contaminate the oceans. We can see the connection between French 
nuclear testing and the Floating Island in some Facebook comments made during 
the Facebook Wave. All comments were originally posted in French and have been 
translated by myself here in the thesis. One user sarcastically commented: "it must 
be done in Mururoa, apparently there is not a radioactive threat" (FacebookUser2, 
2018). Other user asked: "two small questions...why Atimaono? Why not 
Mururoa?" (FacebookUser3, 2018). And another user commented: "We get 
screwed by the government...the government says yes to a bunch of investment 
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projects without even worrying about the impact on the environment" 
(FacebookUser4, 2018).  
 
It is important to note that the environmental critiques, however, did not seem to 
correspond to the project's goal of trying to achieve environmental restoration. To 
achieve the purpose of making an environmentally restorative SeaZone, Blue21 
wrote an Environmental Assessment Framework -EAF- (Blue21, 2017:⁠1). The 
document contained environmental challenges of the project, discussed its 
environmental policy for floating infrastructure and identified potential 
environmental impacts. These would serve as the starting point for a strict 
restoration framework. Blue21 saw the Floating Island as an opportunity to set a 
high environmental bar for future projects of floating infrastructure, in balance with 
local communities and ecosystems.  
 
Some examples in which the Project sought to go beyond sustainability are carbon 
and oxygen levels, toxicity, PH, water temperature, nutrients, shadows and artificial 
light (Roeffen, 2018). Here I explain this restoration approach using light and 
shadows (Blue21, 2017:15). Coral reefs and animals living in them need sunlight. 
Therefore, the Floating Island's design was ‘long and slim’, to prevent platforms 
from permanently casting shadows on the sea-bed. A slim design would allow the 
passage of light underneath platforms while the sun transited West to East. The 
Project would place platforms over a depth that allowed such light passage. There 
were similar additional considerations. Ironically, despite the restorative 
environmental position, the Project faded away after having received 
environmental critiques. The environmental legacy of colonisation was so strong 
that committing to a restorative environmental framework was not enough for the 
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Project to convince the necessary informal local stakeholders that, from an 
environmental point of view, things were going to be different from their past.  
 
Apart from the environment, ancestral knowledge, culture and traditions also 
suffered from the wave of colonisation. Bolin (2004) highlights how French 
missionaries transformed religion, beliefs and even sexual expression in Tahiti. 
Seafaring (Sharp, 1964), Mã'ohi's technique for using the stars as a map to 
navigate, was almost lost too. Other aspects, such as speaking Tahitian, traditional 
Polynesian tattooing, females wearing flowers on their heads and Tahitian dancing, 
were forbidden (O'Reilly, 1977; Présidence, 2017). These prohibitions, aimed at 
transforming Mã'ohi's ways of living, solidified views against foreign enclaves in 
Polynesian islands.  
 
The past thirty years have seen a revival and reapropriation of Mã'ohis' cultural 
heritage. Schools now teach Tahitian language and promote Tahitian dancing. 
These revivals are happening as the colonial power, France, becomes less 
involved. The process of reconstructing ancestral traditions and the historical 
memory can be seen in some artistic expressions of popular culture. One example 
is the song Fafaaite, which in Tahitian translates as reconciliation, by the 
Polynesian band Pepena. The lyrics of this song translated from Tahitian to French 
song sing: "look at me... I'm one of your child... I didn't receive the wisdom of our 
ancestors... Look at me closely... I chose to sing in our language..." (Pepena, 
2016). Similar practices of reapropriation have created a sense of unity among 
Polynesians with Mã'ohi origin. Given the institutional and cultural impact of 
colonisation of Polynesia, some Polynesians opposed the Floating Island Project, 
fearing it could continue the institutional path-dependency that started with the 
original foreign settlement.  
 




One way in which complexity theory can help to understand the Polynesians' 
opposition to the Floating Island is to see it as an attempt to break the institutional 
path-dependency in which they have been locked in for over 170 years - hence 
why many Facebook comments against the Project seemed, indeed, connected to 
colonisation. For instance, the nationality of the project's participants was one topic 
which emerged recurrently in many comments during the Facebook and Protests 
Waves. One of these comments read: "All our heritage is looted by non 
Polynesian... our government has never done anything for its people" 
(FacebookUser5, 2018). Another one read: "It's clear make a speech at the UN 
preservation here and there and do the opposite redo the same mistakes of the 
past for the rich" (FacebookUser5, 2018). Similarly, Pauline Sillinger, a Polynesian 
sustainable-development specialist who worked for Blue Frontiers, told Nature 
Journal: "We have a history of being taken for fools...Nuclear testing, big hotels, 
nice, smiling, white, intelligent people telling us it'll be good for us" (Marris, 
2018).  Alike, the most viral video of what I describe as ‘the Facebook wave’ 
reflects the critique towards foreigners. In that video (Amaru, 2018), a Polynesian 
man with Mã’ohi features, who described himself as unemployed, voiced his 
opposition to the project's foreign financing, claiming that the project's funding 
came from millionaires in the United States.  
 
It is important to note that, at the time, it was not possible to know the nationality 
of all the project's investors, since the Varyon crowd-sale had not taken place. In 
any case, once the pre-sale began, Blue Frontiers did not allow United States' 
citizens to take part in the sale, as I explained in Chapter Six. Therefore, critiques 
against United States millionaires financing the Floating Island did not entirely 
stand. While Blue Frontiers, as some startups, ran a round of investment for friends 
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and family first, the majority of the Project’s funds would have come from selling 
Varyon.  
 
Many of these critiques against United States millionaires financing the Project 
tended to arise in The Seasteading Institute's seed funding by PayPal’s co-founder, 
Peter Thiel. Almost every news article about the Project regurgitated Thiel's 
involvement in seasteading, even though Thiel ceased its financing 3 years before 
Blue Frontiers was registered. However, critiques like Amaru's were commonplace. 
At the end of 2017, as I noted in the previous chapter, Blue Frontiers responded to 
Polynesians critique about the Project being for foreigners by sharing it would 
prioritise 25% of the project's residences to Polynesians (Quirk, 2018a). 
However, this was not well received.  
 
The following comments are some examples of how many found it suspicious that 
a project interested in adaptation to sea-level rise (see Blue Frontiers, n.d.-c) would 
only prioritise 25% of residences for Polynesians. One user wrote: "Are the floating 
islands here to deal with the problem of water? But only 25% of Polynesian people 
will be able to Isn't there an inconsistency in your saying?" (FacebookUser9, 2018). 
Another noted, "But why Tahiti and not directly to the Tuamotu60 where the rise of 
the water will be more catastrophic and its low in fact" (FacebookUser6, 2018). The 
comments go on: "but you only wish 25 % of this people on this island with you 
and tourists" (FacebookUser6, 2018); "ONLY!!! 25% of the space will be occupied 
by locals! Who are the other 75%?" (FacebookUser7, 2018). Similarly, another 
 
60 The Touamotu is a group of islands in French Polynesia. French Polynesia has five group 
of islands and several archipelagos. Some of these islands, like Tahiti, are volcanic islands 
and tend to have tall mountains. However, other islands, such as those in the Tuamotu 
archipelago, are coral atoll islands. Atolls tend to be almost flat, because they are composed 
by a coral reef, where there used to be, millions of years ago, volcanic islands. Atolls will be 
more affected by rising seas because of their almost flat territory.    
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user commented, this time in response to one video that I posted while being Blue 
Frontiers' ‘seavangelesse’:  
 
Okay Nathalie, and how do you explain to our people already in 
difficulty that we will build a place where you will have all the rights. 
That's the problem. How do you explain that there will be only 25% of 
the population who can live there? Which corresponds strangely to the 
percentages of the richest in Polynesia. Do you have any idea of the 
current social divide in Polynesia? Do you know there's a lot of people 
in financial difficulty?  
(FacebookUser8, 2018; my translation) 
 
Perhaps some answers to Polynesians' questions about why only 25% of 
residences lie in the seasteading mindset of colonising ‘unclaimed’ places, 
imprinted into the Floating Island Project. This viewpoint sees `third world 
countries´ as uninhabited places that are ripe for the taking. For example, years 
before the Floating Island, authors at The Seasteading Institute (Mutabdzija & 
Borders, 2011a) wrote that one advantage that Maritime Special Economic Zones 
could have over Special Economic Zones in land was the lack of disputed land. 
This misconception is visible in Friedman & Gramlich’s quote:  
 
easiest thing for us is to ally with small island nation to open a free 
trade zone/business park somewhere in its EEZ. Very strong legal 
status. (Unfortunately, also in the middle of nowhere - South Pacific). 
Secondary to that, we need a nation on our side. But will it let us have 
autonomy? Dunno.  
(Friedman & Gramlich, 2009:105)  
 




The role played by colonisation in the creation of this Floating Island Project, and 
its connection to nationality and cultural differences, brings out one ironic aspect 
of the Project and its relation to diversity. We can understand seasteading as a 
governance interpretation of homophily. Homophily (McPherson et al., 2001) is the 
principle which explains why "birds of the same feather fly together" - that is, why 
people tend to cluster with others similar to them. Seasteading is homophily in the 
sense that foundational seasteading authors expect that individuals on seasteads 
would cluster based on shared traits. According to foundational seasteading 
authors, and as I explained in Chapter Two, choosing governments can lead to 
higher political satisfaction. Ironically, this idea played a reverse role in the Island. 
To create a solid opposition against the project, Mã’ohi strengthened their 
homophily ties and sentiments of nationalism through the reinforcement of the 
notions of themselves and ‘the other’. Polynesians did not want more foreigners in 
charge of their lagoons. 
 
7.4. Wave 2: Facebook 
The second wave which led to the Floating Island fading was, I argue, the 
Facebook wave. This wave mainly consisted of Facebook videos that went viral in 
Tahiti from January to April 2018. Facebook is the primary form of communication 
in Tahiti. I noted this both times I visited Polynesia in 2017. Naturally, because of 
its widespread daily use, Facebook became the main medium to voice opinions 
about the Project. I refer to the momentum gained by these videos as waves based 
on Walby’s endorsement of Biggs's (2001) idea that social movements, including 
protests, behave similarly to natural processes, such as ocean waves. Social 
movements and natural processes have positive feedback loops that generate 
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rapid processes of propagation. This characterised the events I discuss and 
describe in this section.  
 
Based on the number of reactions, there were four key viral videos containing 
people addressing Polynesians during the Facebook wave. These videos involve 
several stakeholders. The first video is by a local informal stakeholder, Amaru, the 
Polynesian man with Mao'hi features whose video I introduced in the previous 
section. I posted the second video of what became the Facebook wave, while I 
was still representing Blue Frontiers. Jean-Francois Bouissou, Minister of French 
Polynesia, posted the third video. The fourth one involves French Polynesia’s 
president Edouard Fritch. From these videos, I extracted comments and selected 
those comments which more broadly represented popular views in other 
comments. A great majority of these video comments  were by users with at least 
one Polynesian name or last name. Their profile pictures and or locations also 
showed that most were from or in Polynesia. They pictured themselves at the 
beach or with their Polynesian families and babies. Here I discuss how the 
Facebook wave interfered with the wave of colonisation, making the distrust 
towards foreign settlement in the island appear as a recurrent topic in many of the 
comments.  
 
The video that started the Facebook wave (Amaru, 2018) was posted publicly on 
January 30th 2018 on the personal profile of a mid-forties Polynesian man of last 
name Amaru. In his video, Amaru criticised the Floating Island Project and the 
government's support. Amaru described himself as unemployed. He expressed 
that he did not see how the Project could improve the Polynesian economy nor 
bring jobs for his peers. He voiced how tired he was of hearing about the Floating 
Island Project, describing it as an independent state inside French Polynesia set 
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up by foreign millionaires to evade taxes. Amaru's video received over 100,000 
views. For an island with approximately 180,000 inhabitants, this number suggests 
that a significant portion of Tahiti's inhabitants saw the video, even if some views 
came from the same users. At the end of 2018, when this thesis' data collection 
process ended, the video had 4,000 native shares, 532 direct comments and 2,000 
reactions. Most reactions were favourable. There were 1,400 likes, 482 hearts, 85 
surprised faces, 9 laughs, 7 angry faces and 3 crying faces.  
 
Comments in Amaru's video addressed the same topics as comments in the other 
videos of this wave. One of the most recurrent topics concerned the Project 
possibly polluting the lagoon and killing the coral reef. Others expressed a lack of 
understanding for how floating architecture could contribute to sea-level rise 
adaptation. Some questioned why building the Project in Tahiti, a volcanic island 
that, unlike flat coral reef atoll islands in the Tuamotu archipelago, would not be 
significantly affected by sea-level rise. Similarly, others wondered why the Project 
would build an artificial island in a country with over 118 natural islands, many of 
them inhabited. Polynesian doctor-in-law Lallemant-Moe (2017a) shared this last 
concern, even though Lallemant-Moe (2017b) conveyed that some opinions 
against the Project were not always rational. 
 
Multiple responses to Amaru's video reflected feelings of unity towards a common 
enemy: rich foreigners. In reaction to Amaru’s critique, one user wrote to Amaru: 
"you have spoken for the Tahitian people" (FacebookUser10, 2018; my 
translation). Another comment read: "don't come here. Piss off with your invention" 
(FacebookUser11, 2018; my translation). Similarly, another one typed: "I don't 
think thats paypal but Bitcoin's boss. That's right, it's gonna destroy the ecosystem 
They love the $$$$$$$$ too much" (FacebookUser12, 2018; my translation). 
 




Although most comments were negative, several were not. One example read: 
"Excellent idea" (FacebookUser13, 2018). Overall, younger users' profiles seemed 
more open or neutral towards the Project than profiles of older people. Some young 
people were even curious about what the Project could mean for French 
Polynesia's economic future. One example was a comment in the press by a young 
female Polynesian student at the Tahiti Business School, who volunteered during 
the First Seasteading Tahiti Conference:  
 
It's a very innovating project with many new technologies that we would 
never imagine here. In terms of the responses in social networks, one 
can see that the eldest ones completely disagree with the environment 
being touched in our Fenua. Besides, they are Americans... But for the 
youth, we are very interested because, as we've been told, it can create 
new jobs.  
(Hereiti Vairaaroa, 2017; my translation) 
 
It is not possible to know if most comments were negative because the majority of 
Polynesians were against the Project or because the medium, Facebook, 
incentives polarising attitudes. Vaccari (2013) explains that the internet can help 
vocalise political views and shape them. However, Del Vicario et al. (2016) argue 
that platforms like Facebook confirm biases about specific phenomena, making it 
more likely that users receive more information about what they already believe 
because of reinforced selective exposure. Del Viccario et al. add that the internet 
is where individuals today reaffirm their political orientations and views. Indeed, 
online social media, thus, has been said to behave as an echo chamber.⁠ While this 
aspect is a limitation of social media, or an advantage, depending on how one 
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looks at it, it does not make the concerns of some Polynesians regarding foreign 
enclaves less valid. Their perspective becomes stronger when understanding that 
the Mã'ohi's word for their land, Fenua, joins together the island and the 
community. Several Polynesians mentioned their Fenua when commenting against 
the Project in Tahiti.  
 
After Amaru's video, and acting as a spokesperson of Blue Frontiers, I publicly 
posted a video in my personal profile (Mezza-Garcia, 2018b), where I spoke in 
French in favour of the Project. This was only 7/19 months into my participation in 
the Project and 2/3s into the data collection process. I had not yet begun to analyse 
the information I captured while being a participant/observer, and this reflects in 
the video. Note that my position in the video does not share the more objective 
standpoint that I try to convey in this thesis. In this thesis, the 'side' I take is that 
special jurisdictions, such as SeaZones, need to understand better the different 
implications of dealing with complex governance systems, if they wish to be 
successful. In the previous chapters, it involved engaging, more realistically, with 
diverse stakeholders on multiple levels and institutions. In this chapter, engaging 
with complexity means understanding the cross-temporality and cross-spatiality of 
events. It means taking into account sensitivities of locations and their history.  That 
said, in the video I defend the Project. I explain that most of its investors were not 
American millionaires, and I expressed admiration for Polynesian culture and the 
Tahitian language - which I was trying to learn back then. I mentioned that the 
Project was small and that environmental protection was one of its priorities. To 
support this last idea, I invited viewers to look at Blue21's (2017) environmental 
study. This video also went viral during the peak of the Facebook Wave; in one 
week of posting, it reached over 50.000 views. When the data collection process 
ended, the video had 675 native comments, 959 shares and 817 reactions. There 
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were 431 likes, 222 angry faces, 118 hearts, 22 surprised faces, 21 laughs and 3 
crying faces. As in Amaru's video, comments in this video evidenced some general 
negative opinions about the Project.61 I recognise the irony and the decolonial role 
I played by being a woman from the Global South defending a project with 
characteristics that were not going to be favourable for other Global South peers. 
I discuss more in depth the ethics implications of my role and this video in section 
4.6.  
 
Comments on my video were similar to those posted in Amaru's video. One user 
wrote: "Sad world where the superich only think about becoming even richer at the 
expense of the countless small hands exploited instead of thinking about solutions 
favourable to the whole population" (FacebookUser14, 2018; my translation). 
Another comment reads: "NO to the floating islands and NO to the profit of rich 
people" (Facebookuser15, 2018; my translation), while another one added: "Same 
style as Marlon Brando's island. That for the rich" (Facebookuser16, 2018; my 
translation).62 One user replied to the Marlon Brando comment by writing: "This 
has nothing to do! Marlon Brando bought the island, it's private. And they pay their 
taxess!! Unlike this floating island where no tax will be returned" (Facebookuser17, 
2018; my translation). Additional comments referred to language. 
 
Some users either praised or criticised my use of French in the video. One 
favourable comment read "Look in her Facebook, there is a video where she is in 
Tahiti (I think that at a museum) and she speaks in French so it is not a danger, 
we should congratulate her because she speaks as she can and she is going to 
learn Tahitian but it’s so cool" (FacebookUser18, 2018; my translation). Other 
 
61 I recognise the irony and the decolo 
62 Marlon Brando bought an island in French Polynesia, Tetiaroa, 4 hours away from Tahiti. 
The island currently hosts the most expensive hotel in French Polynesia, and it is frequented 
by international celebrities and politicians.   
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users criticised: "Of course, she was recruited precisely because she speaks 
French" (FacebookUser19, 2018; my translation). It seems, with these and similar 
comments, that users were not expecting that a non-Polynesian member of Blue 
Frontiers spoke French. Language is an important topic in this discussion and in 
this section because of its connection to nationality. Both, nationality and language, 
are sensitive topics because of their connection or derivation from the wave of 
colonisation.   
 
The third video of the Facebook wave was by a government stakeholder. On 
February 1st, Jean Cristophe Bouissou, Minister of Housing in French Polynesia 
and of the Blue Economy, published a 26-minute video on his personal Facebook 
profile (TNTV, 2017), in which he defended the Floating Island Project. Bouissou 
was the government representative who signed in San Francisco the 
Memorandum of Understanding in 2017. Since then, he showed himself as a 
supporter of the Project (TNTV, 2017j18). At the end of this thesis' data collection 
process, Bouissou's viewers had been watched this video over 18.000 times. It 
was shared natively 282 times and had 210 reactions and 284 comments. From 
the reactions, there were 102 likes, 88 angry faces, 10 hearts, 7 laughs and 3 
surprises. 
 
In the video, Bouissou explained that the Project could help with French 
Polynesia's commitment to finding solutions to adapt to sea-level rise. He 
conveyed that the Project could bring to the country knowledge and technologies 
from Silicon Valley.63 The Minister also said that critics in social media had not read 
 
63 Another way to read this is as Kapoor (2004:829) frames it: “working in development 
inevitably positions us within a ‘development discourse’, where the North’s superiority over 
the South is taken for granted, and Western-style development is the norm. Our encounters 
with, and representations of, our ‘subjects’ are therefore coded or framed in terms of an 
us/them dichotomy in which ‘we’ aid/develop/civilise/empower ‘them’.   
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the proposal submitted to the government at the end of 2017 and, therefore, 
critiques did not sustain. Bouissou's video closed with him saying that President 
Fritch would not impose the Project over the population. He emphasised on the 
fact that the Memorandum of Understanding was non-binding.  
 
Compared to responses in other videos, many responses to Bouissou's video tend 
to be short and expressed a simple idea: many Polynesians did not want the 
Project in their lagoon. For example: "Independence! Leave Tahiti alone!" 
(Facebookuser20, 2018; my translation); "nothing good stop this blooper no 
floating island here" (Facebookuser22, 2018; my translation); "No Floating Islands 
here, leave our lagoon alone" (Facebookuser22, 2018;  my translation); "Don't 
touch our lagoon" (Facebookuser23, 2018; my translation); "no, no floating islands 
at ours" (FacebookUser24, 2018; my translation). Longer comments, such as the 
following, reflected the same position: "Mr Bouissou we don't care about your new 
technologies we don't want your floating islands in our lagoons one point and that's 
all and stop politicising our negative reaction against this project" 
(Facebookuser25, 2018; my translation). 
 
Bouissou, like Amaru, connected the Project to the wave of protests by saying that 
the timing near elections created political interests seeking to hinder the Project. 
Indeed, the closer the presidential elections, the more the political interests 
politicised the Project. The protagonists were the government and the opposition. 
Thus, political parties became key actors in the intersection of the Facebook and 
protests waves. The controversy escalated to national television.  
 
Two weeks after Bouissou's video, the French Polynesian president and 
presidential candidate from the political party Tapura, Edouard Fritch, did a political 
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manoeuvre typical from electoral times. In national television, Fritch contradicted 
Bouissou's video by saying that he had never seen the Project of Atimaono. Fritch 
claimed this, even though he addressed seasteaders on video during the signature 
of the Memorandum of Understanding in San Francisco, one event of the Tahitian 
conference was a dinner at the presidential palace, which I personally attended, 
and that his special advisor, Thierry Nhunfat, accompanied The Seasteading 
Institute throughout the entire process until the Memorandum (TSI, 2017a). Fritch's 
words on TV were:  
 
At the Assembly of French Polynesia I learnt that there is a project in 
the lagoon of Atimaono 300 meters from the bank for 150 hectares. I 
have never seen a project on Atimaono and I want to tell viewers that 
I do not support this kind of project in the lagoon here in Tahiti. It would 
be furious madness  
(Fritch, 2018; my translation). 
 
President Fritch's position also contradicts with what Marc Collins Chen (TNTV, 
2018b), Blue Frontiers representative in Tahiti, told the press two weeks earlier. 
Collins said that he met the cabinet of the vice-president every two weeks after the 
studies were submitted to the government.  
 
Two weeks after Fritch's statement, his political party published a Facebook press 
release about the Project (Tahiti-Infos, 2018a). The announcement stated that one 
of the opposition's representatives, Valentina Cross, instigated the controversy 
about the Floating Island. Cross was the politician from the municipality of Teva I 
Uta that had advocated for more Mã'ohi participation in the government at the 
United Nations in 2018 (UN, 2018b). The communication of the Tapura political 
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party also explained that the Memorandum of Understanding (2017) was a 
collection of reciprocal intentions rather than a binding legal contract. Moreover, It 
stated that the deadline of the document’s validity passed in 2017. The press 
release concluded that because the date of the MOU had expired, the controversy 
about the Floating Island was purposeless. It was amid this wave when the Floating 
Island, a special jurisdiction seeking to create forms of governance beyond 
representative democracy, clearly began fading prey to electoral campaigns. 
Ironically, trying to create spatial extraterritoriality, the Island became prey to one 
of the most territorial forms of governance: elections.  
 
7.5. Wave 3: Protests  
Three months before to the French Polynesian presidential elections of 2018, 
paralleling the online Facebook wave, there were several physical protests against 
the Floating Island. In a way, the Facebook wave gave birth to the wave of protests, 
since videos like Amaru's (2018) and several comments instigated Polynesians to 
protest in the streets. For instance, one comment read: "we must stop the 
massacre people rebel yourself!! for the future of our children" (Facebookuser26; 
my translation). Or "people of Oceania, rebel yourself and act together for the 
future of our generation before it's too late. Let's rise" (Facebookuser27, 2018; my 
translation). And "we must organise a protest" (Facebookuser28, 2018), "not to this 
destructive project. If we must go to the streets, I'll be there" (Facebookuser29, 
2018). 
 
In this way, the colonisation and Facebook waves interfered with the Protests 
wave. If the interaction of the wave of colonisation and the Facebook wave 
reflected the cross-temporality of waves, the interaction of the Facebook and 
protests wave showing their cross-spatiality. This is because one was on Facebook 
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and the other one at the beach. While cross-spatiality was not an original feature 
of waves studied by Walby, it is worth recognising it as a feature of contemporary 
complex governance which, given the relevance that social media and platform-
mediated interactions have today. 
 
There were three main forms of protests involved in politicisation of the project. 
First, there were protests at the Assembly by the opposition. Second, there was an 
online petition against the Floating Island. And third, there were protests at 
Atimaono beach and the streets by fishermen and women. Protests politicised 
even further the Floating Island. One prominent voice of the opposition, Valentina 
Hina Cross, protested against the Project during an extraordinary session of the 
Assembly on the February 14th. Cross was from the opposition's political party, 
Tavini, and represented the commune Teva I Uta, which encloses the Atimaono 
beach. Cross' protest consisted of holding posters which said 'Do not touch our 
Atimaono lagoon'. The politician told the press that she protested because the 
Project was for libertarian millionaires of Silicon Valley and not for Polynesians 
(Actu.fr, 2018). The press confronted Cross about the Floating Island's financing, 
defending that it would be funded entirely with private funds. They asked her why 
was this worse than the 100 million Polynesian Francs that the government would 
spend for a port at the South of Tahiti to accommodate larger cruise ships; 
something which would be more environmentally impactful than the Floating 
Island. Cross replied that her main issue with the Project was its permanence in 
the lagoon and its long-term impact on the lives of the inhabitants of the commune 
(Actu.fr, 2018). She concluded that her goal was requesting the government to 
cease relations with the Project and detract from the Memorandum of 
Understanding. While the local press recognised political interests involved in the 
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Floating Island's politicisation during the presidential campaigns (Tahiti-Infos, 
2018c), Cross's protest reinforced the negative image of the project. 
 
Responses to Cross' protest in social media varied. Many comments favoured her 
actions. Others questioned whether Cross' political party, Tavini, was truly against 
the project. Doubts emerged due to meeting the minutes of a visit in 2017 where 
the leader of the opposition, Oscar Temaru, met Blue21 at their Floating Pavilion 
in Rotterdam.64 The president's political party, Tapura, supported these doubts with 
a Facebook post (Tapura Huiraatira Officiel, 2018). In it, Tapura pointed out that 
the minutes suggested Temaru’s opinion of the Project was favourable. 
Furthermore, the government's party stated there was no reason for protesting that 
day at the Assembly, given that Minister Bouissou had publicly admitted that the 
Memorandum of Understanding was non-binding. Hence, the president's party 
accused Cross of taking advantage of the camera presence in the extraordinary 
meeting of the Assembly, calling her protest "a real media show by branding" 
(Tapura Huiaatira Officiel; my translation).   
 
A second form of protest against the project, also led by Cross, took the shape of 
an online petition. Cross created this online petition two weeks prior to her protest 
at the Assembly. She entitled the online petition 'Against The Polynesian 
Government's Floating Island' (Avaaz, 2018).65 Cross was also involved in the 
creation of a Facebook page against the Project, called Paruru Ia Atimaono (2018), 
which still had weekly posts against floating city projects in December 2019. 
Around 1.600 people, less than 1% of Tahiti's population, had signed the petition 
 
 
64 The Floating Pavilion is Blue21’s signature floating building. The Global Centre for 
Adaptation, a project in collaboration with the United Nations, will place its floating building 
besides it. 
65 The petition’s name in French was: Contre le projet d'îles flottantes du gouvernement de la 
Polynésie: Paruru Ia Atimaono. 
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when the elections finished. It might be important to note that, in the past, Cross 
had been accused of defamation (La1ere, 2017). Correspondingly, the petition 
expressed certainty about likely yet unclear aspects of the project. It read that the 
SeaZone would include a security perimeter of 100 hectares, which would ban 
fishermen, boaters and residents from their activities in the project's area. As I 
explained on Chapter Six, while the Project sidelined Polynesians, their exclusion 
was by omission and by the use of language, but this did not necessarily entail a 
security perimeter. The petition also mentioned American millionaires financing the 
Project. Therefore, as with other events of the waves, nationality was an important 
topic in this petition. This time, the petition stated that American investors led the 
Project and referred to it as a Tax Haven.  
 
Cross was a linking point between the wave of Protests and the Facebook wave. 
In Amaru's (2018) video, she wrote: "Thanks, Sam Amaru. I shared on my wall and 
a friend shared in the group Paruru Ia Atimaono, thanks" (my translation). Likewise, 
on the video I posted (Mezza-Garcia, 2018b), Cross wrote: "Please sign the 
petition online in the group la atimaono group: not touch our lagoon! No Floating 
Artificial Islands in mataiea" (my translation).   
 
The petition and the Facebook waves instigated additional protests (TNTV, 2018a), 
this time led by the Fishermen Collective of Mataieia, `Te feiā rava'ai nō Mataiea' 
(RNZ, 2018a, 2018b; Tahiti-Infos, 2018b). Mataieia is the lagoon neighbouring 
Atimaono. It is also located in the municipality of Teva I Uta. The link between both 
waves is visible, in so far the Fishers Collective reproduced information about the 
security perimeter and the ban on fishing mentioned by Cross. The leader of the 
Collective, Georges Ateo 'Papa Ko' (2018), posted a video to Facebook in which 
he rejected the Floating Island. Ateo did not want the project, neither in Atimaono 
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nor in the rest of Tahiti. His argument was simple: the lagoon was their life. Ateo 
called for a nine hours procession on the 7th of April from the Tehoro Marine to 
Atimaono. Teva I Uta, the municipality that Cross represented, gave the Collective 
permission to divert traffic as they wished. One poster in this protest read 
“Atimaono is not a playground for libertarians” (Cross, 2018b). Another one read 
“Atimaono is not Silicon Valley” (Cross, 2018b).  
 
Blue Frontiers tried to decrease the momentum gained by protests and the waves 
overall. For instance, it directed some online comments to the location studies on 
the Project's website in French, showing how these analysed four additional 
beaches besides Atimaono. One news article quoted Blue Frontiers co-founder 
Collins Chen referring to this: "Collins said four sites were under consideration, but 
once word spread that Blue Frontiers had settled on Atimaono Lagoon, opposition 
to the Project spread quickly" (Conan, 2018). Around that time, Blue Frontiers also 
published a new video, showing a new rendering of the Project, which did not have 
Tahiti in the background (Blue Frontiers, 2018i). However, the Project was already 
too politicised. A quote by Walby referring to waves and timing explain what 
happened:  
 
The level of impact will depend on the conjuncture of circumstances, 
which affects whether it is a mere ripple or a tidal wave of tremendous 
proportions. The effect of the wave will be significantly affected by the 
nature of the local circumstances with which it interacts...It is the 
endogeneity, the positive feedback loops, which are crucial to the 
explanation of the suddenness of waves of social movements and of 
the rapidity of the generation of their intensity and power.  
(Walby, 2003b; 16) 
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In this case study, the local circumstances that gave the ideal context for such 
momentum were the presidential elections. These led political actors in the Island 
to use the Project in ways that could be beneficial for them and detrimental for their 
opponents. For example, the opposition tied president and candidate Fritch to the 
project, conveying the message that if Fritch won, the Floating Island would be 
developed. However, in response, Fritch took the same position as the opposition 
party.  
 
With the protest and Facebook waves in their peak, President Fritch and his 
political party officially detracted their support to the Project by completely turning 
against it on April 13th 2018. Despite publicly supporting the Project for more than 
a year, the Floating Island became the only environmental point of Edouard 
Fritch four points presidential campaign. The official political party's website, a 
Facebook post and pamphlets distributed in Tahiti showed the words in French 
"No to the Floating Island Project" with a big red cross on top of the Project's design 
(Tapura Huaaitira, 2018a, 2018b; Paruru ia Atimaono, 2018). Figures 3 and 4  
show a screenshot and a pamphlet, respectively. This was perhaps the strongest 
and deepest among the multiple events in the Project's fading, which I summed up 
on the timeline in Figure 1.    
 
 




Figure 3. No to the Floating Island Project Facebook electoral campaign by the government66 
 
 
66 . (Tahoera Huiraatira, 2018). 
 
 




Figure 4. No to the Floating Island flyer by the government67 
 
In that way, the Floating Island Project ended up being negatively affected by the 
same forces that seasteading was trying to break away from: electoral politics.  
 
This event is interesting, insofar SeaZones originate in the idea of a self-organised 
market of governments on the ocean where individuals choose their governments. 
However, here, because of a lack of local self-organised community-building 
processes, Polynesians were the ones who self-organised. Polynesians even 
appealed to electoral incentives of traditional governance systems that the Project 
was trying to transcend. This turnaround is in line with Walby's (2003b:16) theory 
of waves. Walby notes that elite's response towards the waves shapes them. 
Moreover, groups can use waves to support their own agendas (Walby, 2003b:17). 
Similarly, foundational seasteading authors, Mutabdzija and Borders (2011b:11), 
 
67 (Paruru ia Atimaono Facebook, 2018).  
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wrote years back that the political zeitgeist of each country would constrain the 
actions of the governments that seasteaders are negotiating with. 
 
But the concept of waves explains even further what happened in this case study. 
Walby (2003b; 17) recalls that societies build themselves around specific principles 
through processes of societalisation which shape waves (Walby, 2009; 41). From 
this perspective, underlining socialisation processes behind the waves could be 
the struggles against continuous foreign control of French Polynesia, evidenced in 
the nested structure of its current governance. Another important issue was 
Mã’ohi’s own nation-building process, culturally and ethnically, and how they saw 
the Project as a neoliberal disruption of it. It might also be important to consider 
Moberg's viewpoint about to governments and creating Special Economic Zones:  
 
We can no longer assume that the SEZ planners are benevolent.68 
Government officials pursue higher salaries, benefits and social status. 
Democratically elected politicians want public support and votes in the 
next election. Bureaucrats seek prestigious titles, larger offices, bigger 
staff, more leisure and the occasional trips to a pleasant resort on 
behalf of their agency.  
(Moberg, 2015b:12).  
 
There are, nonetheless, additional accompanying factors which contributed with 
momentum to the waves, and which facilitated their propagation. I discuss these 
additional “ripples” in the next section.   
 
 
68 SEZ is the abbreviation of Special Economic Zone. 
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7.6. Accompanying Ripples 
Five additional ‘ripples’ contributed to adding the momentum of the Waves. These 
were: poorly researched news pieces about the project, additional videos about it, 
previous business practices of foreign companies, distrust in the government and 
distrust towards the project’s representative in French Polynesia. These ripples 
accentuated locked-in negative perceptions about the project, further challenging 
its creation. Here I explain each of them.  
 
The first ripple was poorly researched news articles about the project. This ripple 
was an international phenomenon. From September 2016 to February 2018, over 
one thousand news articles were written about the Floating Island (see: Universal, 
2018). Few of them (Carli, 2016; Chinn, 2017; Gelles, 2017; Marris, 2017; Metcalfe, 
2017) were almost entirely accurate or were done after interviewing the first source. 
From a sample of the Media Coverage Report of Universal Information Services 
(Blue Frontiers, 2018f) containing hundreds of media outlets written between 
September 2016 and September 2017, in more than ten languages, the majority 
of news articles put The Seasteading Institute as the developer of the Project and 
not Blue Frontiers. 
 
The regurgitated quality of the news is additionally visible in the emphasis given by 
almost all news outlets to sensationalist aspects of the project, such as critiques to 
Peter Thiel’s involvement in the Floating Island and the narrative of Silicon Valley 
millionaires, some of which “just want to see the world burn” (Menegus, 2017), 
seeking to evade taxes on the ocean. Other news articles resort to dystopic popular 
culture references of floating communities, such as the film Waterworld (Griffiths, 
2017; O’Brien, 2018; Miéville, 2007). They also reproduced misunderstandings 
regarding the project’s goal, focusing on seasteads, not on SeaZones. Some 
 
   
 
234 
presented the Floating Island as an attempt to create a micro-nation (Chandler, 
2018). This gave waves an unstable environment, making it easier for their 
interference to gain momentum.  
 
Past business practices of foreign companies in French Polynesia was the second 
ripple which added to the Waves’ momentum. Temaru, leader of the opposition 
political party, told Blue21 during his visit to the Floating Pavilion that Polynesians 
feel foreign companies have played them in the past (Blue21, 2017c). This was an 
opinion several Polynesians voiced to me during my first and second visit to Tahiti 
when I talked to them at the market. For example, there had been several instances 
where the government announced large hotel projects that would create new jobs. 
However, they were never built. Some comments on Facebook allude to this. One 
user wrote on the Minister’s Bouissou’s video: “Bla Bla-Bla-bla. Still projects but 
it’s enough... first mahana beach then the Chinese project for Hao and now floating 
island (FacebookUser30, 2018; my translation). Another user wrote: “Do your 
floating islands at yours and leave our lagoons in peace!! No trust at all in these 
projects of these people” (Facebookuser31, 2018; my translation). Critiques were 
well-founded.  
 
While the Floating Island was waiting for the Assembly to deliver, other large 
maritime and land infrastructure projects were waiting and others were being 
discussed. Industrial Chinese fisheries in the Marquises Archipelago and the old 
Mahana Beach Resort were among them (Tahiti-Infos, 2018c). The latter already 
rebranded due to a previous failure in 2014, changing its name to Village Tahitian 
and was waiting for an answer from the Assembly, at the same time of Blue 
Frontiers. Village Tahitian was driven by the New Zealand firm with Maori name, 
Kaitiaki Tagaloa. Village Tahitian was much larger than the development of the 
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Floating Island. It comprised four hotels and two residential condominiums, for 
1.300 habitation spaces (Tahiti-Infos, 2019). The cost was also much higher. Like 
the Floating Island, Village Tahitian would have a land and a marine area. It would 
have tax exemptions and, as other touristic hotel projects in French Polynesia, it 
would have subsidies from the government. Village Tahitian was seen as an 
opportunity to create a Polynesian consortium, between Mã’ohi from French 
Polynesia and Maori from New Zealand, said the Project leader (la1ere, 2019). 
With this in mind, in 2018, after the presidential elections, these two neighbours 
with the same cultural roots, the New Zealand company and the French Polynesian 
government, signed an agreement. With a Memorandum of Understanding signed, 
the New Zealand company promised to create 4.500 direct jobs.  
 
However, in 2019, the Project was cancelled after the company did not meet 
expected deadlines and did not raise funds to build it (RNZ, 2019). Polynesians 
had already been disappointed by the Tahitian Village. Four years earlier, when 
the Mahana Beach rebranded, it was because it was forced to down-size. This is 
an example of another story that illustrates how past events have led to 
Polynesians distrusting large infrastructure projects by foreign companies — even 
those which are culturally closer to them than Blue Frontiers.  
 
The existence of corrupt elected governments is the next ripple contributing to the 
waves’ momentum. Since elections became possible in French Polynesia, the 
government has been accused of being corrupt. In French Polynesia, most 
presidents and politicians have been accused of corruption, with many been 
investigated or sanctioned. Besides being corrupt, today, many Polynesians 
distrust the government because of its authoritarian nature (Al Wardi, 2009). Most 
importantly, power in the collectivity has been in the same hands since 1984. The 
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presidency has been switched among the same four men. Gaston Flosse has been 
6 times president; Oscar Temaru, 5; Gaston Tong Sang, 3; and Edouard Fritch, 2.  
 
Despite repeating governments, politics in French Polynesia is highly unstable and 
suffers from what Al Wardi (2009:87) calls ideological political nomadism. That is, 
politicians, migrate from one political party to the other, depending on what is more 
convenient. Al Wardi (2009) takes the argument further tagging politics in the 
Collectivity’s islands as clientelist. The author states that French Polynesia’s 
politicians are prone to change their opinion about topics based on their voters’ 
pressures. Al Wardi adds that this happens because politicians in French 
Polynesia know that sentiments, instead of ‘rationality’, are the main driver of most 
Mã'ohi when voting. Al Wardi writes that Mã'ohi are known as one of the most 
sentimental cultures in the world. On top of this, French Polynesia adopted 
France’s tradition of strikes and protests. Therefore, despite the cloud of corruption 
and clientelism, protesters are lead to think that change is possible. This intensifies 
distrust towards a government that Mã'ohi already feel does not represent them. 
All this added reasons to why the government withdrew its support to the Floating 
Island after initial support.    
 
Besides the previous reasons, the relatively small size and population of Tahiti 
makes people’s opinions influence the government more directly. Hence why 
during the visit of Temaru, leader of the opposition, to Rotterdam, he expressed to 
Blue21 that for the Floating Island Project to be successful, it needed the support 
of the Polynesians, more than the support of the government (Blue21, 2017c).69 
The words of another ex-president compliment Temaru’s statement. 6 times 
 
69 The original text in French: Une autre conclusion a été que pour l'avenir du projet, il sera 
essentiel d'avoir plus que le soutien du gouvernement actuel : en fin de compte, les acteurs 
les plus importants sont les habitants de la Polynésie française. (Blue21, 2017c). 
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president Gaston Flosse said that French Polynesia is exactly the opposite of a 
market economy because leaders give the population exactly what it wants (Al 
Wardi, 2009: 196). Therefore, if islanders oppose a project, the government will 
oppose too. Now, the last two last ripples I have here mentioned are intertwined. 
Distrust in foreign companies accentuates because the government deals with 
foreign companies and foreign companies need the government’s approval. 
 
The fourth ripple which added momentum to the Waves was distrust towards Blue 
Frontier’s representative in Tahiti, Marc Collins Chen. The Memorandum of 
Understanding (2017) stated that there would be a single point of contact making 
the liaison between the French Polynesian government and The Seasteading 
Institute. Here, it was Collins Chen. Collins Chen was a relevant ripple because he 
embodied several traits which generate distrust in French Polynesia. On one hand, 
he was a business person, who co-founded Smart Tahiti Networks (Big Think, 
2017). This was a telecommunications company in French Polynesia which one 
month after the peak of the Facebook Wave lost the license to operate. As the 
official journal of the government published in a ministerial order (Conseil des 
Ministers, 2018m1), the company Collins Chen co-founded provided no evidence 
of economic activity since granted the license. Furthermore, the order stated that 
it did not operate any telecommunications services and that it abandoned the 
Project that they gave the authorisation for. The order also highlighted the lack of 
a business plan to match the initial proposal and that the company never reached 
maturity beyond an initial stage of a prospective analysis. It also stated that there 
was a pattern by the company to abandon projects since their authorisation. The 
President, Edouard Fritch, and the Minister of Housing, Jean-Christoff Bouissou, 
were the people in the government who signed the Ministerial Order. It is not 
possible to know with the information publicly available the extent of Collins Chen’s 
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involvement in 2018 in the company he founded years earlier. But this serves as 
an additional example of the pattern that Polynesians are tired of. Companies and 
Polynesian elites promise, but they do not deliver.  
 
Besides being a business person, Collins Chen served in the government for eight 
months as Minister of Tourism in 2007. This made him part of another demographic 
which Polynesians distrust, politicians, and with reason. Collins Chen’s link with 
Blue Frontiers ended in November 2018 after I discovered, while working on this 
research, that he had created a competing company, Oceanix, while still being part 
of Blue Frontiers (see: ICRIS, 2018). Moreover, Collins Chen, while still being the 
local representative of Blue Frontiers in French Polynesia, publicly said in an 
interview published on November 23rd 2018 on China Global Television Network 
that the first floating city in the world would be built in China (CGTN, 201823n) – 
not in French Polynesiia. This was 5 days after Blue Frontiers wrote a blog about 
how, despite the problems in Tahiti, there were still conversations with a mayor in 
the Tuamotu Archipelago (Blue Frontiers, 2018n).  
 
Since Collins Chen was the liaison with French Polynesia, the contrast between 
Collins Chen's behind the backs announcement and Blue Frontiers social media 
outlets represented a key moment in the Project’s fading because it suggests that 
this co-founder might have, almost certainly, been aware that the Project was not 
viable either in other islands of Polynesia, but did not communicate it to the rest of 
the Project founders outside of Polynesia. Added to this, both of these 
announcements took place seven months after the president’s party released the 
re-election agenda, which involved hang-given pamphlets and online posts that 
read “no to the floating island” (see Tapura Huiraatira, 2018a, 2018b; Paruru ia 
Atimaono, 2018 and figures 2 and 3). Many people in Tahiti were aware of this, but 
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outsiders no. This representative, being the only member from French Polynesia 
and living there, was the person in charge of local affairs and doing the liaison - 
including sharing the information from what happened in the Island, such as the 
pamphlet that was circulating. In sum, Blue Frontiers’ public facing contrasted with 
the area Collins Chen was in charge of, dealing with Polynesian affairs.  
 
Cross, the opposition's representative, spoke in some occasions about Collins 
participation in the Project (Actu.fr, 2018). Once she mentioned that Collins Chen 
acted in good faith in saying that Atimaono was an area of priority development for 
the country. However, Cross then clarified that it was perhaps Collin Chen’s 
business partners who were acting in good faith because Collins Chen, who had 
previously been involved in a legal battle for the largest media group in Tahiti, and 
accused of title theft by the CEO - although he won the legal battle due to 
formalities (Tahiti-Infos, 2014b; Tahiti-Infos, 2014a, 2014b) - had said in an internal 
meeting at Cross’ political party, the opposition, but of which he was a member, 
that the deal was concluded - in quotation marks, she added.  
 
A video in French discussing the project, posted the week prior to Amaru’s video, 
was the fifth ripple which seemed to have helped the waves gain momentum. 
Uploaded on January 23 to a Switzerland-based Facebook page (Nouvo RTS, 
2017j23), the video quickly reached over 245,000 views, 1,500 shares and over 
400 reactions. This video said that Silicon Valley millionaires wanted to build 
floating islands. In a neutral, even supportive manner, it highlighted the 
environmental sustainability aspect of the Project and its aim to be self-sufficient 
in food and energy. It also mentioned the project’s goal of adapting to sea-level 
rise, and its purpose of having reduced fiscal policies. However, the video 
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explained that these advantages were only for millionaires and not for the main 
demographic that would be affected by sea-level rise before the end of the century.  
 
While it is not possible to state with certainty that this ripple directly influenced the 
Facebook and Protests Waves,70 it might have. Not only was this viral video posted 
around the same time as the Facebook wave began, but it also shared viewpoints 
mentioned in Amaru’s video and Cross’ protests. Likewise, many of the last 
comments by Facebook users which commented on this video seemed to be from 
French Polynesia, and some comments in Amaru’s video seemed to echo this 
video. For example, one comment reads: “As if it were the Polynesians they were 
going to save from the disappearance of the islands caused by global warming...” 
(FacebookUser31, 2018). Another one commented: “How is this project relevant 
for Polynesians? They are not millionaires” (Nuovo.fr, 2018). Indeed, one of the 
last comments in the video was made by a profile name corresponding to a small 
island hostel called Pension Kanahau Tania Amaru. While it was not possible to 
know if it this hostel was connected to Sam Amaru, from the Facebook waves, the 
timing, comments and last name correlate with him.  
 
7.7. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I used Sylvia Walby’s use of the concept of Waves to illustrate my 
argument that the Floating Island Project exhibited three key features of complex 
governance. The feature I discussed in this case study consisted of  being 
permeated by waves of cross-temporal and cross-spatial events. By narrating how 
the wave of colonisation interfered with the waves of protests and Facebook, 
almost two hundred years later, I showed how the Project was pervaded by the 
 
70 Facebook no longer has public its API, which before used to allow do data analysis with 
posts in the platform.  
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cross-temporal and cross-spatial nature of waves. I used this concept to explain 
the fading of the Floating Island. I complimented the chapter with additional 
phenomena which imprinted momentum to the Waves. Many of these related to 
trust in stakeholders. I also highlighted the importance of timing.  
 
Indeed, some waves I described here peaked right before the French Polynesian 
presidential elections of 2018. Their momentum reinforced negative views about a 
project which was seen as a foreign enclave, reminding Polynesians of the 
negative legacy of colonisation. The interaction among the three waves of this 
chapter (colonisation, Facebook and protests) illustrated the networked, cross-
temporal and cross-spatial nature of rightly timed processes in complex systems. I 
showed this cross-spatiality of waves by looking at the waves’ mutual shaping, 
online-offline. More precisely, I explained how, when the digital space of Facebook 
met the beach and streets where protests took place, waves peaked. In the end, 
the Project faded. 
 
In the next chapter, I put the findings of the empirical chapters into context. I 
discuss the implications of complex governance on projects like this one that are 
ideologically-driven. I discuss the possibilities, limitations and challenges of setting 
them up and I present five best practices derived from the research.  
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PART III. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
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The goal of this thesis was to understand key issues around trying to set up 
SeaZones using complexity theory. My goal was to find out in what ways might a 
complex systems perspective contribute to understanding the governance, 
creation and fading of the Floating Island Project in French Polynesia. I additionally 
sought to explore ways in which complex systems theory might be used as lenses 
to understanding special jurisdictions, with legal, digital and spatial 
extraterritorialities nested or under the umbrella of nation-states. For that, I 
specifically looked at several aspects related to the Floating Island Project, such 
as its regulatory framework, stakeholders and its slow ‘fading’.  
 
The specific way I approached the case study was by looking at the governance, 
creation and ultimate demise of the Floating Island Project through three features 
of complex governance: nested institutions, multiple levels of stakeholders, and 
waves of cross-temporal events. Thus, the argument that ran throughout the thesis 
was that the Floating Island Project exhibited three key features of complex 
governance: first, it was structured as a nested system; Second, it concerned 
stakeholders in multiple levels, including local and global. Third, it was pervaded 
by waves of cross-temporal and cross-spatial events. Through the use of these 
features, I identified various legal, institutional, political, social, cultural economic, 
historic and environmental issues that are encountered when trying to set up an 
new form of governance and a floating island.  
 
In the thesis’s introductory chapter, I introduced the research questions, goals and 
objectives. I presented the research problem, consisting of understanding the 
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governance in the Floating Island using features of complex governance systems, 
claiming that political science and governance have not yet embraced lessons from 
complexity theory. My analysis of the SeaZone was my way to expand the field of 
complex governance, a subfield within complexity and political science that studies 
governance from the lenses of complex systems theory. In that chapter, I also 
presented the scope and limitations of the research and outlined the chapters.  
 
Chapter Two consisted of a literature review of complex governance and a 
historical and conceptual overview where SeaZones originated. In the chapter, I 
described complex systems, complexity’s origin as a field, and I briefly introduced 
features of complex systems relevant for the thesis, namely nestedness, multiple 
levels of stakeholders and waves. I additionally explained the complex governance 
field and the concept of complex governance, as seen in the literature and as 
employed in the empirical chapters. I pointed out that there is a void in the field 
when discussing special jurisdictions and that SeaZones have never been 
explored from a complex systems perspective. I then traced back the conceptual 
history of the SeaZones. This form of governance is new and, therefore, it required 
its own explication. By providing the reader with a better understanding of the ideas 
where the Project originated,  I was able to explain the form of governance of the 
Floating Island.  
 
For instance, I explained how the floating Island Project in French Polynesia is part 
of a subset of Special Economic Zones and Startup Societies that emerged from 
anarcho-capitalism (Friedman, 1989). Unlike other zones, their goal is not so much 
economic growth but economic and political ‘freedom’ (Friedman, 2002). I 
additionally specified how the Project’s form of governance, a SeaZone, would 
have a combination of emerging and alternative forms of governance. This 
 
   
 
235 
combination sought to decentralise governance from nation-states. The Project 
expected to achieve this by placing an artificial island in the ocean of French 
Polynesia, giving it special regulations and governing it with a cryptographic 
token. Thus, I spelled out how the thesis engaged with the conceptual problem of 
using complexity theory to understand SeaZone governance and issues around 
setting one up.  
 
In Chapter Three, I briefly introduced the case study of the Floating Island Project 
in French Polynesia. I narrated its origin in the signature of a Memorandum of 
Understanding between The Seasteading Institute and the French Polynesian 
government. I presented the vision shared in the Project’s inaugural conference, 
and described key aspects of it, such as its sustainability vision and cultural 
inspiration. I additionally presented the Polynesian government’s motivations for 
signing the Memorandum of Understanding, such as sea-level rise concerns for 
atoll islands in the Pacific. I briefly outlined the main developments in the Project’s 
fading, including Polynesians’ opposition towards a foreign enclave.  
 
In Chapter Four, I described the key aspects of the research design. I detailed how 
the use of participatory observation and document analysis allowed me to address 
my research questions and explore complex governance in the thesis. However, I 
likewise, discussed the advantages and challenges of the research methods, and 
reflected on ethical issues arising from my two hats as a participant-observer and 
from having signed a non-disclosure agreement to conduct the research. I also 
discussed strategies I took to overcome these limitations.   
 
In Chapter Five, I used the concept of nestedness to understand the institutional 
structure and regulatory framework of the Floating Island Project. I did this by 
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showing how the regulatory framework of the SeaZone would be structured as a 
nested system. This concept enabled me to grasp how the Project would be 
situated within the municipality of Teva I Uta, which, in turn, is framed by French 
Polynesia. Through the historical exposition of French Polynesia’s colonisation, I 
revealed why this ‘overseas collectivity’ is institutionally nested within France. I also 
explained the project’s nestedness via the strategy by The Seasteading Institute to 
situate itself within a state. Moreover, I presented how additional supranational 
institutions, such as the European Union and the United Nations, would also frame 
the Project, by virtue of France being part of the European Union and by having 
ratified united some United Nations treaties. Besides these formal government 
stakeholders, I analysed how Blue Frontiers introduced other government 
stakeholders into the Project's governance structure, by the Project’s observance  
of international cryptocurrency regulations. These included the United States and 
China. I additionally discussed some implications of dealing with nested, complex 
governance systems, such as the presence of tangled regulations and ambiguous 
jurisdictions.  
 
The empirical observations about ambiguous regulations and ‘tangledness’ were 
consistent with how the literature on complex governance describes the challenges 
of complex governance systems. The chapter closed with a critique of the 
limitations of strategies targeting only formal government stakeholders. 
Understanding this nested structure, comprising institutions within institutions, 
enabled me to see the existence of ambiguous jurisdictions among France and 
French Polynesia and tangled regulations that the Project would had to ‘navigate’ 
and ‘untangle’ to create the regulations and exemptions it sought for its SeaZone. 
With this exploration of nestedness, the case study revealed that special 
 
   
 
237 
jurisdictions, such as SeaZones, are as autonomous as the institutions in the 
nested structure allow them to be.  
 
Chapter Six focused on the governance and marketing strategy of the Floating 
Island. In this chapter, I explored another feature of complex governance, namely 
the existence of multiple levels of stakeholders, including local and global. Thus, it 
centred its attention on other set of project stakeholders, non-government 
stakeholders. My aim in this chapter was to show that the Project concerned local 
both, especially locals. I claimed that the Project concerned locals by virtue of its 
proximity to the Floating Island and it concerned global stakeholders by 
incorporating Varyon investors. Through evidence of language in promotional 
materials and social media channels, and superficial use of a sea-level rise 
narrative, the research found that the Project focused too much on international 
followers at the cost of locals, since it did not seek long-term involvement nor public 
local grassroots support. To highlight problems with this, I used key themes in 
Elinor Ostrom’s work, who is recognised for her contributions to successful 
governance of socioecological systems, and more precisely, commons, such as 
oceans. I further presented missed opportunities to involve locals in the Project’s 
governance based on what  would be hybrid property regimes in the Floating Island 
Project and, most importantly, because resources in the Project’s maritime area, 
such as water, are transboundary. I used this idea to discuss missed opportunities 
for the Project to involve local fishermen and fisherwomen, for instance, in the 
planning of its potential utilities and infrastructure board. I additionally used 
examples related to the Project’s cryptocurrency, Varyon, social media channels 
and language of the marketing and purchasing document to show how the Project 
targeted global stakeholders.  
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In Chapter Seven, I demonstrated how the combination of various events 
contributed to the demise of the Floating Island, which I referred to as ‘fading’. I 
used the term ‘fading’ instead of ended or failed to convey the idea that the Project 
had a slow death and that it never officially announced its cancellation. I employed 
Sylvia Walby's concept of waves to show how waves of cross-temporal and cross-
spatial events pervaded the Floating Island. Despite its strength, the concept of 
waves is not mainstream in complexity theory, nor complex governance. I 
employed this concept because of its power to explain how cross-temporal events 
that can affect complex systems and, most importantly, complex governance 
systems. The three waves I analysed were: Polynesia’s colonisation, a series of 
Facebooks videos, posts and comments about the Floating Island, and protests by 
the opposition and a local collective of fishers at the Assembly, beach and streets. 
I presented how each of these three waves interacted with and reinforced each 
other. The chapter provided evidence for the implications of not engaging better, 
in complex governance systems, with different levels of nestedness and multiple 
stakeholders, in particular with locals, given the   history-dependent nature of 
complex systems.  
 
Indeed, in the chapter, I demonstrated how, because of the cross-temporal and 
networked nature of waves, events which begun two hundred years ago (the 
colonisation of French Polynesia) met with contemporary events (Facebook posts 
and protests), and gained enough momentum to generate social movements 
against the Project. Through ‘waves’, I explained how Polynesians related the 
Floating Island to French colonisation, associating  the Project  to an attempted 
foreign enclave. Since French Polynesia had suffered negative effects from French 
colonisation, such as being used as a nuclear tests site, foreign enclaves, as in 
many places around the world, were a sensitive topic. I showed the connection 
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between each of these waves by presenting evidence for how Polynesians brought 
out the wave of colonisation as a reason for protesting, and stated they did not 
want repetition of the past. I narrated how, as a result, in the first and second 
quarters of 2018, the Floating Island Project fell prey to critiques and online and 
offline protests by locals amid Polynesia’s presidential election climate. These 
socio-political movements managed to influence engines of traditional governance 
systems, such as winning elections, and the impact it had on creating a new form 
of complex governance. With this, I additionally highlighted the importance of 
timing, suggesting that the 2018 presidential elections contributed to, but was not 
responsible for, this case’s unfolding.   
 
I accompanied the description of the waves with four additional ‘ripples’ that gave 
the right conditions for the Project’s fading. One of these ripples consisted of news 
articles that wrote negatively about the Project and its conceptual and political 
inspiration, seasteads. These articles highlighted sensationalistic aspects relating 
the Floating Island Project. For example, they repeated the narrative that Silicon 
Valley millionaires want to set up micronations in international waters to escape 
taxes. Another ripple that, I found out, contributed to the Project’s fading was that 
several projects in French Polynesia have been cancelled after their leaders 
promised they will create new jobs. This has led Polynesians to distrust foreign 
companies. These and other ripples and the waves reflected four ways in which 
Walby characterises waves. These include the ideas that they are networked with 
other waves and are cross-temporal. Indeed, it was this networked and cross-
temporality nature of waves which enabled that the colonisation of Polynesia 
combined with Facebook posts and protests, almost two hundred years later, and 
ended the Project. 
 
 
   
 
240 
This chapter wraps up the thesis. It first reflects on the implications of a complex 
governance framework on ideologically-motivated projects. It then discusses the 
possibilities, limitations and challenges for setting up special jurisdictions with 
alternative forms of governance and extraterritorialities. It then extracts five best 
practices from the research, such as projects being locally-led and involving and 
planning for multiple stakeholders in several levels, especially the local  one. It then 
outlines the contributions and concludes with key remarks and future work.   
 
8.2. Implications of Complex Governance on Setting Up Projects 
Ideologically-Motivated  
This case study consisted of a private special jurisdiction that required the approval 
of a host nation to locate on a common-pool resource. The Project would navigate 
nestedness and untangle regulations to simplify existing regulatory frameworks. 
For the Project’s drivers, the purpose of doing this was being able to implement 
forms of governance which one day could lead to seasteads and forms of 
governance alternative to nation-states, such as those sought in anarcho-
capitalism. However, the empirical observations of this case study showed the 
limitations of trying to set up complex governance systems that are too tied to 
particular political economies. This observation is theoretically relevant to thinking 
about complex governance, and I want to push it forward in this section. 
 
The limitations of thinking complex governance from an ideological standpoint 
becomes evident when realising that seemingly distant theories of governance, 
namely Ostrom and the Friedmans, meet in the Floating Island. Here, while the 
Floating Island Project originated in seasteading and anarcho-capitalism, its 
governance had elements of state, market and collective governance. This is partly 
seen in its nested framework. The Project had elements of state governance 
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because of the regulatory framework required the approval of the French 
Polynesian government. It would have elements of market governance because it 
would be governed via a private entity. And it would have elements of collective 
governance because of the existence of hybrid property and ownership regimes.   
 
I acknowledge that this idea might be controversial. It may even go against what 
most people believe about seasteading, SeaZones, anarcho-capitalism and 
Ostrom, supporters and detractors. I am aware that it is not common to stress that 
a project with origins in anarcho-capitalism, a form of governance which tends to 
be associated to free-market libertarianism, shares elements with Ostrom; an 
author sometimes related to left-wing libertarian ideas (Wall, 2014), socialism, and 
even anarcho-communism (Carson, 2013). However, part of Ostrom’s work was 
precisely an attempt to move away from theoretical dichotomies in complex 
socioecological systems. After all, she recognised a third way to govern natural 
resources besides the market and the state. In my recognition that elements of 
these distinct forms of governance can coexist in one project which also has 
anarchic origin, while not being any of them entirely, I am acknowledging the 
existence of a fourth, a fifth, if you wish, a polycentric, complex governance system. 
And While the SeaZone was not exactly a common property arrangement such as 
those described in Ostrom’s work, it did try to set up rules for managing common 
resources.  
 
The overlapping of market, state and collective governance in the SeaZone was 
not a theoretical anomaly. Instead, it can be understood as a derivation of the 
Project’s complexity. The coexistence is interesting, insofar it helps ground forms 
of governance that, like seasteading, have been tagged as being too 
idealistic. What is most importantly, dealing with this coexistence requires being 
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practical, rather than dogmatic. A practical attempt for creating SeaZones begins 
by asking who is already living near the existing location. It is the responsible thing 
to do, calling to Puig de la Bellacasa’s approach to making visible neglected 
stakeholders. And then it moves to traditional floating real-estate projects. This is 
a serious idea to consider for seasteading supporters fixed on the idea that 
seasteading starts, not with floating real estate and more zones on land, but with 
politically autonomous floating communities in territorial or international waters. 
Disregarding the regulatory aspect of floating communities and seeking traditional 
floating real estate projects could be a smoother step towards creating SeaZones. 
A more likely alternative is beginning with a port. Most ports already have a 
maritime area and some form of free trade zone.  
 
What I am trying to argue is the Project should have engaged with the implications 
of its complex governance and with a territory, instead of acting in ways that made 
the Project seem a mere step towards anarcho-capitalism. While I do not condemn 
this political economy, I do recognise that the execution of the Project fell short in 
dealing with the Project’s extraterritorialities. Allow me to explain: 
 
In addition to being legally and spatially nested, this aquatic special jurisdiction, in 
particular, would also have digital extraterritoriality. It would have legal 
extraterritoriality because their regulations would have been different from the rest 
of French Polynesia. It would have been a spatial extraterritory because the ocean, 
its location, is an extraterritorial place – although territorial waters to a much smaller 
degree than international ones. Likewise, it would have been a digital extraterritory 
because the SeaZone sought to provide governance via a digital, cryptographic 
token, Varyon, and digital systems are extraterritorial places too. Despite the 
possibilities of these extraterritorialities, the research showed the extent to which 
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traditional governance systems shape the autonomy of extraterritories. Therefore, 
any discussion that seeks to understand the limitations, possibilities and 
challenges of creating extraterritorial systems is not complete, for better or worse, 
without considering the role and prevalence of traditional, legacy, governance 
systems, such as nation-states and even political parties. It seems, therefore, that 
the more extraterritorialities a project seeks to have, the more of these traditional 
governance systems it needs to align to move forward. Doing so is possible and 
can be done, but it is a rather difficult task to do. It has to be done in the right way 
since the beginning. By this, I do not attribute the ‘fading’ of the Floating Island to 
features of complex governance. Instead, I am saying that, If not engaged in the 
correct way, with care, features can end up becoming challenges. With this, I want 
to highlight an idea that complexity scientists have been stating for some time: 
complexity needs to be taken seriously.71  
 
Taking complexity seriously seems particularly important for small companies like 
Blue Frontiers, with little startup capital and limited experience as developers and 
lobbyists. Unlike governments, the finite financial runway of companies means they 
 
71 To mention an additional example of the extent to which complexity pervaded the Project, 
using two concept of complex systems I did not address on this thesis, uncertainty and 
path-dependency, the opposition to the Floating Island could be seen as a way for some 
Polynesians to bifurcate from unequal institutional path-dependencies that they have been 
locked-in for the past two hundred years. Polynesians trying to break away from path-
dependency led to an uncertain status about the Project's future, where the Assembly 
never pronounced itself about the Project. Thus, there was uncertainty about its status. 
Likewise, there were mixed views about the Project: favourable and negative ones coming 
from the government, negative ones coming from the population, and optimistic ones from 
the local representative. These made it unpredictable to know what was going to happen 
with the Floating Island. The unpredictability intensified around the presidential elections. 
These features, uncertainty and unpredictability, are also key features of complex systems 
and, it seems with this thesis, are important for complex governance too. Institutional path-
dependency of traditional governance systems is incredibly strong. So much so that even 
a thesis like this one, which I thought at first it would be about an emerging/alternative form 
of governance, unwillingly and to my own surprise as a complexity researcher, who should 
have expected surprises, ended emphasising how traditional forms of governance are, to 
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often cannot conduct long business developments cycles. Creating grassroots 
support then becomes a way to balance lack of experience in the field. Now, some 
companies could choose to try to escape dealing with complexity and taking a post-
anarchic route (see: Newman, 2015), acting as if the state did not exist. This would 
mean simply setting up a floating project anywhere where residents do as they 
please. Yet, post-anarchism, while it works in contexts like preventing animal 
abuse, is not a successful route for establishing long-term special jurisdictions, like 
seasteads.  
 
For example, after my data collection process ended, an ex-Blue Frontiers 
volunteer and former forum manager of The Seasteading Institute, and his now-
wife, Chad Elwatorski and Supranee Thepdet, moved to a floating home in the 
Contiguous Zone of Thailand for two months, built by their Company Ocean 
Builders. While the Contiguous Zone is not per se territorial waters, it is not 
international waters either. Thai jurisdiction still applies for taxes, immigration and 
other aspects in the contiguous zone. Elwartowski either did not do his research, 
or if he did, he  disregarded it (see Elwatorski, 2019). When asked about what 
would he do if a Thai gun boat would approach, he said everyone there had military 
experience. A Thai gunboat, indeed, overtook the floating home. It revoked 
Elwartowski’s visa and considered applying the death penalty or life in prison to 
the couple on the grounds that they had tried to interfere with Thailand’s 
sovereignty (Sakot, 2019). Of course, the couple had to flee. Ocean Builders 
announced in December 2019 that they are now working on floating homes called 
‘seapods’ in Panama (Ocean Builders, 2019). 
 
In a nutshell, when the governance framework is complex, it is valuable to work 
side-by-side with existing institutions and states. While governments frame and 
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limit projects, they also enable them.  And while seeking autonomy in a host-nation 
when being a private entity is not trivial (Moberg, 2015), to make things simpler, it 
might be better to first seek only one or two extraterritorialities at the same time. 
Three, as in 1) a aquatic floating platform, 2) that functions on a special economic 
zone, 3) governed on the blockchain, might be too disruptive and difficult to explain.  
 
A better understanding of the tensions among various extraterritorial systems is 
crucial to comprehend extraterritoriality, one of this century’s main governance 
trends. Some of the Project’s tensions in this regard were visible, for instance, 
when Facebook’s digital extraterritoriality affected the legal and spatial 
extraterritoriality the Project desired. It can also be seen in how the oceanic spatial 
extraterritoriality desired by the Floating Island was blocked by dynamics mediated 
on the internet and on land. Likewise, land-based governance was affected and 
often mediated by digital systems.  
 
To navigate the tension of extraterritoriality, there are different views around how 
desirable it is for Zones to be close or far to the host nations. For Moberg (2015) 
and Strong and Himber (2009), the success of special Zones lies in this separation 
with the host nation. For institutions like the World Bank, ideally, there would be 
more backwards and forward linkages between the enclave and the host 
nation. However, both views about “separation” agree on the relevance of legal 
autonomy and spatial closeness. Going back to nestedness and the idea that the 
more nested a system is, the more projects must navigate regulations and politics, 
I want to point out that the extraterritoriality tension brings out a ‘paradox’. This 
paradox relates to autonomy and navigating nestedness. Paradoxically, navigating 
nestedness needs to be done in the search for more autonomy and to improve 
governance and overcome bureaucracy. However, tangled networks of regulations 
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shape the limits of extraterritorial systems’ achievable autonomy. Consequently, 
the extent of autonomy in the extraterritorial systems like SeaZones depends upon 
how much the ‘simplification’ of complex governance results in frameworks that 
previous to such navigation have allowed for legal, digital and spatial 
extraterritorialities to be possible. And this entails a process of navigation in the 
quest for autonomy in the first place.  
 
Part of today’s extraterritoriality comes from the networks creating them. However, 
this is ultimately explained by what underlies this is complexity, local processes: 
local interactions, self-organised behaviours, more diversity, nested hierarchies, 
and, ultimately, nonlinearity. And this is one important reason why one of this 
thesis’ take-home messages is that special jurisdictions being set up are better led 
by people of the Project’s location, even when funding is international. Locals know 
the culture, the people, the past, and, most importantly, they understand if a project 
will be welcomed or not. They also have more interest in making a project 
respectful, although this is not always the case.   
 
Tension aside, it cannot or should not be underestimated that localized special 
jurisdictions with extraterritoriality carry a powerful momentum. They are ‘trendy’. 
This is partly because of the advocacy of important non-profits in the space but 
also because they feed on other important contemporary tendencies. Kantor and 
Savitch (2002, 2010) name some examples: decentralising economies, 
interconnected cities, globalisation, free markets, private enterprises and reduced 
government intervention. Innovations with digital extraterritoriality expand what is 
possible with these already complex forms of governance. As a result, we are 
subsumed in more complex, networked world, economically, socially, and 
culturally. This, in turn, leads private actors and governments to invest in 
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infrastructure at unprecedented rates, leading to what authors such as Khanna 
(2016) call ‘the connectivity revolution’. This is when the world functions through 
the connectivity of infrastructure networks, as opposed to political borders. Urry 
engages with a related topic of today’s connected world, in his work of offshoring 
(see Urry, 2014) too, although a bit more critically. Like Khana, Urry and myself 
many, indeed, argue that the twenty-first century world in the is becoming more 
complex. Gershenson (2007:2), for instance, writes: “Every year there are more 
people, more computers, more devices, more cars, more medicines, more 
regulations, more problems”.  
 
Localisation and its relation to extraterritoriality is a topic which deserves serious 
consideration when dealing with increasingly complex governance. This is 
because there seems to be a positive feedback loop between extraterritoriality and 
features of complex governance. Extraterritorialities seem to be local solutions to 
increased complexity. This is because, despite trying to simplify local regulations, 
special jurisdictions create more global links, making societies systemically more 
complex. Likewise, digital extraterritoriality facilitates communication with less 
mediation. This creates more networks on a global scale. Some ways to deal with 
increased complexity is through more extraterritorialities. Thriving special 
jurisdictions push countries to create more of them. Similarly, spatial 
extraterritoriality propels legal and digital extraterritoriality by giving them spaces 
for them to exist and be developed. In this way, extraterritorial systems created for 
making jurisdictions, governments, financial transactions and human interactions 
more ‘simple’ also make the world systematically more complex. Exploring or 
identifying more of these tensions can help further understand the possibilities, 
limitations and challenges of creating special jurisdictions nested within states.  
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The interplays among multiple levels, structures, systems, networks and dynamics 
of extraterritorial systems bring out more features of complex systems. Hence, 
increasing legal, digital and spatial extraterritorialities requires forms of governance 
that are able to deal with these ‘complexifications’. Indeed, one can argue that 
many special Zones today skilfully navigate complexity by creating localised 
regulations suited to specific, small territories. As a result, they are able to compete 
in global markets. According to Sassen (2000b), smaller jurisdictions already 
reshape the frontier between the national and the global. 
 
Today’s globalisation induced transformation of nation-states, and their mutual 
shaping, has been a recurrent topic for contemporary thinkers, such as Appadurai 
(1991, 1993, 1995), Sassen (1996, 2000) and McGrew (2014). Several authors 
have, indeed, discussed the idea that smaller jurisdictions will replace nation-states 
as economic, political and financial epicentres (see: Khanna, 2010, 2016; Bell, 
2017; Frazier, 2018; Sassen, 2001; Appadurai, 1990, 1991, 1993). Among these 
jurisdictions we find cities (McKinsey, 2011), global cities (Sassen, 2000:151), 
clusters of cities ‘megalopolis’ (Yu-ping and Heligman, 1994) and global city-
regions (Vogel et al., 2010).  Even organisations such as United Cities and Local 
Governments (n.d.) relate to this idea. In the words of Potts & McDonald (2013:1) 
when contemporary sociotechnical systems allow citizens to choose public goods 
club, regardless of their territorial location, this undermines “the exclusive role of 
the territorial nation-state”. It seems that, as this happens, we are at the edge of a 
new governance era. Cities, global cities (Sassen, 1994), Zones and megalopolies 
now shape the global economy, many with less large state mediation. Complex 
governance presents itself as a handy tool to understand this important 
phenomenon today, but it requires to embrace complexity, as opposed to 
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simplifying it under particular political economies or ideologies. Embracing and 
dealing with complexity begins by grasping what happens at the local level.  
 
8.3. Analysis and Best Practices  
 
This thesis helped to visualise tensions that emerge when trying to set up a new 
form of governance, namely a SeaZone, on a floating island. Here I present some 
best practices, which are applicable to similar, yet different projects, including 
Special Economic Zones in land, projects with alternative governance, digital, 
spatial or legal extraterritorialities, and next generation of governance forms. Even 
though today most still minimise or ignore their past, present and future impact, I 
am particularly interested in new forms of governance, whereas in floating districts, 
cities or in land, because what is behind them is the ‘complexification’ of rules (legal 
extraterritoriality), interactions, territories (digital extraterritoriality), structures and 
urban landscapes (spatial extraterritoriality).  
 
The following best practices can guide the work of projects that have either a 
floating architecture component, a special regulations component and other types 
of extraterritorialities. With this, my hope is that this research can help future 
SeaZone, special jurisdictions and floating cities projects avoid repeating the same 
mistakes as the Floating Island. More specifically, this thesis can also potentially 
serve individuals, private companies, practitioners, consultants, investors, public 
servants, non-governmental organisation members and local partners involved in 
attempts to establish projects with similar characteristics. Most importantly, I these 
best practices can also help local communities identify projects which will not be 
convenient for them from an early stage.  
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That said, these best practices are written firstly with project practitioners and 
developers in mind for two main reasons. First, this section and the best practices 
are my own way to reflect on my future work after the PhD. I will continue to work 
in this field, although from a  business development angle. Therefore, I expect that 
this section will help project developers, consultants, and practitioners in  the 
industry, including myself, craft projects that align with and that are planned for the 
community they are being built in or invited into. I would have liked to  read these 
recommendations four years prior to being hired as a contractor of the Floating 
Island. The second reason why these best practices have practitioners in mind is 
that, in the last twenty years, private and non-state companies have set up the 
majority of new special jurisdictions (FIAS, 2008). The most interesting special 
jurisdiction projects today, those that go beyond manufacturing and focus on 
services, also tend to be private. It is in these privately led projects where 
consultants, practitioners and non-governmental organisations have more say, 
influence and manoeuvrability. These projects are also more likely to adopt best 
practices in the interest of a project’s economic prosperity.  
 
It is important to note that the language used in this section and last chapters does 
not exclude projects that go to a location where they are being invited to, like the 
Floating Island. This is because many of the newest, most innovative special 
jurisdictions today are being created in Latin America, Africa and the Middle East 
by non-local companies working together or through permits of local governments. 
The interests of these two not always fit the views of the local population. However, 
it is impossible to make a respectful and thriving project if it does not go beyond 
the government and developers’ interests to include informal stakeholders (human 
and non-human) in their plans. It is necessary and beneficial to do so. It can also 
be profitable. Ostrom was right when she wrote that: “If we do not find the means 
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to enhance the capabilities of local, indigenous institutions to govern and manage 
smaller common-pool resources effectively, the absence of such institutions in the 
twenty-first century will lead to an even greater acceleration of the destruction of 
valuable natural resources (Ostrom, 1994:2).”  
 
Now, unlike previous seastead examples, the Floating Island Project attempted a 
‘Trojan Horse method’. It was a 'back door strategy' for floating communities to gain 
some autonomy away and within a nation-state. Other seasteading-like attempts, 
such as Operation Atlantis, New Utopia or Ocean Builders, failed because they 
were explicitly anarchist or micronations. In contrast, having a special framework 
seemed a more practical path. While nothing ensures success when setting up a 
special jurisdiction, on the water or on land, a better understanding of the 
institutions framing the projects, their stakeholders and sensitive events in the 
potential location’s past can smoothen their path from design to implementation. 
Most importantly, doing so makes it more likely that the project matches the vision 
and expectations of both, the local community and partners with respect to a new 
project. This is an important way to mobilise care towards stakeholders that are 
usually neglected when foreign projects go to new locations. Framed by this 
approach to project-planning, one that has local stakeholders’ expectations at the 
centre, I move on to presents some best practices derived from the research.  
 
Best Practice No.1. Special jurisdictions should emphasize on involving 
locals and crafting a project for them. In cases where the projects are not 
locally led, they should have significant local participation, especially in 
managerial roles.  
In this thesis, Ostrom’s work was used to criticize the little emphasis placed by the 
Floating Island on activities that involved local stakeholders. In more than one way, 
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the way the project was conceived in, executed in, reproduced in and embodied a 
latent orientalism. It involved a western power bringing knowledge that was 
believed to not be currently found in French Polynesia. Polynesia was portrayed 
as not possessing certain characteristics  normally found in the origin countries of 
many seasteaders. In this way, the Project embodied several of the critiques to 
orientalism that have been pointed out by authors such as Praveen, based on the 
work of Said and Spivak: “the west is considered a place of scientific progress and 
development, while the orient was deemed remote, unchanging, primitive and 
backward” (Praveen, 2016: 48). The project, indeed, did not do a good job in 
understanding and portraying an idea that Polynesia more fairly. It used an all-
encompassing characterisation of the location. It also did not dig deep to discover 
whether the specific knowledge the project wished to bring to French Polynesia 
was even desired by its local population. In a way, the Floating Island Project’s 
targeting of global stakeholders, despite concerning local and global ones, can be 
seen as the Project remaining faithful to its origins in seasteading. As shown in 
earlier chapters, some foundational seasteading publications show poor language 
choice when they refer to location searches in countries with developing 
economies. In various texts, the language in the literature preceding SeaZones 
portrayed a superiority mindset towards the global south and a lack of 
acknowledgement to the fact that ‘third world countries’ are inhabited.  
 
While Blue Frontiers did not use the same terminology of some foundational 
seasteading texts, the Project’s absence of strategies aimed at involving locals 
followed the entitlement of some foundational seasteading authors that view 
territorial waters of third world countries as unclaimed. This is backed by how its 
marketing focused on governance and appealed to a global audience with 
libertarian messages, such as decentralising governance, while seeking a location 
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in a place interested in sea-level rise. In doing so, the Floating Island Project erred 
by portraying itself as a step before seasteading’s anarcho-capitalism, focusing too 
much on the market of governance and not on the governance that would help the 
Project facilitate a popularizing kind of real estate that could be beneficial to both 
sides. In a nutshell, the Project was planned in such way that contradicted was 
trying to set up: a SeaZone, a form of governance nested within French Polynesia, 
a place where local stakeholders have nature and the ocean attached to their 
identities, and who also vote.  
 
My use of Ostrom was complemented by the concept of Waves. Waves were key 
to show the relevance of local, informal stakeholders in the creation of the Floating 
Island. Waves also showed the extent to which the location’s and local 
stakeholders’ past should have been considered in the Project’s planning. The 
empirical chapters demonstrated how the actions of informal, local stakeholders of 
the Floating Island overshadowed the formal legal strategy of submitting studies to 
the government for the Assembly to approve them. This showed the importance of 
local stakeholders, even when they are not formally considered as part of a zone 
project. They still can have more incidence than formal and/or international ones, 
even when a project targets them.  
 
Similarly, the local culture needs to be more than a source for architectural 
inspiration. Locals must either drive or be part of decision-making processes and 
governance of these zone projects. If zone projects with an active global 
component do not fulfil this, they will almost certainly face obstacles. It is difficult 
to quantify a specific proportion of local versus international participants of a 
floating zone or any  project similar to  this one. However, it should be higher than 
a 25% minority and 1/5th of the managerial roles. That said, if local partners are 
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not trusted by the population, it will be very difficult for a zone with international 
funding or participation to grow local trust, as it happened with the Floating Island.   
 
Several authors in the literature focused on the creation of special jurisdictions 
have addressed the topic of local participation before. Frazier and McKinney 
(2019b), for instance, argue that the ultimate test for whether a zone is an enclave 
is if locals want it, benefit from it (especially economically) and if there are 
representatives of the local community with rule-making power in projects. Frazier 
and McKinney add that, especially when projects are foreign, they should ask 
locals for their inputs in every stage of the process. Traditional methods, such as 
conducting surveys, reveal if a community is open to a project and how they best 
would like to participate in it. From the perspective of a developer, these methods 
can also help prevent wasting energy and resources on a site which will end up 
being not viable.  Moberg (2015) adds additional reasons for prioritizing local 
participation. She explains that involving the local community in a zone’s 
governance is also a way to keep governments in check. And if local partners are 
trustworthy, it also contributes to promoting transparency.  
 
Best Practice No. 2. Special jurisdictions should conduct activities that 
generate honest grassroots support in the local community. 
 
Besides having local stakeholders involved in a project’s governance and activities, 
zones should also try to generate honest, public support in the local community. 
Grassroots support should complement legal studies and marketing strategies. 
These matter a lot, especially when projects seek to create extraterritoriality. 
Grassroots support happens by engaging with non-elite members of the local 
community. While media, press and a good architectural render take a project far, 
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as was the case with other floating city projects which emerged afterwards, such 
as Oceanix’s, grassroots support can take a project much farther when seeking for 
a location. Grassroots are crucial for projects seeking to locate on the commons, 
including lagoons. This is because having grassroots support also facilitates the 
design and implementation of programs which can give back to the community. 
Having honest grassroots makes it easier to understand potential synergies 
between a project and a location.  
 
One of the most noteworthy things zone projects can do to generate honest 
grassroots is, at first, to simple listen to specific local needs.72 This provides 
insights for designing programs that directly benefit the location and to find middle 
points, if it is possible, among all participants. Even, or especially, market-driven 
projects, should not underestimate the implications of Ostrom’s work.  
 
There are additional steps zone projects can take. One way that could even help 
safeguard against politician’s wills turning against projects is to involve several 
offices of the government. That way, retracting support for the project unexpectedly 
could be a bit harder.  Moberg (2015) explains why doing this might work: 
“Politicians enjoy public support and thus electoral votes if they can take credit for 
good SEZ policies. If the link between politics and economic outcomes is clear, 
they have a stake in designing good policies, including growth promoting SEZs” 
(Moberg, 2015b:15). Moberg adds: “When voters in a democratic system realise 
what benefits SEZs can bring, they will demand more say about SEZ policies and 
keep the spotlight on policy-makers working on SEZ policies (Moberg, 2015b:17)”.  
 
 
72 Listening can also be hearing about local dynamics, including the opinions that locals have 
about politicians and representatives of projects in a location. 
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Having multiple parties involved in and leading a project also opens decision-
making to more participants and distributes the image and responsibility of a 
project’s team. Doing so makes it less likely that one party or individual stains the 
reputation of a project. However, it can also increase the chances. Frazier and 
McKinney (2018; 2019) suggest several best practices for zone and Startup 
Societies creation along these lines. One of them is to build a consortium. In the 
Floating Island, while Blue Frontiers had multiple strategic partnerships (Blue 
Frontiers, ND), with the exception of Blue21, it was not clear what role of most of 
them had - if any – other than sharing logos on websites. This practice was 
common among blockchain companies during the cryptocurrency bubble of 2018. 
But partnerships should be more than that. Their work together should be oriented 
towards the construction of projects and/or a unified project goal that is beneficial 
for all involved, but especially to locals who are not part of the project.  
 
Best Practice No. 3: Projects should know they are dealing with complex 
governance systems, composed by multiple levels of stakeholders, a nested 
structure and history-dependent systems 
This case study showed the relationship between nested governance systems and 
multiple levels of stakeholders. The empirical chapters showed how the Floating 
Island focused on the mezzo level in the nested governance structure, the state. 
Locally, this meant interacting only with formal government stakeholders instead 
of engaging more with those informal, yet key, stakeholders of the community (see 
Actu.fr, 2018). The Waves that took place during the Project’s fading showed how 
important it is to engage with multiple stakeholders, within and outside nested 
governance systems, when creating special jurisdictions. With this, the thesis’s 
findings back several important notions about complex systems, including ideas 
such as those mentioned by Solé et al. (2013), relating to how poor initial conditions 
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make it less efficient to navigate in the ‘possibilities landscape’ of a system. In this 
case, while it is not possible to predict how the project would have unfolded had it 
interacted more with multiple levels of stakeholders, not doing it negatively 
impacted the Floating Island.   
 
Being very aware of where a project starts is important, considering, as the thesis 
showed, the extent to complex governance systems are history-dependent. Here, 
some starting points were French Polynesia's lack of autonomy derived from 
colonisation, the literature preceding SeaZones which exalted colonising marine 
'tabula rasas', and international critiques to seasteading, such as the "millionaires 
wanting to evade taxes on an island". All these set unfavourable initial conditions 
for the project.   
 
The importance of the initial conditions is related to the irreversibility of complex 
systems. Because complex governance systems are time-coupled, the starting 
point matters. Indeed, the initial conditions are one of the most influential factors in 
the development of Zone and other types of alternative governance and 
extraterritorial systems. In a way, one way complexity best serves this study by 
helping to reveal the obvious: history matters. It matters so much that one reading 
of this research could be, as it relates to complexity, that path-dependency can 
lead to unpredictable outcomes and manifest itself in uncertainty, regardless of 
whether people are trying to break path-dependencies or to remain in them.  
 
In this case, institutional path-dependency started with the colonisation of French 
Polynesia. Clientelism became ingrained in French Polynesia's institutions and its 
government. This was followed by detrimental practices towards the environment 
and the opportunism of foreign governments and companies in Polynesia which 
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go to French Polynesia for its resources, something that many Polynesians, for 
obvious reasons, do not approve. A path of economic inequality then became 
linked to nationality and identity. Understandably, this has led Polynesians to be 
antagonistic towards the repetition of colonial and neo-colonial practices where 
foreigners determine the future of their lagoons. Hence why Polynesians protested 
against the Floating Island Project to avoid repeating this path to expatriates 
holding higher socioeconomic status in their islands. This contributed to what for 
many was the unexpected collapse of the Floating Island, given the extensive 
media attention and international relevance it received after the signature of the 
Memorandum of Understanding. While there was never certainty about the Project, 
the Floating Island received so much attention that many, including me at the 
beginning, were assured that it would succeed. However, as Gerrits and Verweij 
(2018) explain in relation to complex infrastructure projects, things tend not to 
unfold as planned. 
 
The concept of waves helped me see how trying to break from these institutional 
path-dependencies played a part in the emergence of self-organised online and 
offline protests, fundamental to the Floating Island’s demise. After all, places have 
history and societies have memory. While this might seem obvious, the literature 
from where the Project originates, in particular, the literature of seasteads, 
presents location searching for floating communities as a matter of finding a third 
world country willing to host a project.  
 
Thus, the best practice derived from this experience is that special jurisdictions 
should try to navigate more strategically the implications of dealing with complex 
governance systems. Instead of meeting with a single level of governance, projects 
should remember that, in democratic systems like French Polynesia, governments 
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respond to local concerns. Likewise, in many cases voters are informed by 
international media systems. This sounds obvious. Yet, it seems that many 
projects whose mission is to create new forms of governance have overlooked it.   
 
In sum, my recommendation for nested, special jurisdictions that are rooted in the 
idea of decentralising governance from nation-states, like SeaZones, or those 
trying to create innovative zones is to be aware that they must operate within the 
centralised systems they seek to decentralise. The systemic decentralisation of 
governance requires, for better or worse, centralised systems. Decentralisation 
can only happen through the systems that initiators attempt to decentralise.  
 
Focusing specifically on Zone projects, floating and not, my previous point means 
that, for as long as we live in a Westphalian system, the autonomy of private special 
jurisdictions and of floating real estate projects begins, is bound to, and ends with 
the complex governance systems that result from them being tied to the nation-
state. This is because of how the issue relates to another relevant implication of 
nestedness today: sovereignty, commonly understood as states’ exclusive power 
over a territory since the Westphalia Treaty in 1648.  
 
Now, the Floating Island Project did not seek a sovereign type of autonomy when 
establishing the SeaZone. However, sovereignty was important for the case study 
specifically in three ways: first, the Project would nest in a complex governance 
structure with multiple sovereign and other less sovereign entities; Second, having 
the support of a country was The Seasteading Institute’s motivation for signing the 
agreement with the Polynesian government; Third, the Project attempted to gain 
legitimacy by following foreign sovereign states’ cryptocurrency regulations. 
Likewise, the nesting of the Project within sovereign entities limited the Project also 
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in three main ways. First, French Polynesia’s voters led the government to 
withdraw support. Second, United states’ regulations limited the pool of Varyon 
buyers. Third, Polynesia’s own lack of sovereignty became a key factor in local 
antagonism towards this foreign Project. 
 
One lesson from this: the implications of having a nested system should never be 
underestimated. However, it is interesting to note that the same issues motivating 
and challenging the creation of seasteads, namely elections and sovereignty, can 
challenge creating special jurisdictions, such as SeaZones. But the nested 
institutional framework is more than simply a potential limitation for these projects. 
It is their enabling factor. In the Floating Island, it was the Memorandum with 
French Polynesia which granted initial legitimacy to the Floating Island as a 
possible decentralising system. However, it was during the peak of waves and 
internal processes within Polynesia, the place whose governance Blue Frontiers 
would to decentralise, that the attempt to create the Floating Island faded away.  
 
To restate this best practice: creating special jurisdictions and other extraterritorial 
systems, including floating islands, needs to take the implications of complex 
governance, nested governance systems and multiple levels of stakeholders, and 
what they care for, into account. Extraterritorial projects, regardless of their specific 
extraterritoriality should pay close attention to and engage with diverse 
stakeholders at several levels; formal and informal, government and non-
government, local and global, but especially local. 
  
Best Practice no. 4. Splicing levels together  and thinking through territory   
Projects nested within nation-states that seek to decentralise governance, like the 
SeaZone, should seek a ‘true’ middle ground between existing hierarchical 
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institutions and the decentralisation of governance they are after. This means 
recognising the hybrid nature of these systems and using strategies that involve 
both bottom-up and top-down governance systems. This means dealing with the 
entire spectrum of governance: hierarchal and heterarchical structures, fixed, 
adaptive and flexible processes, decentralised, distributed and centralised 
systems, and also with bottom-up and top-down control, local and global 
interactions, self-organisation, alternative and traditional governance. Being aware 
of the complexity of a project’s governance and framework can lead to better 
strategies. Rather than privileging one or other levels, the challenge for future 
complex governance projects will be to splice the levels together, to find ways of 
merging more traditional governance (often top-down) systems and new forms of 
governance. This entails dealing with traditional systems and their issues, such as 
elections, but without forgetting the more global vision of a project.  
 
The Floating Island Project in particular did not do that. While seeking to distance 
from traditional modes of governance, it focused too much on project participants 
who were removed from the Project’s possible location and whose concerns were 
more focused on autonomous governance than environmental issues, the 
location’s concern. In the Floating Island, we can approach this as a question of 
nestedness and autonomy, a problem of the particular extraterritorialities of the 
Project.  
 
Given nestedness, the Floating island Project’s autonomy to act as a SeaZone 
would have depended on the extent to which it was allowed to physically (with the 
floating island) and legally (with the special regulatory framework) nest within 
Polynesia while not being detached from its legal and physical infrastructure, and 
the nested institutional framework surrounding it. But it seems from this case study 
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that, because of nestedness, the more extraterritorial a governance system is, the 
more institutions it has to ‘navigate, the more regulations it must untangle.  This 
adds to the already challenging introduction of a foreign, legal, digital and spatial 
extraterritory in a place where people manifested to have different concerns from 
Blue Frontiers and average seasteaders. It is almost impossible at this point not to 
remind readers that even if projects are partly driven by a digital and spatial 
extraterritorial component and are aware of their international support, territoriality 
is still important because these extraterritorial projects can only exist in relation to 
geographical space.  
 
Cases like this one show that the way projects engage with topics such as 
nationality and territory of origin should be crafted carefully. Practitioners should 
be aware that, despite globalisation, or because we live in a globalising world, there 
are underlying power dynamics in almost everything we do, including the 
messages we send about how we see projects moving forward. This is particularly 
true for where a location’s nationality and culture significantly differ from those of 
the company leading a project. This takes me to my next point.  
 
Best Practice No. 5 Crafting a coherence in message  
In the literature which spurred the Floating Island Project, a key concept is that 
using water as the territory would lead to bottom-up, better forms of governance. 
However, in this case study, the plans for the SeaZone did not differ much from 
top-down, centralised governance, despite the aim of having water as its territory. 
This happened, among other reasons, because the Project was approached in a 
very centralised way. Blue Frontiers sought to have a monopoly of the Project and 
its view on water: its operation, infrastructure, construction and, most importantly, 
its governance. The emphasis on governance did not match what water signified 
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for residents of Tahiti. Sea-level rise, which lead to the opportunity in Polynesia, 
was not a core part of the Project’s public-facing vision, outside of Polynesian-
focused marketing. 
 
The confusing message was clear. While sea-level rise was present in some of the 
Project’s documents and marketing materials (see Blue Frontiers, n.d.-c; 2018e), 
an in-depth exploration of these suggested that this concern was more an 
afterthought arising from conversations with the Polynesian government, rather 
than an objective core to the project’s governance mission. Before the Project 
faded, scholars such as Ranghanatan (2019) had highlighted this and criticised the 
Project for its toned-down libertarianism. Ranghanathan (2019) contrasts the 
“politically neutral” view of the Floating Island with an initial writing on a 
Seasteading Institute letter for contacting potential host nations. She contrasts the 
letter’s very radical message to Blue Frontier's more moderated version for the 
Floating Island Project: 
 
Several high profile technology billionaires in the United States have 
advocated for the formation of legally independent territories, to 
promote new economic and social opportunities. These include Peter 
Thiel, co-founder of our nonprofit think tank, The Seasteading Institute, 
which promotes the creation of independently -governed floating cities 
– seasteads – to experiment with policies and technologies that could 
spur economic development around the world. I would like to set up a 
meeting with you. 
(TSI, 2014: 45). 
 
 
   
 
264 
The waves of events that pervaded the Floating Island reflected followed-up the 
mismatch highlighted by Ranghanathan.  
 
It is, therefore, best for special jurisdictions to coherently link their goals with steps 
to get there. If there is a social mission behind a project that involves stakeholders 
different from those making a project, it must be its core rather than a rhetorical 
tool for local support. If there is not a social reason as part of a project’s mission, 
then projects should try to avoid adding something that is not true to their interests. 
This makes messaging much more straight-forward and creates an easier to digest 
image for non-ideologically aligned individuals.  
 
Here, the offer to prioritise 25% of the Floating Island’s residences to Polynesians 
did not change that, on average, the ‘matters of care’ -using Puig de la Bellacasa’s 
(2017) notion, of Polynesians and seasteaders tend to be different. This explains 
why the 25% measure for Polynesian residents was perceived as superficial and 
not as a true community engagement strategy. This had more weight than  
international marketing, initial government support and beautiful architecture.   
 
One way to craft a simpler message, for a SeaZone specifically, could be to focus 
on the real estate aspect, rather than emphasising on specific governance features 
that projects will deploy.  Concepts such as freedom and decentralisation, while 
popular among governance niches and particular political economies, are not very 
friendly for governments. They make otherwise feasible projects with governance 
impact less digestible. Starting with small goals is, thus, more desirable. For 
example, one can propose creating a sustainable floating co-working/co-living 
space where entrepreneurs can work on blockchain and sustainability projects, 
such as carbon credits. This vision sells easier than decentralising governance and 
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helping communities adapt to sea-level rise. Having specific goals facilitates this 
messaging.  
 
It is especially important, when the governance framework is complex, ambiguous, 
tangled, has multiple stakeholders and digital, spatial and legal aspects, for 
SeaZones and special jurisdictions in general to be particularly clear in stating what 
they want. If projects are not coherently crafted, they can sink in the midst of 
contradictions similar to those faced by the Floating Island. To name one example: 
the Floating Island Project sought to create more diversity in forms of governance 
by placing human settlements on the ocean. However, it targeted a particular type 
of demographic, taking few, minor steps to engage with the cultural diversity of the 
desired location. It seemed as if the desire for diversity in governance did not 
translate into cultural diversity in the Project’s creation. Even when projects aim for 
forms of governance based on deterritorialisation and extraterritorialities, they 








8.4. Contributions  
This is the first doctoral thesis about the only attempt, so far, to create a floating 
Special Economic Zone, and the first one to study a SeaZone or seasteading-like 
project, from a complex system perspective. More specifically, I have used the 
complex governance field to understand and describe several aspects of the 
Floating Island Project, including its proposed form of governance, creation and 
fading. In doing so, I showed with empirical evidence the presence of several 
features of complex governance in the case study. These features were namely 
nested institutions, multiple levels of stakeholders and waves of cross-temporal 
events. Therefore, this thesis bridged the gap between the literature of special 
jurisdictions and complexity by bringing out fundamental features of complex 
systems which matter when creating floating Special Economic Zones. In doing 
this, the thesis made several original contributions, many of them to the field of 
complex governance.  
 
In identifying and being able to conceptually describe and understand these 
phenomena, the thesis’ main contribution to knowledge was to identify various 
legal, institutional, political, social, cultural economic, historic and environmental 
issues relating to the Floating Island that are encountered when trying to set up an 
new form of governance and a floating island. I shall, however, note that, by 
assuming that SeaZones exhibit complex governance features, I also assumed 
that there were complexity science approaches to understanding how we might 
begin to make sense of a series of events and processes that shaped the Floating 
Island Project. Ironically, the fading of the Floating Island helped me understand 
the scholarship of the complex governance field, where only a handful of 
publications discussed special jurisdictions from a complex systems perspective. 
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This is because the case study showed that, to a large extent, new forms of 
governance emerging in parallel to or within nation-states are still almost entirely 
under their control and influence. The prominence of traditional governance 
systems, such as elections and the nation-state, over the Floating Island goes a 
long way to explain why the complex governance field has not paid sufficient 
attention to special jurisdictions, such as SeaZones and Special Zones. 
 
This thesis extended the complex governance field by examining a form of 
governance not yet fully explored by the literature, SeaZones. Thus, a second 
contribution of the thesis, specific to the complex governance field, was to expand 
the field by using a framework composed by particular features of complex systems 
(nestedness, waves, multiple levels of stakeholders) in relation to a form of 
governance that the field had not yet studied. The thesis showed how the case 
study exhibited key characteristics pointed out in the literature when dealing with 
complex governance: intertwined levels of multiple governance institutions and 
dealing with regulations that in many cases are tangled. The research also showed 
how multiple levels of diverse stakeholders were involved in the creation, 
governance and fading of the SeaZone.  
 
Through the use of complex governance, I was additionally able to explain different 
ways in which the Floating Island and SeaZone concerned different demographics. 
This is important for the complex governance field because it shows the impact 
and influence that multiple levels of stakeholders, and their various perspectives of 
what they want, can have over the creation of a special jurisdiction or a project that 
involves floating architecture. That said, this and many of this thesis’ findings also 
apply for land-based special jurisdictions.  
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The framework, and the concept of waves, additionally provided evidence showing 
the impact of history-dependence when creating a complex governance 
system. Now, it is not a new finding to argue that socio-political systems involve 
multi-level stakeholders or that they are nested. Nor is it novel to argue that a series 
of ‘waves’ shaped the events that were to unfold; Sylvia Walby has made this point 
already. However, it is novel to bring these aspects together specifically in relation 
to SeaZones and the creation of special jurisdictions and floating projects.  
 
Indeed, this thesis also contributed to the field of seasteading, and the emerging 
field of special jurisdictions, by investigating, from a complex systems perspective, 
the governance, stakeholders, and even problems that arise in the planning and 
attempt to set up a SeaZone. Figuring out what happens when trying to take one 
a seasteading-like project in territorial waters from design to implementation had 
not been done before. Therefore, the third thesis contribution, specifically relating 
to the fields of seasteading and SeaZones, is to have found complex systems-
related factors that affect their creation. Moreover, no one had yet reflected in a 
scholarly way on what shaped the fading of the Floating Island Project. Neither had 
there been a scholarly piece that explained why the presumed logical pass from 
SeaZones in territorial waters to seasteading in international waters is not as 
simple as several authors in the field believe. This is one way in which the thesis 
pushes the boundaries of knowledge in in seasteading. After all, seasteads 
measure autonomy by the possibility to choose and detach from a governance 
service provider. But on SeaZones, movements of floating houses are just a matter 
of changing neighbours, not governments. Dynamic geography  floating zones 
cannot occur with only one because that means there is only a single SeaZone 
Authority to choose from. Hence why here I showed how autonomy in a SeaZone 
strongly depends on enclaved extraterritoriality, even though extraterritoriality 
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depends on autonomy too because without a certain autonomy, extraterritorial 
special jurisdictions do not exist. Thus, we then have a chicken and egg problem. 
It is this same nestedness that, in a way, challenges creating autonomy via 
extraterritorialities which also makes creating a floating special jurisdictions and 
other Startup Societies worth pursuing. 
 
Now, in relation to Zones, an important contribution of this thesis is to unfold new 
factors that can play a part in the successful creation or lack of success of a special 
jurisdiction and floating island. Specifically in relation to zones, the zone literature 
previous to this research (Farole, 2011; Moberg, 2015a) had previously identified 
several factors determine the success in creation of special jurisdictions. For the 
World Bank (FIAS, 2008:51), the success of a Zone depends on its legal framework 
and on the incentives for private Zone developers and operators. It also explains 
that it depends on the integration of the Zone within the economy of the host 
country and its correlation with national policy frameworks (FIAS, 2008). Other 
factors found in the literature include the characteristics of the location (Nema and 
Pokhariyal, 2008), infrastructure and proximity to urban hubs (Pradeep and 
Pradeep, 2008; Farole and Akinci, 2011), and Zones’ openness to professionals 
from everywhere in the world (Yuan and Eden, 1992). Factors that make Zones 
unsuccessful, which previous literature identified, include not offering enough fiscal 
incentives, having incompetent administrative bodies, lacking operational 
autonomy and offering incentives such as subsidises for rent (FIAS, 2008). 
 
This thesis was first in providing additional, complexity-based reasons that can 
determine whether a zone project and floating island succeeds in moving from 
design to implementation. In a nutshell, this is how well do the  developers manage 
to understand that they are dealing with a complex governance system and, 
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consequently, how do they choose to strategically navigate nested institutional 
frameworks, engage with stakeholders in multiple levels and are able to try to 
prevent, to the extent to which it is possible, waves that might surface in the 
creation of these projects.  
 
Additionally, in most of these cases, success in the literature tends to be 
determined from the perspective of the jurisdiction creators, not the local 
population. This thesis distances from the majority of the literature that discusses 
creating these type of projects by linking success to how much a project benefits a 
local population. That said, the thesis also recognized the limitations of my own 
perspective, as an outsider, to determine what the local population in this case 
considered as success.   
 
In brief, research like this one advances knowledge in three main ways. First, by 
examining a new kind of case study and form of governance, the Floating Island 
Project and the SeaZone. Second, by using the features of complex system theory 
nestedness, multilevel stakeholders and waves to better understand the 
governance and ‘fading’ of the Floating Island, the first attempt to make a floating 
Special Economic Zone. Thus the research directly expands two, if not three, fields, 
complex governance, zones and seasteading.  
 
8.5. Concluding Remarks and Future Work 
 
This empirical investigation allowed me to identify various legal, institutional, 
political, social, cultural, social, economic historic and environmental issues that 
are encountered when trying to set up an alternative form of governance and 
floating island. In doing this, I pointed out, from a complex systems perspective, 
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key issues that appeared in the governance, creation and demise of an alternative 
form of governance that is often in the media despite that no SeaZone exists yet. 
This thesis, thus, extended the knowledge about a type of governance that had not 
been explored in the literature of complex governance. More precisely, the thesis 
expanded the complex governance field by showing how features of complex 
systems - nestedness, multiple levels and waves - shaped the governance, 
creation and fading in this attempt to establish a SeaZone. The complexity 
perspective on the Floating Island Project also provides a new angle, about the 
case study and SeaZones, new to the literature about seasteading. It also seeks 
to call for an ethical perspective for acting in similar projects with more 
responsibility. I want to summarise this research’s significance through a nautical 
analogy:  
 
The field of floating special economic zones and special jurisdictions on floating 
islands, SeaZones, is new. We are in new waters. These waters are turbulent and 
have not been explored. There is no map for them. This research did not make the 
map. However, it explained some parts of the boat, of their assemblage, of the 
ocean, and how they relate. More importantly, the research also found rocks and 
icebergs that future boats could crash into by explaining the intertwined, 
environment-sensitive and history-dependent nature of these rocks and icebergs. 
Therefore, this research can help future projects and local communities create 
better boats to navigate the complexity of these new waters and the waves. This 
research is key for future alike projects, despite that, today, projects similar to the 
Floating Island are blips on the world’s radar. However, in the coming years and 
decades, we will see other innovative maritime projects with special regulations.  
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More likely than not, SeaZones, floating cities and seasteads will see the light of 
day. Once set up, they will be worth millions, if not billions, of dollars, and will be 
home to millions of people. They will create and transform, on a systemic level, 
some cities and, by extension, governance and urbanisation as we know them 
today. Then, the importance of cases like the Floating Island, and the results of not 
understanding the implications of dealing with complex governance systems, could 
become tragic. And while today, self-governed private communities floating on the 
ocean sound closer to science fiction, legal, digital and spatial extraterritorialities 
are rapidly becoming more popular. This applies for floating real estate and 
architecture, floating islands and zones.   
 
In 2019 alone, there were 500 new Special Economic Zones in development 
(UNCTAD, 2019:xiii). China is also working on a $4 trillion projects connecting 100 
Special Zones in Asia, Europe and Africa, the Belt and Road Initiative. Added to 
that, economic projections for the market size of the blue economy are around 24 
trillion (Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2015:5). Moreover, today there are serious 
engagements for creating new spaces to inhabit and the number of companies 
working on them is growing. Some companies, like SpaceX, are even NASA-
backed, and have clear intentions for terraforming Mars, others for creating lunar 
colonies and underwater research stations. There have also been government-led 
and private capital-led ideas for buying sovereignty in territories from other 
countries. One example is Kiribati. This Pacific Island nation bought land on Fiji for 
climate refugees. And while ideas such as Trump’s 2019 suggestion to buy 
Greenland from Denmark was not taken seriously, Prince Michael from 
Liechtestein (2019) recalls that buying land used to be a legitimate state strategy 
for expansion. When seeing altogether, or better or worse, these extraterritoriality 
attempts cannot be ignored.  
 




Works like this one provide examples of problems that emerge in new, water-based 
urbanisation trends. As such, this research can help future SeaZone projects, local 
communities other special jurisdictions and Startup Societies avoid erring in the 
same way as the Floating Island. It can be used to better understand the behaviour 
of the currents, tides, waters and the coasts where these boats will anchor in. 
Becoming familiar with the waves is as fundamental as being familiar with the 
coasts. After all, this thesis showed that the autonomy of these floating special 
jurisdictions is dependent on the will of the nation they are enclaves in. And while 
technically projects can legally exist through a state’s approval, it is green light of 
the population what legitimates them.  
 
Some areas of future work derived from the thesis can engage with tensions 
present in the case study, but which I did not explore here (extraterritoriality, path-
dependency, self-organisation, diversity, etc.). They could also approach the case 
study from angles I did not emphasise here. One of them is how the Floating Island 
reflected critiques made to seasteading before. Authors such as Simpson (2016b), 
for instance, had criticised that the seasteading demographic of supporters is 
mostly composed by men. The Floating Island reflected this. Blue Frontiers, 
indeed, had no CEO, but five male managing directors, all with equal decision-
making power.  
 
To avoid repeating this and other power dynamics which surfaced in different 
aspects of the case study, I am particularly interested in engaging with a different 
approach to floating islands and maritime projects by looking at them as part of an 
integrated approach to understand environmental issues. These approaches 
would not only consider governance, potential tenants and territories but also the 
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meanings given by the peoples who neighbour and inhabit them. With this in mind, 
someone can decide to expand on the thesis’ recommendations by exploring how 
complex governance can better inform inclusive climate action. This can happen 
when projects have environmental missions that are part of their cores and create, 
for instance, maritime or coastal Zones dedicated exclusively to sustainable issues 
or to blue cleantech. These type of Zones could become hubs for planning and 
designing sea-level rise adaptation and governance in ways that benefit all 
stakeholders, human and non-humans, involved.   
 
This topic could not be of greater  importance today. Many special jurisdictions are 
planned on greenfield zones where ‘no one’ lives. In the case of water, I have 
shown how  even when there are no humans living on a plot of water,  there are 
human neighbours, stakeholders, nearby. But I do not want to close this thesis 
without pushing this idea forward, restating what I hinted somewhere in the thesis. 
This is the idea that zone projects need to put at the centre non-human 
stakeholders too. For this, we need to plan and execute projects in ways 
permeated by preconditions of care for our world. I use in the same way of Puig de 
la Bellacasa’s (2017:198) perspective when she quotes Tronto and Fisher: 
‘everything that we do to maintain, continue and repair “our world” so that we can 
live in it as well as possible. That world includes our bodies, ourselves, and our 
environment, all of which we seek to interweave in a complex, life sustaining web’ 
(Tronto, 1993: 103 (her emphasis).”  
 
But caring, as Puig de la Bellacasa adds, “is more than an affective-ethical state: 
it involves material engagement in labours to sustain interdependent worlds, 
labours that are often associated with exploitation and domination…the meanings 
of caring are not straightforward. Interdependency is not a contract but a condition; 
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even a pre-condition” (Puig de la Bellacasa, 2017:198). With this in mind, the 
projects we participate in are an opportunity to actively intervene in favour of 
neglected, excluded stakeholders of the globalising world; those who cannot speak 
nor stand for themselves, or those who can’t but won’t, human and, especially non-
human. Their wellbeing can, and should, be at the centre of our projects, our 
governance, our economics, our architecture.   
 
That said, this research will, indeed, guide my own practice when doing business 
development for floating architecture and Special Jurisdiction projects after the 
PhD. I have now set up my own company and have named it Seaphia, a 
combination of “sea” and the Ancient Greek word for wisdom, “sophia” (Σοφία). 
With this name, I hint the type of services my company will provide. I will bring to 
the space the type of wisdom that comes when you operate under similar principles 
to this thesis’ best practices. For Seaphia, I have understood, as this research has 
shown, that the success of floating innovative developments lies on: a) projects 
bring led by locals, b) trust and reputation of the parties and members involved, c) 
good government relationships, d) economic self-sufficiency and e) a well-scouted 
location. However, a good location not only means favourable geography, weather, 
tides, waves and other oceanographic conditions. For a project to have a good 
location, locals need to be onboard and its future neighbours, human and non-
human, should directly benefit from it. With this, there is no need for a map. The 
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